Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Employee's petition for review challenging the validity of Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment, holding that the offer was valid under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.475(8).Under section 616C.475(8), an employer may offer temporary, light-duty employment to an injured employee instead of paying temporary total disability benefits. In this case, Employee argued that the location, schedule, wages, and duties of the offered temporary employment as a secretary was not substantially similar to Employee's pre-injury position as a fire captain. The Supreme Court held (1) the offered employment here was substantially similar to the pre-injury position as to both schedule and number of hours, as well as wages, benefits, and location, and thus, Employer's offer of temporary, light-duty employment was reasonable and complied with section 616C.475(8); and (2) therefore, Employee's temporary total disability benefits were properly terminated. View "Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a preliminary injunction based on a blue-penciled noncompetition agreement, holding that Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 159 (Nev. 2016), does not prohibit a district court from blue-penciling an unreasonable noncompetition agreement if the agreement allows for it.Defendants signed an employment contract containing a blue-penciling provision providing that, if any provision is found to be unreasonable by the court, the provision shall be enforceable to the extent the court deemed it unreasonable. When Defendants quit their employment and began work elsewhere, Plaintiff filed a complaint to enforce the agreement, alleging that Defendants violated the agreement's noncompetition clause. The district court found that the noncompetition agreement was overbroad and blue-penciled it. The court then granted Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce the revised agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the noncompetition agreement had a blue-penciling provision, the district court did not abuse its discretion by blue-penciling the noncompetition agreement and enforcing the revised agreement. View "Duong v. Fielden Hanson Isaacs Miyada Robison Yeh, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that NAC 281.305(1)(a) is a jurisdictional rule that exceeds the rulemaking authority of the Nevada Department of Administration's Personnel Commission.NAC 281.305(1)(a) provides that a state officer or employee claiming whistleblower protection must file a whistleblower appeal within ten workdays of the alleged retaliation or reprisal. The Personnel Commission promulgated the rule under Nev. Rev. Stat. 281.641(5), which provides that the Personnel Commission may adopt procedural rules for whistleblower appeal hearings. Approximately eight months after the Nevada Department of Transportation's (NDOT) fired him, John Bronder filed a whistleblower appeal alleging that his termination was retaliation for whistleblower activity. NDOT filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Bronder's appeal was untimely by several months. The hearing officer concluded that the ten-day rule is invalid and ordered NDOT to reinstate Bronder's probationary employment. The district court denied NDOT's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that NAC 281.305(1)(a) is a jurisdictional, rather than a procedural, rule and is thus invalid. View "State, Department of Transportation v. Bronder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Clark County's petition for judicial review of the decision of an appeals officer reversing Clark County's denial of a retiree's claim for ongoing partial disability benefits, holding that the appeals officer correctly found that the retiree was entitled to benefits based on the wages he was earning at the time he retired.Brent Bean worked as a Clark County firefighter and retired in 2011. In 2014, Bean was diagnosed with prostate cancer and had part of his prostate removed. Clark County rejected Bean's claim for occupational disease benefits insofar as it sought ongoing permanent partial disability benefits, concluding that because Bean was retired at the time he became permanently partially disabled, he was not earning wages upon which to base a permanent partial disability benefits award. The appeals officer reversed, and the district court rejected Clark County's petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer correctly found that compensation for Bean's permanent partial disability rating must be based on the wages he was earning at the time of his retirement. View "Clark County v. Bean" on Justia Law

In this appeal regarding the scope of the law-enforcement exception to the "going and coming rule" in workers' compensation matters the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing the decision of the appeals officer, holding that the appeals officer's decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the officer's accident.Plaintiff, a police officer, was struck by another vehicle during his drive home from work. Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for the injuries he sustained in the accident. His claim was denied. On appeal, the appeals officer also denied the claim, concluding that Plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of his employment. The district court granted Plaintiff's petition for judicial review and concluded that Plaintiff's accident indeed arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court must look to the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis in determining whether the law-enforcement exception to the going and coming rule applies; and (2) Plaintiff qualified for the law-enforcement exception under the totality of the circumstances test. View "Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that service of a petition for judicial review of an agency's decision does not require personal service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a) because a petition for judicial review is best construed as a post-complaint filing so an alternative method of service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b) will suffice.After Patricia DeRosa was fired by the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), DeRosa requested a hearing. The hearing officer reversed the NDOC's decision. NDOC filed a petition for judicial review and served the petition on DeRosa by mailing it to her counsel under Rule 5(b). DeRosa moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal service. The district court granted the motion, concluding that personal service was necessary under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a petition for judicial review is best construed as a post-complaint pleading and that personal service is unnecessary and an alternative method of service under Rule 5(b) will instead suffice. View "State, Department of Corrections v. DeRosa" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing the decision of the appeals officer denying benefits to Respondent, holding that the plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.366(1) did not exclude the possibility of benefits for hearing loss when at least part of Respondent's current hearing disability was attributable to some level of hearing loss before he began his job that made the hearing loss worse.While serving as a police officer for the City of Henderson, Respondent suffered progressive hearing loss to the point where he was assigned to desk duty. Respondent sought compensation under Nev. Rev. Stat. 617.430 and .440, which entitle employees to workers' compensation benefits if they suffer a disability caused by an "occupational disease." Because Respondent already had some level of hearing loss, perhaps genetically induced, before his employment as a police officer, the appeals officer denied benefits. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer applied the relevant statutes incorrectly as a matter of law. View "City of Henderson v. Spangler" on Justia Law

In this case involving workers' compensation for "traveling" employees the Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants' petition for judicial review of the denial of their request for workers' compensation benefits, holding that the appeals officer failed to apply Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.612(3).Jason Buma died in an ATV accident while on a required business trip for Respondent, his employer. Appellants, Buma's wife and daughter, filed a workers' compensation claim for workers' compensation benefits. Respondent denied the claim. The hearing officer affirmed, concluding that Buma's death occurred during an activity that was not part of his work duties. The appeals officer affirmed the denial, and the district court denied judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) under section 616B.612(3), a traveling employee is under his employer's control for the duration of his business trip; and (2) because the appeals officer failed to apply the statute the case is remanded for reevaluation under the correct standards. View "Buma v. Providence Corp. Development" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court awarding attorney fees in a wrongful termination suit, holding that because Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim rested on a novel yet arguable construction of the limitations period the district court should not have awarded attorney fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b).Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination more than two years after she was terminated. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(4)(e) applied and that the wrongful termination period had expired. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and awarded Defendant attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred; but (2) because this Court has not previously addressed the appropriate limitations period for a wrongful termination claim, Plaintiff's argument presented a matter of first impression, and therefore, the district court should not have awarded attorney fees on the basis that Plaintiff's claim was untimely filed and thus groundless under Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010(2)(b). View "Patush v. Las Vegas Bistro" on Justia Law

In this claim for workers' compensation benefits the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court affirming the appeals officer's decisions as to compensability and liability and reversing as to the award amount, holding that the liability determination and award amount determination were improper.Plaintiff sought benefits after her husband died as a result of heart disease. The decedent's former employer and its former insurer denied benefits. The appeals officer reversed, concluding that the decedent's death was caused by a compensable occupational heart disease, that his employer was liable as the self-insurer, and that the amount of the claim was based on the decedent's income from his private employer at the time of death. The district court reversed in part, concluding that the award should be based on the decedent's wages on the date of disablement, or death, which were zero. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the last injurious exposure rule determines the liable insurer for an occupational disease claim that arose out of and in the course of employment even if the employee no longer works for that employer; and (2) death benefits should have been based on the decedent's wages at the time he last worked for the employer. View "Demaranville v. Employers Insurance Co. of Nevada" on Justia Law