Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Alabama
Ex parte B.T. Roberts
The case involves members of the Auburn University Board of Trustees and various Auburn University employees (defendants) who were sued by Patti Northcutt and her husband, Walter Northcutt (plaintiffs). Patti, a former employee and doctoral student at Auburn, alleged that the defendants retaliated against her for previous lawsuits and grievances she had filed, which were settled through agreements. She claimed that the defendants breached these settlement agreements and interfered with her ability to complete her doctoral program and obtain employment at Auburn.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Lee Circuit Court, which they amended multiple times. The third amended complaint included claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, and procedural due process violations, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, asserting federal qualified immunity and State immunity under the Alabama Constitution.The Lee Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims but denied the motion regarding the other claims. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983 for equal protection and procedural due process violations, based on federal qualified immunity. The Court also directed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to state-law claims for prospective injunctive relief, based on State immunity. However, the Court denied the petition regarding the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to federal-law claims for prospective injunctive relief and the state-law claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte B.T. Roberts" on Justia Law
Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington
Adam P. Harrington was injured on February 15, 2018, while using a swing rope to transfer from an offshore gas platform to a transport vessel. Harrington, employed by Skelton's Fire Equipment, Inc., was inspecting fire-suppression equipment on Exxon's platform. Due to rough seas, Harrington mistimed his swing and fractured his leg. His medical expenses were covered by Skelton's workers' compensation insurer.Harrington sued Exxon for maritime negligence and wantonness in the Mobile Circuit Court. Before trial, the court granted Harrington's motion to exclude evidence of his medical expenses being paid by the workers' compensation insurer. The jury found Exxon liable for $1,500,000 in damages, reduced by 10% for Harrington's fault, resulting in a $1,350,000 judgment. Exxon's postjudgment motion for a new trial, arguing the exclusion of evidence was erroneous, was denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. Exxon argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the workers' compensation payments, citing Alabama Code § 12-21-45. However, the court held that substantive maritime law, which includes the collateral-source rule, applied. This rule prevents the reduction of damages by amounts received from third parties, such as insurance. The court found that applying § 12-21-45 would conflict with maritime law.Exxon also claimed that Harrington's expert witness opened the door to admitting evidence of the workers' compensation payments. The court disagreed, stating that the expert's testimony did not justify introducing such evidence under the doctrine of curative admissibility.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Harrington and dismissed Harrington's conditional cross-appeal as moot. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Harrington" on Justia Law
Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc.
A minor, Iyana Crenshaw, was injured while working at Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc. Her father, Derrick Crenshaw, filed a negligence lawsuit against Sonic, alleging that the injury was caused by Sonic's negligence. The complaint did not seek workers' compensation benefits but solely pursued a negligence claim.The Butler Circuit Court dismissed the negligence action, concluding that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act barred the claim. Crenshaw did not dispute that Iyana's injury was subject to the Act but argued that the Act itself was unconstitutional under Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022. The attorney general and Sonic defended the constitutionality of the Act, and the circuit court rejected Crenshaw's constitutional challenges, leading to the dismissal of the negligence action.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act does not violate Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution. The court applied both the vested-rights approach and the common-law-rights approach to determine the constitutionality of the Act. Under the vested-rights approach, the Act did not deprive Crenshaw of a vested right in a cause of action. Under the common-law-rights approach, the court concluded that the Act was a valid exercise of the legislature's police power, as it eradicated or ameliorated a perceived social evil. Therefore, the Act's exclusive-remedy provisions were upheld, and the dismissal of the negligence action was affirmed. View "Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc." on Justia Law
Leader v. Pablo
Catalina Estillado died from injuries sustained in a workplace accident at ABC Polymer Industries, LLC. Her spouse, Crescencio Pablo, filed a wrongful-death claim against her coworkers, Dean Leader and William Durall, alleging their willful conduct caused her death by removing a safety guard from the machine involved. The Jefferson Circuit Court found in favor of Pablo, awarding $3 million in damages. Leader and Durall appealed.The circuit court determined that the machine was originally manufactured with a safety gate interlocked with a limit switch, which was later removed. The court concluded that Durall had effectively "removed" the safety device by not reinstalling it and by training employees to bypass it. The court also found that Durall knew injury was likely from this removal and that the removal was not part of a modification that rendered the safety device unnecessary.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that while the machine was originally manufactured with the safety device, there was no evidence that Durall knew the safety gate should be interlocked with a limit switch when he inspected and installed the machine. The court also noted that instructing employees to bypass a safety device does not equate to its removal under § 25-5-11(c)(2), referencing the precedent set in Williams v. Price. Additionally, Durall had left ABC Polymer before Estillado was hired and did not train her.The court concluded that Pablo failed to prove Durall willfully and intentionally removed the safety device. Consequently, the judgment against Durall was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The appeal by Leader was dismissed due to his bankruptcy discharge. View "Leader v. Pablo" on Justia Law
McGilvray v. Perkins
David McGilvray, a former investigator for the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners (the Medical Board), was terminated for sending a sexually explicit email to his coworkers. Following his termination, the Medical Board requested the Local Government Health Insurance Board (the Insurance Board) to cancel McGilvray's health-insurance benefits. McGilvray, claiming he had retired before the Medical Board ratified his termination, sought retiree-health-insurance benefits. His request was denied by the Insurance Board on the grounds that he had been fired for cause and had not retired.McGilvray filed two lawsuits in an attempt to obtain retiree-health-insurance benefits. The first lawsuit was against the executive director of the Medical Board and the CEO of the Insurance Board. The Montgomery Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him, ruling that his claims were time-barred. In the second lawsuit, which is the subject of this appeal, McGilvray sued the executive director of the Medical Board and the members of the Medical Board in both their official and individual capacities. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed this suit based on the doctrines of State immunity and res judicata.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that McGilvray's breach-of-contract claim, seeking damages from the Medical Board defendants in their official capacities, was barred by State immunity. Furthermore, the court ruled that all of his other claims were barred by res judicata, as they arose from the same set of facts as his claims in the prior action: the termination of his employment and the Insurance Board's denial of his request for retiree-health-insurance benefits. View "McGilvray v. Perkins" on Justia Law
Roberson v. Drummond Company, Inc.
In the case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, David and Anna Roberson appealed from an order by the Jefferson Circuit Court that dismissed their indemnification claim against Drummond Company, Inc. ("Drummond"). David, a former vice president of Drummond, was convicted of bribery in federal court for approving payments that were part of an environmental public-relations campaign. After his conviction, Drummond continued to pay David's salary and benefits for a period, but later terminated his employment. The Robersons then sued Drummond and others, asserting multiple claims, including one for indemnification. They alleged that Drummond had directed David to make the payments that were later deemed to be bribes, and that he had incurred damages as a result, for which Drummond had a duty to indemnify him. The circuit court dismissed the indemnification claim, ruling that indemnification generally comes into play in a contractual arrangement, and the Robersons had neither produced nor alleged the existence of a contract or agreement establishing such a duty. The Robersons appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the losses the Robersons sought to recover were not indemnifiable, as they were not judicially imposed liabilities to a third party or out-of-pocket expenses that David incurred in processing the invoices. The court also found that the Robersons failed to demonstrate they had sufficiently pleaded a claim for common-law indemnification. The court rejected the Robersons' argument that Drummond's resolution to pay David's salary and benefits constituted a contract for indemnification, stating that the obligation they alleged Drummond undertook was not a promise to indemnify David, but simply a promise not to fire him. Finally, the court found that the Robersons had failed to preserve their claim for court-ordered indemnification under the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entity Code for appellate review, as they had not asserted this argument in the trial court. View "Roberson v. Drummond Company, Inc." on Justia Law
Women’s Care Specialists, P.C. v. Potter
Consolidated appeals arose from an employment dispute between Dr. Margot Potter and her former employer, Women's Care Specialists, P.C. ("Women's Care"), and out of a dispute between Potter and three Women's Care employees: Dr. Karla Kennedy, Dr. Elizabeth Barron, and Beth Ann Dorsett ("the WC employees"). In case no. CV-21-903797, Potter alleged claims of defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract against Women's Care. In case no. CV-21-903798, Potter alleged claims of defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship against the WC employees. After the cases were consolidated by the circuit court, Women's Care and the WC employees moved to compel arbitration on the basis that Potter's claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision in Potter's employment agreement with Women's Care and that the arbitration provision governed their disputes even though Potter was no longer a Women's Care employee. The trial court denied those motions. In appeal no. SC-2022-0706, the Alabama Supreme Court held Potter's breach of-contract claim and her tort claims against Women's Care were subject to arbitration. In appeal no. SC-2022-0707, the Court likewise held Potter's tort claims against the WC employees were subject to arbitration. The trial court's orders were denied and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "Women's Care Specialists, P.C. v. Potter" on Justia Law
Protective Life Insurance Company v. Jenkins
Protective Life Insurance Company ("Protective") appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing its action against Andrew Chong Jenkins pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. Jenkins was an executive employed by Protective at its corporate headquarters in Birmingham. In October 2019, Jenkins gave notice to Protective that he was terminating his employment. A month after the notice's effective date, $105,230 was entered into Protective's accounting system as the amount of deferred compensation owed to Jenkins. In reality, Protective owed Jenkins only $1,052.30. After Protective deducted taxes and withholdings, Jenkins was mistakenly overpaid by $73,752.64. Protective asserted the reason for the two-digit mistake was a data-entry error. Protective's payroll department discovered the error and communicated this fact to Jenkins, ultimately sending him a letter detailing the overpayment and asking him to repay the money. When he didn't return the money, Protective Life filed suit, asserting claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money paid by mistake, and account stated. Jenkins moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that Protective's claims were barred under the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 6-2-38(m), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the purpose of the action was to recover wages and, thus, that it was barred under § 6-2-38(m). Protective unsuccessfully moved to vacate, and appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the statute of limitations contained in § 6-3-38(m) is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the circuit court's judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Protective Life Insurance Company v. Jenkins" on Justia Law
Amanda Howard Real Estate, LLC v. Lee, et al.
Amanda Howard Real Estate, LLC ("Howard Real Estate"), appealed a partial summary judgment in favor of Clair Lee and JRHBW Realty, Inc. ("RealtySouth"), in Howard Real Estate's suit to enforce a noncompete agreement against Lee. The circuit court ruled that the noncompete agreement was void because it was not signed by both parties as required by statute. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because none of Howard Real Estate's arguments established that it satisfied the statutory signatures requirement. View "Amanda Howard Real Estate, LLC v. Lee, et al." on Justia Law
Ex parte Insurance Express, LLC, et al.
Petitioners Insurance Express, LLC ("Insurance Express"), Wayne Taylor, and Julie Singley sought a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate an order staying the underlying action against defendants Lynne Ernest Insurance, LLC ("LEI"), Lynne Ernest, Chynna Ernest, and Deadra Stokley. According to the complaint, Lynne and Stokley were longtime employees of Insurance Express. It alleged that they, while still employed by Insurance Express, entered Insurance Express's office after business hours and, without authorization, made electronic copies of various business records related to Insurance Express's clients and insurance policies. Lynne and Stokley resigned soon after and began employment with LEI, which purportedly had been formed by Lynne and Chynna and was a direct competitor of Insurance Express. Lynne and Stokley, it is alleged, then induced some Insurance Express clients to transfer their policies to LEI. Insurance Express sought injunctive relief to, among other things, prevent defendants from communicating with past or current customers of Insurance Express and to require defendants to return any customer information taken by them. It further sought damages for breach of contract, conversion, intentional interference with business relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found petitioners established they had a clear legal right to the relief they sought. The Court granted their petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting a stay. View "Ex parte Insurance Express, LLC, et al." on Justia Law