Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a $30,880 judgment covering backpay and pre-judgment interest was entered against Oakridge Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC, for its age and disability discrimination against a former employee, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101. Oakridge Rehab had already gone out of business and transferred the assets and operation of its nursing home facility to Oakridge Healthcare Center, LLC in 2012. Unable to enforce the judgment against Oakridge Rehab, the state instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment against Oakridge Healthcare.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Oakridge Healthcare, declining to adopt the federal successor liability doctrine in cases arising under the Human Rights Act. The court noted four limited exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for corporate successors and declined to apply the fraudulent purpose exception, which exists “where the transaction is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for the seller’s obligations.” The court stated that it is within the legislature’s power to abrogate the common-law rule of successor nonliability or otherwise alter its standards through appropriately targeted legislation for employment discrimination cases. View "Department of Human Rights v. Oakridge Healthcare Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The Police Union sued the City of Chicago for failing to destroy records of police misconduct that were more than five years old, as required under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator held that the CBA should prevail and directed the parties to come to an agreement regarding the destruction of the documents.The circuit court rejected the award. The appellate court agreed, finding requiring the city to destroy all records related to alleged police misconduct without consideration of whether the records have administrative, legal, research, or historical value ignored the requirements of the Local Records Act (50 ILCS 205) and resulted in diminishing the Local Records Commission’s authority to determine what records should be destroyed or maintained. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The arbitration award violated an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy. Although the city could comply with the Local Records Act by submitting disciplinary records to the Commission, that is not required under the CBA. Submission to the Commission is only part of the statutory procedures a local government must follow under the Act. The most crucial aspect is compliance with the Commission’s ultimate decision regarding the retention or destruction of the government records. View "City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7" on Justia Law

The Pension Code allowed elected county board members to participate in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) if the participant occupied a position requiring 1000 hours of service annually and the public employee filed an election to participate. A 1968 administrative rule required the governing body of a participating employer to adopt a resolution certifying that the position of elected governing body members required the hourly standard. Williamson County complied with the 1968 rule. The plaintiffs satisfied the original requirements for IMRF participation, electing to participate in 2004, 2008, and 2012. In 2016, Public Act 99-900, amended parts of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7-137.2(a), requiring, for the first time, that all county boards certify within 90 days of each general election that their board members were required to work sufficient hours to meet the hourly standard for participation and that members who participate in IMRF submit monthly timesheets. The Fund issued “Special Memorandum #334” to the authorized IMRF agent in every county, explaining the change: “If the County Board fails to adopt the required IMRF participation resolution within 90 days after an election, the entire Board will become ineligible and IMRF participation will end for those Board members.” The Fund also sent a direct mailing to individual county board members participating in IMRF. Williamson County did not timely adopt the required resolution. The Fund notified the plaintiffs that they were not eligible for continued IMRF participation.The Illinois Supreme Court found Public Act 99-900 invalid under Illinois Constitution article XIII, section 5. A public employee’s membership in a pension system is an enforceable contractual relationship; continued IMRF participation was protected from unilateral legislative diminishment or impairment when the plaintiffs became IMRF participants and began accruing the service credits. View "Williamson County Board of Commissioners v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund" on Justia Law

The School Code provides that school districts must grant full-time teachers paid sick leave of at least 10 days in each school year. Unused sick days accumulate. Sick leave means "personal illness, quarantine at home, serious illness or death in the immediate family or household, or birth, adoption, or placement for adoption. The school board may require a certificate from a physician ... as a basis for pay during leave after an absence of 3 days for personal illness or 30 days for birth,” 105 ILCS 5/24-6.Dynak, a full-time teacher, gave birth by scheduled caesarian section on June 6, 2016. The District approved her use of accumulated paid sick leave on June 6 and 7, the last day of the school year. The District approved her request for 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, (FMLA) 29 U.S.C. 2601, beginning on August 18, the first day of the next school year. The District denied her request to use paid sick leave for the first 28.5 days of her FMLA leave. Dynak did not submit a physician’s certificate to substantiate a medical need for additional paid sick leave.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Dynak’s suit; "there is no evidence ... that the legislature intended to create a vested right in an employee to take paid sick leave on any days the employee chooses.“ Sick leave for birth must be interpreted in the same manner as sick leave for other events listed in section 24-6. If a teacher gives birth during the school year, she must use her accumulated sick leave to take paid time off for the birth. If a teacher gives birth just before or during a summer break, however, the teacher has no need to use her accumulated sick days. View "Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7" on Justia Law

Ammons and Riley sued Wisconsin Central under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, for injuries they sustained when the train they were operating struck another train. Both alleged Wisconsin Central was negligent in violating various rules and regulations, which resulted in their injuries. Wisconsin Central alleged that plaintiffs failed to exercise ordinary care and that multiple locomotives, railroad cars, track, and track structures sustained significant damage, which caused it to spend significant amounts of money to repair, perform environmental cleanup and remediation, and incur other incidental and consequential damages. Wisconsin Central sought damages in excess of $1 million.Section 55 of the FELA prohibits “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from liability.” Section 60 prohibits “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee.” Plaintiffs argued that Wisconsin Central’s counterclaims constituted a “device” designed to exempt itself from liability to pay damages to injured employees, to deter railroad employees from providing information regarding injury or death of an employee, or both.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the counterclaim was not prohibited, citing the employer’s long-standing right to sue its employees for negligence, the statute's plain language, and federal court decisions. Unlike a contractual agreement or a release, a counterclaim does not extinguish a plaintiff’s FELA cause of action or exempt the railroad employer from liability. View "Ammons v. Canadian National Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District entered into a contract with the Joint Venture, for the “Primary Settling Tanks and Grit Removal Facilities” project to be carried out at the Calumet water reclamation plant. Under the contract, the Joint Venture was responsible to determine the procedures and methods for the work and furnish all temporary structures and safety equipment and was responsible for the safety of all personnel on the worksite. The contract required the Joint Venture to submit plans for the work to the District’s engineer but state that the engineer’s acceptance of the plans did not relieve the Joint Venture of its responsibility for safety, maintenance, and repairs on the project. Andrews, a Joint Venture employee, suffered severe, career-ending head injuries while working on the project.In a suit alleging construction negligence, willful and wanton construction negligence, and loss of consortium, the District alleged immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201). The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the District was not entitled to summary judgment of immunity. The Act immunizes a local governmental entity from liability for injuries arising out of its employee’s acts or omissions while determining policy and exercising discretion. The District did not provide evidence that its employees made discretionary or policy decisions with respect to the two-ladder configuration that resulted in Andrews’s injuries. Seven witnesses testified that no District employees weighed in on worksite safety decisions. View "Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago" on Justia Law

Roberts sued City Colleges of Chicago following his termination as director of medical programs at Malcolm X College, alleging retaliatory discharge, violation of section 20 of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/20), and wrongful termination. City Colleges gave no reason for his termination, which followed his complaints about the use of unqualified instructors. The circuit court dismissed the retaliatory discharge and Whistleblower Act counts with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s Whistleblower Act claim but reversed the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the Whistleblower Act claim but reinstated the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. Roberts did not establish that his termination violated a clearly mandated public policy; he failed to allege sufficient facts to conclude that the use of the instructors put federal funding at risk. Section 20 of the Whistleblower Act requires that an employee refuse to participate “in an activity that would result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” The complaint lacked sufficient facts to conclude that appointment of the instructors violated the standards of a recognized accrediting agency or misrepresented the nature of its educational program or employability of its students. View "Roberts v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Jane and her parents, sued two individuals and several entities including and affiliated with the United Church of Christ (UCC) after Jane was sexually assaulted by a youth pastor. Plaintiffs alleged that the First Congregational Church of Dundee (FCCD) and its pastor, James, negligently and willfully and wantonly hired, supervised, and retained FCCD’s director of youth ministries, Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice. All counts of the second amended complaint were dismissed as against FCCD and James. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the striking of portions of the plaintiffs’ complaint but reinstated all counts of the complaint. The stricken statements concerned FCCD’s and James’s post-assault actions, which do not support plaintiffs’ claims of an ongoing conscious disregard for Jane’s welfare or a pattern of conduct prior to the assault nor do they make it more likely or less likely that they acted negligently before the assault. The negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention counts were reinstated, as were the willful and wanton counts inasmuch as they overlap with the negligent supervision counts but not to the extent they overlap with the negligent retention counts. View "Doe v. Coe" on Justia Law

The 2007 Act, 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10), amended the Pension Code, which governs the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS): An officer or employee of a statewide teachers’ union was permitted to establish TRS service credit if the individual: was certified as a teacher no later than February 27, 2007, applied to the TRS within six months, and paid into the system both the employee contribution and employer (state) contribution, plus interest, for his prior union service. Plaintiff worked as a union lobbyist from 1997 until his 2012 retirement. In 2006, plaintiff obtained a substitute teaching certificate. In January 2007, he worked one day as a substitute teacher. Within six months, plaintiff became a member of the TRS. Plaintiff then contributed $192,668 to the system for his union service. In 2011, the Chicago Tribune published an article, identifying plaintiff and criticizing the law that allowed him to qualify for a teacher’s pension. In response to the negative media coverage, the 2012 Act repealed the 2007 amendment and provided for a refund of contributions. TRS eliminated plaintiff’s service credits and refunded his contributions. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the retroactive repeal violated the state constitution’s pension protection clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII).The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The 2007 amendment's inclusion of a cutoff date did not render it unconstitutional special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV); the amendment applied generally to all eligible employees who met its criteria. Under the pension clause, “once a person commences to work and becomes a member of a public retirement system, any subsequent changes to the Pension Code that would diminish the benefits conferred by membership in the retirement system cannot be applied to that person.” View "Piccioli v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System" on Justia Law

The Property of Unincorporated Associations Act, 765 ILCS 115/2, requires a labor union to notify its members and obtain their approval before entering into an agreement to lease or purchase real estate. The circuit court held that an agreement is enforceable despite a union’s failure to follow these requirements because the Act is silent as to the consequences of noncompliance. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Where a party lacks the legal authority to form a contract, the resulting contract is void ab initio. Absent compliance with the statutory prerequisites, an unincorporated association has no power to execute a valid real estate contract. The apparent authority doctrine is not relevant. A contract that is void ab initio is treated as though it never existed and, thus, cannot be enforced by either party. View "1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700" on Justia Law