Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an in-home registered nurse, was injured in an automobile accident while driving her employer's vehicle to to a patient's home to perform her nursing duties. Plaintiff incurred $382,849 in medical expenses as a result of the accident. After Plaintiff's employer's workers compensation carrier (AIG) denied Plaintiff's workers compensation claim, Plaintiff filed a medical payments claim with Allstate, with whom Plaintiff had a personal automobile insurance policy that provided $100,000 in medical payments coverage. Allstate failed to provide medical payments benefits immediately to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and AIG later settled Plaintiff's worker's compensation claim for $150,000. Plaintiff then commenced this breach of contract and bad faith action against Allstate based on Allstate's failure to pay medical benefits. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law for $33,000 on the breach of contract claim and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred in excluding Allstate's evidence of AIG's acceptance of the worker's compensation claim, and that exclusion prejudiced Allstate's ability to defend the bad faith and punitive damages claims. View "Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a teacher employed by the Beresford School District. In 2011, the Beresford Board of Education voted not to renew Plaintiff's teaching contract for the upcoming year as part of a reduction-in-force (RIF). Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Board utilized the wrong RIF policy in not renewing her contract. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board correctly found that the policy for reductions in force was governed by a 2010-2011 negotiated agreement and properly followed the staff reduction policy contained in that agreement in deciding to terminate Plaintiff's employment; (2) the Board correctly applied the 2010-2011 RIF policy; and (3) the Board's decision to eliminate Plaintiff's position was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Huth v. Beresford Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Claimant was employed full-time by School District (District). The District later notified Claimant it was replacing her full-time position with a part-time position, which would consist of seventy-five percent of the time of Claimant's full-time position and a twenty-five percent reduction in pay. Claimant rejected the offer of the part-time position and filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor and Regulation, Unemployment Insurance Division concluded that Claimant was eligible to receive unemployment benefits, and an ALJ affirmed. The Secretary of the Department of Labor reversed, finding that Claimant was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits. The circuit reversed, concluding that the part-time position was not "suitable" employment and that Claimant had good cause to reject the offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Claimant was eligible for unemployment benefits because the twenty-five percent pay reduction made the part-time position unsuitable and gave Claimant good cause to reject the new position. View "Easton v. Hanson Sch. Dist. 30-1 " on Justia Law

Appellant worked for the City of Sioux Falls as an assistant city attorney. In 2010, Appellant was terminated for violating various subsections of the Sioux Falls City Ordinance. Appellant appealed and applied for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel discovery of certain documents including personnel records of other city employees. The trial court denied the writ, determining that the files were not relevant to Appellant's appeal of his termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge had jurisdiction to preside over the writ of mandamus; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the writ of mandamus, as Appellant did not prove the existence of a clear legal duty to act; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. View "Tornow v. Sioux Falls Civil Serv. Bd." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff's surgeon, Dr. Krouse, performed wrist surgery on Plaintiff's left wrist, Plaintiff visited another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Curd, complaining of continuing pain. Dr. Curd concluded that another surgery was necessary to remove the metal plate and screws implanted by Dr. Krouse. After the surgery was performed, Plaintiff brought suit for medical malpractice against Dr. Krouse and the hospital in which she was treated during her first surgery. A jury returned a verdict for Dr. Krouse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) excluding another doctor's previously undisclosed opinion that Dr. Krouse breached the standard of care; and (2) rejecting Plaintiff's proposed jury instruction on res ipsa loquitor. View "Thompson v. Avera Queen of Peace Hosp." on Justia Law

Claimant was injured on a job site while working in North Dakota for the North Dakota office of Hamm & Phillips Service Company. Claimant worked about sixty percent of the time in North Dakota and about thirty-five percent of the time in South Dakota and lived in South Dakota. Claimant filed for and received benefits through North Dakota's workers' compensation agency, but after about nine months of benefits, he received a benefit denial notification from the agency. Claimant then filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in South Dakota. While awaiting adjudication of that claim, Claimant died of causes unrelated to his injury. His wife (Wife) sought to substitute herself as a party in the South Dakota claim. The South Dakota Department of Labor granted Wife's motion to substitute but dismissed the claim for lack of statutory jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed the motion to substitute Sharon and affirmed the dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction because South Dakota was not the location of the employment relationship; and (2) did not reach the issue of substitution. View "Knapp v. Hamm & Phillips" on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant Megan Peterson worked at a nursing home owned by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan). Claimant alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her back when assisting a resident with a wheelchair. Good Samaritan denied the claim. Two doctors, who testified by deposition, disagreed whether Claimant suffered a work-related injury and whether employment was a major contributing cause of her back condition. The Department of Labor (Department), after considering the depositions and Claimant's medical records, determined that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable work-related injury. The Department also determined that Claimant failed to prove that her employment remained a major contributing cause of her condition and need for treatment. The circuit court affirmed. On de novo review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded that one of the doctor's opinions was sufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proving that her employment caused a work-related injury and that was and remained a major contributing cause of her back condition and need for treatment.

The Surgical Institute of South Dakota, P.C. filed suit against Dr. Matthew Sorrell who was formerly employed by the practice. The practice alleged breach of contract against the physician for failing to give required notice of resignation and breach of an implied contract resulting in unjust enrichment. The implied contract claim was dismissed by summary judgment; a jury found the physician did not breach the contract. The practice timely appealed the dismissal of its implied contract claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the practice's motion for a new trial. Additionally, the Court found that the practice did not show a "clear abuse of discretion" in excluding certain evidence from trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Defendant Paul Wentzlaff, an insurance agent, stole thousands of dollars from Harvey Severson, an elderly man who asked Defendant to help manage his financial affairs. Plaintiff Donald Hass, as personal representative for Severson’s estate, sued Defendant and two insurance companies who appointed Defendant as an agent, North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (North American) and Allianz Life Insurance of North America (Allianz). Hass and North American each moved for summary judgment and Allianz joined North American’s motion. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion and granted the insurance companies’ motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the insurance companies were vicariously liable for Defendant's acts. Based on undisputed material facts on the record in this case, the Supreme Court found that Defendant Wentzlaff was not acting within the scope of his employment when he stole money from Severson, and thus, as a matter of law, North American and Allianz were not vicariously liable for his acts. The Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies.

Michael Manuel, the sole owner of Toner Plus, Inc., closed his business on May 30, 2009. Manuel then filed a personal claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The South Dakota Department of Labor determined that Manuel was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he "voluntarily" dissolved his business and did not have "good cause" for doing so under S.D. Codified Laws 61-6-13 to -13.1 The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in finding the Department met its burden of showing Manuel's decision to terminate his employment with Toner Plus was voluntary; and (2) the Court did not need to address whether Manuel had "good cause" for voluntarily terminating his employment.