Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Georgia
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. JUSTICE
Richard Andrew Justice filed a claim against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) for breach of an employment contract, alleging that DPS failed to pay him for overtime hours as required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice argued that the FLSA provisions were incorporated into his employment contract. The central issue was whether Justice had demonstrated the existence of a written contract sufficient to overcome DPS’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.The trial court allowed limited discovery and reviewed documents submitted by Justice, including a written offer of employment and subsequent communications. The trial court ultimately granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, finding that the documents did not constitute a valid written contract and that there was no meeting of the minds regarding FLSA overtime compensation provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the documents did form a written contract that included FLSA provisions, thereby waiving sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that Justice had shown the existence of a written contract with DPS, which established a waiver of sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Georgia Constitution. The Court held that the question of whether the FLSA obligations were part of the written contract was a merits question, not a sovereign immunity question, and thus was not properly before the trial court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. JUSTICE" on Justia Law
NORTH AMERICAN SENIOR BENEFITS, LLC v. WIMMER
In 2018, North American Senior Benefits, LLC (NASB) entered into employment contracts with Ryan and Alisha Wimmer, which included a restrictive covenant prohibiting them from recruiting NASB employees for two years post-termination. In 2021, after the Wimmers left NASB and allegedly started a competing business, NASB sued to enforce the covenant. The Wimmers argued that the covenant was unenforceable due to the lack of an express geographic term.The Statewide Business Court agreed with the Wimmers and granted their motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding the covenant unenforceable without an express geographic term. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, relying on its prior ruling in CarpetCare Multiservices v. Carle, which held that a restrictive covenant must include an express geographic term to comply with OCGA § 13-8-53 (a). One judge dissented, arguing that the GRCA does not require an express geographic term for non-recruitment provisions.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court held that OCGA § 13-8-53 (a) does not mandate an express geographic term for a restrictive covenant to be enforceable. Instead, the statute requires that the restrictions be reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities. The Court emphasized that the reasonableness of a covenant's geographic scope should be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances, not solely on the presence of an express geographic term.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the non-recruitment provision under the GRCA. View "NORTH AMERICAN SENIOR BENEFITS, LLC v. WIMMER" on Justia Law
WORTH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TIBBETTS
The case involves John R. Tibbetts, a teacher, and his employer, the Worth County School District. The District offered Tibbetts a contract for the upcoming school year, but Tibbetts did not return the signed contract within the stipulated time. The District then informed Tibbetts that his employment would end when his current contract expired. Tibbetts sued the District for breach of contract, arguing that the offered contract did not comply with Georgia's statutory requirements for teacher contracts because it was missing terms and contained blanks. Therefore, he contended, his employment contract for the prior school year was renewed by operation of law.The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no existing written contract between the parties that operated to waive sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. The trial court found that the District offered Tibbetts a contract that complied with the statutory requirements, but that Tibbetts did not timely accept that offer.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It determined that the contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year failed to comply with the requirements of the statute; therefore, Tibbetts’s contract for the previous school year was renewed by operation of law and constituted a contract in writing. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Tibbetts’s claim was one for breach of a written contract, and sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to the ex contractu clause.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the District because the employment contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year satisfied the requirements of the statute. Because Tibbetts failed to timely accept this offer, no written contract exists to support Tibbetts’s claim for breach of a written contract. Absent such a claim, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to the ex contractu clause. View "WORTH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TIBBETTS" on Justia Law
Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC v. Cotton
In January 2018, Bianca Bouie was returning from her lunch break to her workplace, Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC, also known as University Childcare Center (“University Childcare”), when she looked away from the road to scroll through the contacts in her cell phone so that she could call her manager to report that she was running late. While Bouie was distracted, her car crossed the median and caused an accident with a truck that was driven by Andrea Cotton. Cotton filed a personal injury lawsuit against Bouie and later added University Childcare as a defendant, alleging, among other things, that Bouie was acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and that University Childcare was therefore liable under the legal theory of respondeat superior. University Childcare moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding, in pertinent part, that Bouie was not acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred. Cotton appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that under the “special circumstances exception” to the general rule that employees do not act in furtherance of an employer’s business and within the scope of employment when they are commuting to and from work or when they are on a lunch break, and under two of its cases applying that “exception,” there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to the issue of liability under respondeat superior. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ “special circumstances exception,” as well as the multi-factor test the court developed for applying that “exception.” The Supreme Court also concluded that the two cases on which the Court of Appeals relied in applying the “special circumstances exception” used imprecise language regarding the respondeat-superior test, and the Supreme Court disapproved such language. In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case to that court so that it could apply the proper respondeat-superior test in the first instance. View "Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC v. Cotton" on Justia Law
Motorsports of Conyers, LLC, et al. v. Burbach
The petitioners here—two motorcycle dealerships who sought to enforce restrictive covenants against a former employee under Florida law— asked the Georgia Supreme Court to reconsider the application of a public-policy exception, citing recent changes in Georgia law that required a more flexible and permissive approach to enforcing restrictive covenants. When contracting parties choose the law of a jurisdiction other than Georgia to govern their contractual relations, Georgia courts generally honored that choice unless applying the foreign law would violate Georgia's public policy. Having taken a fresh look, the Supreme Court concluded that Georgia law remained "the touchstone for determining whether a given restrictive covenant is enforceable in our courts, even where the contract says another state’s law applies." After a careful review of Georgia decisional law and statutory history in this space, the Court found the Georgia legislature has codified this view, including with the recent enactment of the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act. In this case, the trial court accepted the parties’ choice of Florida law to govern the employment contracts at issue without first determining whether the restrictive covenants in the contracts complied with the GRCA. The Court of Appeals reversed, and in doing so, correctly identified application of the GRCA as the first step in the analysis of whether the public-policy exception overrides the parties’ choice of foreign law. But because the Supreme Court set out a clear framework for that analysis in this opinion, it left it for the trial court to apply that framework in the first instance. The Court therefore vacated the decisions below for further review by the trial court. View "Motorsports of Conyers, LLC, et al. v. Burbach" on Justia Law
Mimbs v. Henry County Schools
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment against public school teacher Sheri Mimbs, on the basis that Mimbs failed to institute her whistleblower action within one year after discovering the alleged acts of retaliation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Mimbs’s complaint was timely with respect to one of the acts giving rise to her retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the school district. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mimbs v. Henry County Schools" on Justia Law
Quynn v Hulsey et al.
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this wrongful death and personal injury case to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that TriEst Ag Group, Inc., the employer of the driver whose truck struck and killed the decedent, was entitled to summary judgment on the estate’s claims of negligent entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision because TriEst admitted the applicability of respondeat superior and the estate was not entitled to punitive damages. The Supreme Court concluded OCGA 51-12-33 ("the apportionment statute") abrogated the decisional law rule on which the Court of Appeals relied in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Quynn v Hulsey et al." on Justia Law
Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers Compensation
Rochelle Frett was injured when she slipped and fell at her place of employment during a scheduled lunch break. She filed a claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, but the State Board of Workers’ Compensation denied her claim. Frett appealed, and the superior court upheld the denial of her claim. Frett then appealed the decision of the superior court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Farr, 178 SE 728 (1935), the Court of Appeals held that Frett suffered no injury compensable under the Act because she sustained her injury during a scheduled break, and her injury, therefore, did not arise out of her employment. The Georgia Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to reconsider Farr and reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. The Supreme Court overruled Farr, and reversed the decision below. View "Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers Compensation" on Justia Law
Jackson v. Raffensperger
In June 2018, Appellants Mary Jackson and her non-profit organization, Reaching Our Sisters Everywhere, Inc. (“ROSE”), filed a complaint against the Secretary of State challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act (the “Act”), which prohibited the practice of “lactation care and services” for compensation without a license from the Secretary of State. Specifically, Appellants alleged that, under the Act, they were ineligible for a license because they lacked a privately issued credential that the Act required for licensure, even though they had other private credentials that made them equally competent to provide lactation care and services and pose no risk of harm to the public. Accordingly, they argue that the Act violates their rights to due process and equal protection under the Georgia Constitution. The trial court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the trial court ruled that Appellants failed to state a claim that the Act violated due process, because the Georgia Constitution did not recognize a right to work in one’s chosen profession, and that Appellants failed to state a claim that the Act violated equal protection, because the complaint did not sufficiently allege that Appellants were similarly situated to those who are able to obtain a license. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with Appellants that the trial court erred in both rulings. "We have long interpreted the Georgia Constitution as protecting a right to work in one’s chosen profession free from unreasonable government interference. And the trial court erred in concluding that the Appellants are not similarly situated to lactation consultants who can be licensed because, according to the allegations in the complaint, they do the same work." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with direction to the trial court to reconsider the motion to dismiss. View "Jackson v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law
Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al.
The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on a claim of abusive litigation that Timothy Coen filed based on a previous contract lawsuit against his former employer that was resolved in his favor. In his abusive litigation case, Coen sought punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that punitive damages were not available for a statutory abusive litigation claim, relying on its prior decisions that in turn relied on dicta in footnote 3 of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Yost v. Torok, 344 SE2d 414 (1986), which was decided three years before the current abusive litigation statutes, OCGA sections 51-7-80 to 51-7-85, were enacted in 1989. The Supreme Court granted Coen’s petition for certiorari to decide whether that statute authorized the recovery of punitive damages. The Court concluded punitive damages generally may be recovered in an abusive litigation lawsuit (as long as the lawsuit is not solely to recover damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings), because the text of OCGA 51-7-83 (a) indicated that punitive damages were included, the statute did not change the common law generally allowing punitive damages in abusive litigation cases, and punitive damages in abusive litigation cases did not always constitute an impermissible double recovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al." on Justia Law