Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In February 2015, Samuel Paulino was injured while working as a custodian at Diversified Coatings, Inc. Despite undergoing surgery and various treatments, Paulino continued to experience persistent pain and limited mobility. His doctors assigned him impairment ratings of 12% to his lumbar spine and 13% to his whole person. Paulino argued that he was permanently and totally disabled under South Carolina law, which presumes total and permanent disability where there is a 50% or more loss of use of the back.The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Paulino total and permanent disability benefits, finding that he had sustained a 50% or greater loss of use to his back. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, stating that there was no medical evidence in the record to support the Commission's findings.The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that the lower court had misapplied the "substantial evidence" standard for reviewing decisions of the Commission. The Supreme Court noted that the Commission's decision was not solely based on medical evidence, but also considered Paulino's testimony about his pain and limitations, as well as the results of his functional capacity evaluation. The Supreme Court held that the Commission's award was supported by substantial evidence and should have been affirmed. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Commission's award. View "Paulino v. Diversified Coatings, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Dale Brooks, an employee of Benore Logistics Systems, Inc. Brooks claimed that he suffered a work-related repetitive trauma injury to his back due to the nature of his job as a "switcher" truck operator, which involved moving semitruck trailers and ocean freight containers to various points in a shipping yard. He substantiated his claim with medical evidence and testimony. However, his employer commissioned an ergonomics report that concluded his injury was statistically unlikely to have been caused by his work activities.The single commissioner ruled in Brooks's favor, but an appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission relied on the ergonomics report, reversed the single commissioner, and denied Brooks's claim. The appellate panel concluded that Brooks's job was not repetitive and that it was statistically unlikely that his back injury was caused by his work duties. The court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that the appellate panel did not have the authority to determine whether Brooks's job was repetitive and that any reliance on the ergonomics report was impermissible.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The court agreed that the appellate panel erred in its reliance on the ergonomics report to deny Brooks's claim. The court held that while the Commission does have the authority to determine whether an employee's job is repetitive, the appellate panel's decision that Brooks's job was not repetitive was unsupported by the substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, the court ruled that any reliance on an ergonomics report in a work-related repetitive trauma injury case is contrary to the rule of law and constituted reversible error by the appellate panel. The court remanded the matter to the Commission for it to calculate the benefits to which Brooks is entitled. View "Brooks v. Benore Logistics System, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Jeffrey L. Cruce, the former head football coach and athletic director for Berkeley High School, filed a lawsuit against the Berkeley County School District (the District) for wrongful termination and defamation. The defamation claim was based on an email circulated by an athletic trainer questioning the integrity of student athlete files maintained by Cruce. The court of appeals had ruled that Cruce was a public official for the purposes of defamation law, and thus required to prove actual malice to win his defamation claim, which the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA) grants the District immunity from.The Supreme Court of South Carolina disagreed, stating that being a public employee and enjoying media attention does not make Cruce a public official, as he did not have any official influence or decision-making authority about serious issues of public policy or core government functions. The court also rejected the District's claim that Cruce was a public figure, stating that the controversy over Cruce's coaching tactics did not affect large segments of society and was unrelated to the defamation claim. The court ruled that Cruce was not a public official, not a public figure, and that his defamation claim was supported by evidence, reversing the decision of the court of appeals and reinstating the jury's damages award. View "Cruce v. Berkeley County School Dist" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of South Carolina Supreme Court to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Metal Recycling Services, LLC, hired an independent contractor - Norris Trucking, LLC - to transport scrap metal. A truck driver employed by Norris Trucking hit the car Lucinda Ruh was driving and injured her. Ruh sued Metal Recycling Services and its parent company, Nucor Corporation, in state court. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court, which granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding Ruh did not allege an employer-employee relationship between the defendants and Norris Trucking or its driver, nor did she otherwise allege any basis on which the defendants could be liable for the negligence of their independent contractor. The district court delayed entry of judgment to allow Ruh to seek leave to amend her complaint. Ruh then moved to amend her complaint to add a claim that Metal Recycling Services itself was negligent in selecting Norris Trucking to transport the scrap metal. The district court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the complaint. The federal appellate court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether an employer could be subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent selection of an independent contractor. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative: an independent contractor relationship may be subject to liability for physical harm proximately caused by the principal's own negligence in selecting the independent contractor. View "Ruh v. Metal Recycling Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Stephany Connelly was a passenger in a vehicle driven by co-worker Freya Trezona during the course and scope of their employment when Trezona negligently caused the accident, injuring Connelly. Because workers’ compensation benefits did not fully redress Connelly’s injuries, she made a claim for bodily injury and uninsured motorist (UM) benefits with her own insurance carrier and with Trezona’s carrier. Both companies denied the claim, contending Connelly’s sole remedy lay with the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. Connelly filed suit seeking a declaration that both policies provided coverage. The parties agreed the dispute turned on the interpretation of the phrase “legally entitled to recover” found in the UM statute. The trial court ruled in favor of Connelly, and the court of appeals concurred the phrase was legally ambiguous. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the phrase unambiguous: the amount a plaintiff is “legally entitled to recover” under a UM provision of an insurance policy is the amount for which the plaintiff has secured a judgment against the at-fault defendant. Because the Act prevents Connelly from ever becoming “legally entitled to recover” from Trezona under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the trial court. View "Connelly v. Main Street America Group" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted three certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In this case, Curt Hall sued UBS Financial Services Inc. (UBS) (his former employer) and Mary Reid, a former co-worker, seeking to hold them liable for damages he allegedly incurred when he was fired by UBS. Hall's claims against UBS included one for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Hall's claims against Reid included one for tortious interference with contractual relations. The certified questions concerned the nature of Hall's at-will employment and the viability of Hall's causes of action in the employment at-will context. Hall did not concede he was an at-will employee. The Supreme Court held: (1) terminable at-will employment relationships are contractual in nature as a matter of law; (2a) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may arise in the context of terminable-at-will employment relationships; (2b) an employer's termination of an at-will employee does not constitute a breach of the relationship such that it may give rise to a claim by the former employee against the employer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) potential liability extends to third parties who are not fellow employees of the terminated employee. The Court issued a caveat to its responses to the district court's questions: it answered all questions under the assumption that no exception to the doctrine of at-will employment applies "our answers to these questions do not alter the established rule that, as long as an exception does not apply, an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason without incurring liability." View "Hall v. UBS Financial Services Inc." on Justia Law

Hystron Fibers, Inc. hired Daniel Construction Company in 1965 to build a polyester fiber plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. When the plant began operating in 1967, Hystron retained Daniel to provide all maintenance and repair workers at the plant. Hystron soon became Hoechst Fibers, Inc. Pursuant to a series of written contracts, Hoechst paid Daniel an annual fee and reimbursed Daniel for certain costs. The contracts required Daniel to purchase workers' compensation insurance for the workers and required Hoechst to reimburse Daniel for the workers' compensation insurance premiums. Dennis Seay was employed by Daniel. Seay worked various maintenance and repair positions at the Hoechst plant from 1971 until 1980. The manufacture of polyester fibers required the piping of very hot liquid polyester through asbestos-insulated pipes. He eventually developed lung problems, which were later diagnosed as mesothelioma, a cancer caused by inhaling asbestos fibers. Seay and his wife filed this lawsuit against CNA Holdings (Hoechst's corporate successor) claiming Hoechst acted negligently in using asbestos and in failing to warn of its dangers. After Seay died from mesothelioma, his daughter, Angie Keene, took over the lawsuit as personal representative of his estate. Throughout the litigation, CNA Holdings argued Seay was a statutory employee and the Workers' Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for his claims. The circuit court disagreed and denied CNA Holdings' motion for summary judgment. A jury awarded Seay's estate $14 million in actual damages and $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied CNA Holdings' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again finding Seay was not a statutory employee. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly determined the injured worker in this case was not the statutory employee of the defendant. View "Keene v, CNA Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

William Crenshaw, a tenured professor of English at Erskine College, filed suit claiming he was wrongfully fired. A jury found in favor of Dr. Crenshaw and awarded him $600,000. However, after review of the College's appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court determined the trial court properly granted Erskine's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because, as a matter of law, Erskine did not breach its contract with Dr. Crenshaw. View "Crenshaw v. Erskine College" on Justia Law

Danny Crane sought workers' compensation benefits for hearing loss and brain injuries he alleged he suffered in a work-related accident. The workers' compensation commission denied most of Crane's claims, finding he was not entitled to benefits for temporary total disability, permanent impairment, or future medical care. The primary basis for denying these three claims was the commissioner who initially heard the case found Crane was not credible. The court of appeals reversed the commission's denial of temporary total disability benefits, but otherwise affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the commission's denial of permanent impairment and future medical care benefits, finding the commission erred in denying Crane's claims based on credibility without explaining any basis on which credibility could justify ignoring objective medical evidence. The matter was remanded to the commission for a new hearing on all three claims, and before a different commissioner. View "Crane v. Raber's Discount Tire Rack" on Justia Law

In August 2013, Timothy York drowned when his boat capsized on a pond at Longlands Plantation in Greeleyville, South Carolina. The deceased's brother and personal representative of the estate filed a claim for death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Although there were initially several individuals who were potential dependents, only York's mother and his girlfriend, Yvonne Burns, claimed death benefits. Burns noted she began seeing the deceased in the late 1990s, but the parties separated before reuniting sometime in 2004-2005. She worked approximately fifty hours per week as a nurse's aide, and filed as head of the household on her tax returns, indicating no one else could claim her as a dependent. Her house was in her name, and she only used "York" on a furniture contract, purportedly because she planned to marry him. Although several witnesses testified she planned to marry while others were unaware of this fact, no one testified that they were in fact married. Burns claimed she was the deceased's common-law wife or alternatively, that she was a dependent under the Act. Whether Burns could qualify as a dependent was the issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review. The commission found that because Burns was engaged in an illicit relationship in violation of South Carolina’s fornication statute, she could not recover the death benefits as a matter of public policy. The court of appeals reversed, finding, notwithstanding the fact the girlfriend’s initial claim was based on being the deceased's common-law wife, there was no evidence of fornication in the record. Because the relevant facts were not in dispute, the Supreme Court reversed and awarded benefits to the deceased’s mother. View "York v. Longlands Plantation" on Justia Law