Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Following a diagnosis of cancer, Opyoke requested information from his employer, Fairmont Tool, about his right to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). For approximately four months, Fairmont failed to advise Opyoke of his FMLA rights, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1). Opyoke sued, alleging that Fairmont interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, his rights under the FMLA. A jury awarded monetary damages.The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed. Although FMLA interference claims do not require a showing of intent on the part of the employer, proof of an interference violation is not enough to establish injury; an employee must also show that he was prejudiced by the violation. While Opyoke was entitled to FMLA benefits and Fairmont was covered by the FMLA, Opyoke failed to present any evidence that he lost compensation or benefits by reason of Fairmont’s technical violation of the FMLA; he presented no evidence as to how he would have structured his leave had Fairmont advised him of his rights under the FMLA. View "Fairmont Tool, Inc. v. Opyoke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Board of Review affirming the decision of the Office of Judges denying Appellant's request to add C5-6 spondylosis with C6 radiculopathy as a compensable condition, holding that Appellant was entitled to a permanent partial disability award.Appellant suffered a compensable injury to his shoulder, neck and back while working for Respondent. After the injury, Appellant developed cervical radiculopathy. At issue was whether cervical radiculopathy should be added as a compensable condition of Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case with directions to add cervical radiculopathy as a compensable condition, holding that Appellant proved a causal connection between his compensable injury and his cervical radiculopathy. View "Moore v. ICG Tygart Valley, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent and dismissing Petitioner's civil action alleging that Respondent violated the terms of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, the terms of her employee agreement, and the employee handbook by failing, upon her resignation, to provide her severance pay and compensation for accrued paid time off, holding that the circuit court erred.Following her resignation, Petitioner initiated a lawsuit alleging that Respondent failed timely to pay her wages on several occasions, thereby breaching the employee agreement that triggered Respondent's duty to pay her a severance package. Petitioner additionally asserted that the failure to pay her the severance package constituted violations of the employee handbook and the Act. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's claims. View "Miller v. St. Joseph Recovery Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia seeking to clarify the application of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) when the plaintiff's employing entity does not meet the WVHRA definition of "employer," as set out in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(d).Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against her former employer alleging violations of the WVHRA and other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court and moved for dismissal of the WVHRA claim on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to allege that Defendant satisfied the numerosity portion of the WVHRA definition of "employer." The district court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court ordered that a question of law be certified. The Supreme Court answered that an entity that does not meet the WVHRA's definition of employer may not be potentially liable to its own employee as a "person," as defined in W. Va. Code 5-11-3(a), for an alleged violation of W. Va. Code 5-11-9(7). View "Pajak v. Under Armour, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order to strike the notice it received pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-13d regarding Respondent's belief that some or all of the fault in the matter should be assigned to the Monongalia County Commission, holding that Petitioner was entitled to the writ.Respondent was employed by the County Commission when he was injured his work. After resolving his workers' compensation claim Respondent sued Petitioner for further compensation. Thereafter, Petitioner filed the motion at issue. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to strike the notice, concluding that fault could not be assigned to the County Commission, and, alternatively, that Petitioner failed to allege deliberate intention on the part of the County Commission. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that the County Commission could not be named as a nonparty defendant under W.Va. Code 55-7-13d; and (2) section 55-7-13d did not require Petitioner to meet the deliberate-intention standard in order for fault to be assigned to the County Commission. View "State ex rel. March-Westin Co. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court preliminarily enjoining the West Virginia Paycheck Protection Act, passed by the Legislature in 2021, from taking effect, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it granted Respondents injunctive relief.Respondents - labor unions, employee associations, and individual members of such groups - sought to enjoin the enforcement of the Act, which prohibits state employers from continuing to deduct union dues and employee association membership fees from public employees' wages. The circuit court concluded that the law violated certain of Respondents' constitutional rights and that its enforcement would irreparably harm them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it did not deny injunctive relief to Respondents. View "Justice v. W. Va. AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the circuit court entered under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va. Code 23-5-1 to -18 (the WPCA), holding that the court acted within its discretion, and there was otherwise no error.Employer in this case made withholdings from the wages of its employees that met the definition of an assignment set forth under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va. Code 23-5-1 to -18 (the WPCA). Employer, however, never procured from its employees a writing that complied with the conditions set forth in the WPCA. Employees filed a class-action suit to recoup Employer's withholdings. The circuit court entered an orders (1) finding Employer liable for violating the WPCA, and (2) awarding Employees the wages improperly taken from their paychecks, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion or err in its orders. View "Fairmont Tool, Inc. v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court reversing the decision of a West Virginia State Police Grievance System hearing officer and ordering the reinstatement of Respondent to his employment as a state trooper, holding that the circuit court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing examiner.The hearing examiner concluded that Respondent had committed conduct unbecoming of a state trooper and had used excessive force, among other things, and that the preponderance of the evidence supported the decision to terminate Respondent's employment. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the hearing examiner's decision was clearly wrong and erroneous as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing examiner, who was the factfinder in this manner; and (2) the hearing examiner's account of the evidence was plausible in light of the entire record. View "W. Va. State Police v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a county solid waste authority has no power to enter into a fixed-term employment contract with a non-civil service employee.In 2008, The Nicholas County Solid Waste Authority (NCSWA) entered into an employment contract with employee Larry Bradford under which Bradford was to continue in his position for a fixed term. In 2014, the West Virginia Solid Waste Management Board (WVSWMB) exercised its statutory power of supersedure over the NCSWA. The next day, the WVSWMB terminated Bradford's employment. Bradford brought suit, asserting causes of action for violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act and for breach of contract. After five years of litigation, the parties jointly moved the circuit court to certify questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted one certified question, which rendered the remaining three questions moot, answering that a county solid waste authority has no authority to enter into a fixed-term employment contract with a non-civil service employee and that any such contract is unenforceable and void as a matter of law. View "Bradford v. W. Va. Solid Waste Management Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the circuit court affirming the judgment of the Board of Review affirming the decision of a Labor Dispute Tribunal that certain union members employed at a production plant (Claimants) were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits, holding that the lower tribunals erred.In 2012, representatives of Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC and United Steelworkers Local 5668, the union representing the majority of Constellium's employees, met to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. When the parties could not come to terms Claimants went on strike. After the strike ended, Claimants applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The Tribunal decided that Claimants were not disqualified for benefits under W. Va. Code 21A-6-3(4), the labor dispute provision. The Board and circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the lower tribunals erred in holding that Claimants were not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits under the labor dispute provision. View "Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC, v. Cooper" on Justia Law