Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court accepted the Ninth Circuit’s request for certification and answered (1) California’s wage and hour statutes and regulations have not adopted the de minimis doctrine found in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); and (2) the relevant wage order and statutes do not permit application of the de minimis principle on the facts of this case.Here, an employer required an employee to work “off the clock” for several minutes per shift. The employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the employee’s uncompensated time was so minimal that the employer was not required to compensate him. The district court concluded that the de minimis doctrine applied and granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court to answer whether the FLSA’s de minimis doctrine applies to claims for unpaid wages under California Labor Code sections 510, 1194, and 1197. The Supreme Court held (1) the pertinent statutes and wage order have not incorporated the de minimis doctrine set forth in the FLSA; and (2) while California has a de minimis rule that has operated in various contexts, that rule is not applicable under the facts of this case. View "Troester v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

At issue was what standard applies in determining whether workers should be classified as employees or as independent contract for purposes of California wage orders.Two drivers filed this purported class action alleging that Dynamex Operations West, Inc. had misclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The trial court ultimately certified a class action embodying a class of Dynamex drivers who, during a pay period, did not themselves employ other drivers and did not do delivery work for other delivery businesses or for the drivers’ own personal customers. The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s class certification order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that the “suffer or permit to work” definition of “employ” contained in the wage order may be relied upon in evaluating whether a worker is an independent contractor; (2) in determining whether, under the suffer or permit to work definition, a worker is properly considered the type of independent contractor to whom the wage order does not apply, it is appropriate to look to the so-called “ABC” test utilized in other jurisdictions; and (3) the trial court’s certification order was correct as a matter of law under a proper understanding of the suffer or permit to work standard. View "Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

In calculating an employee’s overtime pay rate when the employee has earned a flat sum bonus during a single pay period, the divisor for purposes of calculating the per-hour value of the bonus should be the number of nonovertime hours the employee worked during the pay period, rather than the number of hours the employee actually worked during the pay period, including overtime hours, or the number of nonovertime hours that exist in the pay period, regardless of the number of hours the employee actually worked.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, his former employer, alleging that Defendant had not properly computed his overtime pay under California law. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court should look for “persuasive guidance” to a federal regulation explaining how to factor a flat sum bonus into an employee’s regular rate of pay and that its formula for calculating overtime compensation was complaint with the relevant federal regulation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, thus favoring the formula that allocates an employee’s bonus to the nonovertime hours worked, rather than to all hours worked. View "Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California" on Justia Law

In calculating an employee’s overtime pay rate when the employee has earned a flat sum bonus during a single pay period, the divisor for purposes of calculating the per-hour value of the bonus should be the number of nonovertime hours the employee worked during the pay period, rather than the number of hours the employee actually worked during the pay period, including overtime hours, or the number of nonovertime hours that exist in the pay period, regardless of the number of hours the employee actually worked.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, his former employer, alleging that Defendant had not properly computed his overtime pay under California law. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court should look for “persuasive guidance” to a federal regulation explaining how to factor a flat sum bonus into an employee’s regular rate of pay and that its formula for calculating overtime compensation was complaint with the relevant federal regulation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, thus favoring the formula that allocates an employee’s bonus to the nonovertime hours worked, rather than to all hours worked. View "Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California" on Justia Law

The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., does not preempt unfair competition and consumer protection claims based on workplace safety and health violations when, as in California, there is a state plan approved by the federal Secretary of Labor.The Division of Occupational Safety and Health charged Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC with five violations of state occupational safety and health regulations. The District Attorney of Orange County subsequently filed this action for civil penalties under the state’s unfair competition law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, and fair advertising law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500. The court of appeal concluded that the federal OSH Act preempted the district attorney’s UCL and FAL claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no implied or express preemption of the district attorney’s UCL and FAL claims. View "Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

For the reasons set forth in a companion case issued today, Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal correctly rejected Employer’s defense that Union had abandoned its employees and thus forfeited its status as bargaining representative.In this case, Employer refused to bargain with the labor union that its employees had elected as their bargaining representative under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). The Agricultural Labor Relations Board (Board) rejected Employer’s abandonment defense and determined that Employer’s refusal constituted an unfair labor practice under the ALRA. The Board ordered Employer to pay make-whole relief under Cal. Labor Code 1160.3. The court of appeal affirmed the Board’s rejection of Employer’s abandonment defense but reversed the Board’s make-whole relief award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeal (1) properly rejected Employer’s abandonment defense, but (2) did not accord the Board sufficient deference as to the issue of make-whole relief and improperly exercised the Board’s remedial authority. View "Tri-Fanucchi Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act’s (ARLA) “mandatory mediation and conciliation” (MMC) statute neither violates equal protection nor unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. Further, employers may not refuse to bargain with unions - whether during the ordinary bargaining process or during MMC - on the basis that the union has abandoned its representative status.In this case, the United Farm Workers’ of America (UFW) filed an MMC request with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board after failing to reach a collective bargaining agreement with Gerawan Farming, Inc. Mediation also failed to produce an agreement, and therefore, the mediator submitted a report fixing the contractual terms. The Board adopted the report in its final order. The court of appeal concluded (1) the MMC statute on its face violates equal protection principles and improperly delegates legislative authority, and (2) an employer may not defend against a union’s MMC request by challenging the union’s certification as bargaining representative on the basis of abandonment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the MMC statutes is not unconstitutional; and (2) an employer may not raise an abandonment defense to an MMC request. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted reviewing this PAGA action to consider the scope of discovery available in PAGA actions. The court held that, in non-PAGA class actions, the contact information of those a plaintiff purports to represent is routinely discoverable without any requirement that the plaintiff first show good cause, and nothing in the characteristics of a PAGA suit affords a basis for restricting discovery more narrowly. The court thus reversed the trial court’s discovery order denying Plaintiff’s motion seeking contact information for fellow California employees in other state Marshalls of CA, LLC stores in this representative action seeking civil penalties on behalf of the State and aggrieved employees statewide for alleged wage and hour violations. The court held that Marshalls did not meet its burden of establishing cause to refuse Plaintiff an answer to his interrogatory seeking the identity and contact information of his fellow Marshalls employees. View "Williams v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Independent contractors are not categorically excluded from Cal. Gov’t Code 1090, which prohibits public officers and employees from making contracts in which they have a financial interest when they act in their official capacities.The prosecution in this case charged Dr. Hossain Sahlolbei with violation of section 1090 for allegedly influencing the hospital where he worked as an independent contractor to hire another doctor and then profiting from that doctor’s contract. The trial court dismissed the 1090 count. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, concluding that because Sahlolbei was not an employee of the hospital section 1090 did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) liability under the statute can extend to independent contractors who have duties to engage in or advise on public contracting; and (2) Sahlolbei’s duties brought him within the scope of the statute. View "People v. Superior Court of Riverside County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered questions certified to it by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the construction of the state’s day of rest statutes, which prohibit an employer from causing his or her employees to work more than “six days in seven” but do not apply “when the total hours of employment do not exceed 30 hours in any week or six hours in any one day thereof.” The Court answered (1) periods of more than six consecutive days of work that stretch across more than one workweek are no per se prohibited; (2) the exemption for employees working shifts of six hours or less applies only to those who never exceed six hours of work on any day of the week; and (3) an employer “causes” its employee to go without a day of rest when it induces the employee to forgo rest to which he or she is entitled. View "Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc." on Justia Law