Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Patrick Kendall suffered a work-related injury while working at John Morrell and Company, a self-insured employer. Morrell initially accepted Kendall's workers' compensation claim, but because Kendall later missed a number of physical therapy and doctor's appointments, Morrell later denied all further benefits relating to the injury. Almost three years later, Kendall filed a petition with the state Department of Labor requesting additional benefits for the injury. The Department granted summary judgment in favor of Morrell, concluding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that all of Kendall's claims for benefits were procedurally barred by the statute of limitations in S.D. Codified Laws 62-7-35.

Employee received workers' compensation benefits for a neck and back injury he suffered in 2002 while working for Employer. After his benefits were discontinued in 2004, Employee sought treatment for a low back condition and petitioned the Department of Labor for workers' compensation benefits. The Department denied the petition, ruling that Employee did not prove his low back condition was related to his original 2002 work injury. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department correctly denied workers' compensation benefits where Employee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 2002 injury was a major contributing cause of his current low back condition.

Employee was prosecuted for theft from his Employer, but he was acquitted by a jury. Employee later commenced an action for malicious prosecution against Employer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, concluding (1) Employee did not establish legal causation between Employer's report of theft and the criminal prosecution, and (2) Employee failed to establish the absence of probable cause to prosecute. Employee appealed, arguing that although the decision to prosecute was made by the state's attorney and grand jury, his claim was actionable because Employer did not give full and correct information to the authorities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err where (1) Employer's report was not the legal cause of the prosecution, and (2) Employee identified no facts suggesting that the prosecution was based on such information and that but for such information the decision to prosecute would not have been made by the prosecutor.

Employee was injured while working for Employer, a railroad corporation, by falling on snow-covered ice. Employee filed a personal injury claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits suit against railroads for an employee's injury that results in whole or in part from the railroad's negligence. A jury returned a verdict in Employee's favor and awarded Employee $300,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing evidence of drainage problems and failing to enter a judgment as a matter of law on foreseeability; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employer's motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court did not err in permitting Employee to receive post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict until the entry of judgment; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Employer a set-off on the judgment.

Employee submitted a workers' compensation claim to his Employer after suffering a reaction that some doctors attributed to work-related exposure. Employee petitioned the Department of Labor for a hearing on his workers' compensation claim. The Department denied Employee's claim, concluding that Employee failed to demonstrate that he sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee's efforts to prove causation were thwarted by Employer's refusal to allow collection of samples of various materials in areas around the plant and its later destruction of potential samples. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department failed to properly consider the spoliation question and Employee was entitled to a new hearing before the Department.

Vera Martin, who lived in South Dakota, worked at an American Colloid plant in Wyoming. After suffering a work-related injury at the Wyoming plant, Martin received Wyoming workers' compensation benefits. Martin then filed a claim for South Dakota workers' compensation benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor dismissed her claim for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) while Martin was a South Dakota resident throughout her employment with American Colloid, that fact was not alone sufficient to create the substantial connection necessary to conclude that South Dakota was the place of the employment relationship; and (2) because South Dakota was not the place of the employment relationship, the department did not have jurisdiction over this matter.

Matt Onnen was terminated from the position of registrar at Southeast Technical Institute (STI), an entity of the Sioux Falls School District, after STI officials found several degrees or diplomas had been approved and awarded by Onnen to students who had not earned them, and several students entitled to a degree or diploma had not received one. The Sioux Falls School Board affirmed the decision. Onnen appealed the District's and Board's decision to circuit court, which affirmed the District. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the District's decision was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion; (2) because Onnen was not a teacher at STI, he was not entitled to sixty days' notice before termination, and therefore Onnen was not denied procedural due process when he was terminated; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Onnen's motion for a new trial.

Pizza Hut hired Norman Williams, who was at the time on parole for a felony conviction involving a gang-related incident of mutual combat resulting in serious injury. While working at the restaurant, Williams allegedly attacked David Iverson. Iverson filed suit against Williams and Pizza Hut, asserting (1) vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) negligent hiring, (3) breach of duty to control an employee, and (4) negligent supervision. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Pizza Hut's favor on all four theories of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where (1) Pizza Hut's agency relationship was immaterial to Williams's tort, (2) because at the time Williams was hired he was only to have incidental contact with the public, Pizza Hut did not have a duty to inquire further into Williams's background, (3) because Iverson did not satisfy the foreseeability prong, he failed to show that Pizza Hut had a duty to control Williams, and (4) given the facts and circumstances, it was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on Pizza Hut to prevent Iverson from meeting with Williams at the restaurant.

Timothy Farmer, a patrol officer for the Rapid City Police Department, was investigated for excessive use of force relating to the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators of an assault. The Department later fired Farmer after finding, in addition to the most recent incident, Farmer had been the subject of several complaints for excessive force. The Department of Labor upheld the Police Department's decision. The circuit court affirmed, finding ample evidence to support the discharge. On appeal, Farmer contended that he never acted beyond the Department's use of force continuum policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Department of Labor and circuit court, holding that sufficient cause existed to discharge Farmer.

After the City of the Pierre and the International Union of Operating Engineers were unable to reach an agreement for employment contracts, the City imposed the terms and conditions of one of its previously proposed contracts that had been rejected by the Union. The Union filed for conciliation and fact-finding with the state Department of Labor, arguing the City could not impose the previously rejected contract until after the Department's conciliation and fact-finding process was complete. The trial court held in favor of the City, holding that the conciliation and fact-finding process was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore the City could unilaterally impose a contract any time after impasse was declared. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City could not impose a previously rejected contract until the Department's conciliation and fact-finding was complete. Remanded.