Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Catalina Estillado died from injuries sustained in a workplace accident at ABC Polymer Industries, LLC. Her spouse, Crescencio Pablo, filed a wrongful-death claim against her coworkers, Dean Leader and William Durall, alleging their willful conduct caused her death by removing a safety guard from the machine involved. The Jefferson Circuit Court found in favor of Pablo, awarding $3 million in damages. Leader and Durall appealed.The circuit court determined that the machine was originally manufactured with a safety gate interlocked with a limit switch, which was later removed. The court concluded that Durall had effectively "removed" the safety device by not reinstalling it and by training employees to bypass it. The court also found that Durall knew injury was likely from this removal and that the removal was not part of a modification that rendered the safety device unnecessary.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that while the machine was originally manufactured with the safety device, there was no evidence that Durall knew the safety gate should be interlocked with a limit switch when he inspected and installed the machine. The court also noted that instructing employees to bypass a safety device does not equate to its removal under § 25-5-11(c)(2), referencing the precedent set in Williams v. Price. Additionally, Durall had left ABC Polymer before Estillado was hired and did not train her.The court concluded that Pablo failed to prove Durall willfully and intentionally removed the safety device. Consequently, the judgment against Durall was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The appeal by Leader was dismissed due to his bankruptcy discharge. View "Leader v. Pablo" on Justia Law

David McGilvray, a former investigator for the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners (the Medical Board), was terminated for sending a sexually explicit email to his coworkers. Following his termination, the Medical Board requested the Local Government Health Insurance Board (the Insurance Board) to cancel McGilvray's health-insurance benefits. McGilvray, claiming he had retired before the Medical Board ratified his termination, sought retiree-health-insurance benefits. His request was denied by the Insurance Board on the grounds that he had been fired for cause and had not retired.McGilvray filed two lawsuits in an attempt to obtain retiree-health-insurance benefits. The first lawsuit was against the executive director of the Medical Board and the CEO of the Insurance Board. The Montgomery Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him, ruling that his claims were time-barred. In the second lawsuit, which is the subject of this appeal, McGilvray sued the executive director of the Medical Board and the members of the Medical Board in both their official and individual capacities. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed this suit based on the doctrines of State immunity and res judicata.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that McGilvray's breach-of-contract claim, seeking damages from the Medical Board defendants in their official capacities, was barred by State immunity. Furthermore, the court ruled that all of his other claims were barred by res judicata, as they arose from the same set of facts as his claims in the prior action: the termination of his employment and the Insurance Board's denial of his request for retiree-health-insurance benefits. View "McGilvray v. Perkins" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, David and Anna Roberson appealed from an order by the Jefferson Circuit Court that dismissed their indemnification claim against Drummond Company, Inc. ("Drummond"). David, a former vice president of Drummond, was convicted of bribery in federal court for approving payments that were part of an environmental public-relations campaign. After his conviction, Drummond continued to pay David's salary and benefits for a period, but later terminated his employment. The Robersons then sued Drummond and others, asserting multiple claims, including one for indemnification. They alleged that Drummond had directed David to make the payments that were later deemed to be bribes, and that he had incurred damages as a result, for which Drummond had a duty to indemnify him. The circuit court dismissed the indemnification claim, ruling that indemnification generally comes into play in a contractual arrangement, and the Robersons had neither produced nor alleged the existence of a contract or agreement establishing such a duty. The Robersons appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the losses the Robersons sought to recover were not indemnifiable, as they were not judicially imposed liabilities to a third party or out-of-pocket expenses that David incurred in processing the invoices. The court also found that the Robersons failed to demonstrate they had sufficiently pleaded a claim for common-law indemnification. The court rejected the Robersons' argument that Drummond's resolution to pay David's salary and benefits constituted a contract for indemnification, stating that the obligation they alleged Drummond undertook was not a promise to indemnify David, but simply a promise not to fire him. Finally, the court found that the Robersons had failed to preserve their claim for court-ordered indemnification under the Alabama Business and Nonprofit Entity Code for appellate review, as they had not asserted this argument in the trial court. View "Roberson v. Drummond Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose from an employment dispute between Dr. Margot Potter and her former employer, Women's Care Specialists, P.C. ("Women's Care"), and out of a dispute between Potter and three Women's Care employees: Dr. Karla Kennedy, Dr. Elizabeth Barron, and Beth Ann Dorsett ("the WC employees"). In case no. CV-21-903797, Potter alleged claims of defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract against Women's Care. In case no. CV-21-903798, Potter alleged claims of defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship against the WC employees. After the cases were consolidated by the circuit court, Women's Care and the WC employees moved to compel arbitration on the basis that Potter's claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision in Potter's employment agreement with Women's Care and that the arbitration provision governed their disputes even though Potter was no longer a Women's Care employee. The trial court denied those motions. In appeal no. SC-2022-0706, the Alabama Supreme Court held Potter's breach of-contract claim and her tort claims against Women's Care were subject to arbitration. In appeal no. SC-2022-0707, the Court likewise held Potter's tort claims against the WC employees were subject to arbitration. The trial court's orders were denied and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "Women's Care Specialists, P.C. v. Potter" on Justia Law

Protective Life Insurance Company ("Protective") appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing its action against Andrew Chong Jenkins pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. Jenkins was an executive employed by Protective at its corporate headquarters in Birmingham. In October 2019, Jenkins gave notice to Protective that he was terminating his employment. A month after the notice's effective date, $105,230 was entered into Protective's accounting system as the amount of deferred compensation owed to Jenkins. In reality, Protective owed Jenkins only $1,052.30. After Protective deducted taxes and withholdings, Jenkins was mistakenly overpaid by $73,752.64. Protective asserted the reason for the two-digit mistake was a data-entry error. Protective's payroll department discovered the error and communicated this fact to Jenkins, ultimately sending him a letter detailing the overpayment and asking him to repay the money. When he didn't return the money, Protective Life filed suit, asserting claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money paid by mistake, and account stated. Jenkins moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that Protective's claims were barred under the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 6-2-38(m), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the purpose of the action was to recover wages and, thus, that it was barred under § 6-2-38(m). Protective unsuccessfully moved to vacate, and appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the statute of limitations contained in § 6-3-38(m) is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the circuit court's judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Protective Life Insurance Company v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Amanda Howard Real Estate, LLC ("Howard Real Estate"), appealed a partial summary judgment in favor of Clair Lee and JRHBW Realty, Inc. ("RealtySouth"), in Howard Real Estate's suit to enforce a noncompete agreement against Lee. The circuit court ruled that the noncompete agreement was void because it was not signed by both parties as required by statute. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because none of Howard Real Estate's arguments established that it satisfied the statutory signatures requirement. View "Amanda Howard Real Estate, LLC v. Lee, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Insurance Express, LLC ("Insurance Express"), Wayne Taylor, and Julie Singley sought a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate an order staying the underlying action against defendants Lynne Ernest Insurance, LLC ("LEI"), Lynne Ernest, Chynna Ernest, and Deadra Stokley. According to the complaint, Lynne and Stokley were longtime employees of Insurance Express. It alleged that they, while still employed by Insurance Express, entered Insurance Express's office after business hours and, without authorization, made electronic copies of various business records related to Insurance Express's clients and insurance policies. Lynne and Stokley resigned soon after and began employment with LEI, which purportedly had been formed by Lynne and Chynna and was a direct competitor of Insurance Express. Lynne and Stokley, it is alleged, then induced some Insurance Express clients to transfer their policies to LEI. Insurance Express sought injunctive relief to, among other things, prevent defendants from communicating with past or current customers of Insurance Express and to require defendants to return any customer information taken by them. It further sought damages for breach of contract, conversion, intentional interference with business relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found petitioners established they had a clear legal right to the relief they sought. The Court granted their petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting a stay. View "Ex parte Insurance Express, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Dr. William Morgan, Dr. Carol Zippert, Morris Hardy, Leo Branch, Sr., and Carrie Dancy, each of whom is or was a member of the Greene County Board of Education ("the Board"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Greene Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the individual-capacity claims asserted against them by Dr. Rhinnie B. Scott. Scott had been an employee of the Board for over two decades. For most of that time, she served as "Vocational Director." During the 2007-2008 school year, Scott was asked by the president of the Board at that time, Elzora Fluker, to serve as "Acting Principal" at Greene County High School ("GCHS"). During a search for a school principal in the 2010-2011 school year, Scott was tapped to serve as "Instructional Leader" for GCHS in addition to her regular function of Vocational Director. The purpose of such designation was for Dr. Scott to serve as the leader of the school until a principal was selected. At the time of that decision, the period of time of the designation was thought to be only a few weeks at most. Problems arose, however, with the selection, and Dr. Scott ended up having to serve in the position for the entire 2010-2011 school year. Scott filed a grievance with the Board in 2014 concerning her claim that she had not been compensated for her service as "Instructional Leader," which she deemed to be service as the de facto acting principal, at GCHS during the 2010-2011 school year. Additionally, Scott presented a claim that she had been "underpaid by approximately $1,664.00" each year since 2007 because, she asserted, the Board had "inadvertently reduc[ed] the annual pay for the Vocational Director." The Board denied Scott's grievance claims. Because Scott conceded that no genuine issues of material fact remained to be decided with respect to her individual-capacity claims against the Board members, the Board members were entitled to summary judgment concerning those remaining claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the Board members' petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Morgan, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Karen Watters and Cheryl Yarbrough appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Birmingham Hematology and Oncology Associates, LLC, d/b/a Alabama Oncology ("Alabama Oncology"), and Brian Adler on their claims alleging defamation and wantonness. Plaintiffs were formerly employed by Alabama Oncology. In August 2019, an anonymous letter was delivered to various physicians at several Alabama Oncology locations. The letter alleged that there had been illegal and unethical behavior by four staff members, two of whom were plaintiffs, and that there was "a massive lawsuit brewing." The letter also warned that an attorney would be contacting Alabama Oncology regarding a class-action lawsuit. In response to the letter, Alabama Oncology's executive director, Chris Barnes, contacted Alabama Oncology's outside legal counsel, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP ("Bradley Arant") for advice on responding to the letter and preparing for the threatened litigation. Bradley Arant began conducting an internal investigation regarding the allegations in the anonymous letter. Ultimately, after the conclusion of the internal investigation, Alabama Oncology terminated plaintiffs' employment. Plaintiffs sued Alabama Oncology, and certain executive staff, alleging that their employment had been wrongfully terminated based on the executives' conspiracy to defame the plaintiffs and the results of what they alleged was a "sham investigation." The Alabama Supreme Court found that plaintiffs' "bare assertion that they satisfied their burden to defeat the summary-judgment motion" was insufficient to warrant reversal; the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Watters, et al. v. Birmingham Hematology and Oncology Associates, LLC, d/b/a Alabama Oncology, et al." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals stemmed from an employment dispute between Dr. Margot G. Potter and her former employer, Women's Care Specialists, P.C. ("Women's Care"), and out of a dispute between Potter and three Women's Care employees: Dr. Karla Kennedy, Dr. Elizabeth Barron, and Beth Ann Dorsett ("the WC employees"). In case no. CV-21-903797, Potter alleged claims of defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract against Women's Care. In case no. CV-21-903798, Potter alleged claims of defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship against the WC employees. After the trial court consolidated the cases, Women's Care and the WC employees filed motions to compel arbitration on the basis that Potter's claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision in Potter's employment agreement with Women's Care and that the arbitration provision governed their disputes even though Potter was no longer a Women's Care employee. The trial court entered an order denying those motions. Women's Care and the WC employees separately appealed; the Alabama Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. In appeal no. SC-2022-0706, the Supreme Court held that Potter's breach of-contract claim and her tort claims against Women's Care were subject to arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Women's Care's motion to compel arbitration. In appeal no. SC-2022-0707, the Supreme Court held that Potter's tort claims against the WC employees were subject to arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Women's Care Specialists, P.C. v. Potter" on Justia Law