Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was severely injured when he was assaulted by a stranger in the West End of the City of Providence. Petitioner had been sent to that location by his employer, Verizon New England. Petitioner subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge denied Petitioner's request, concluding that Petitioner's injuries were noncompensable under Rhode Island's actual-risk test, which requires that there be some causal connection between the injury suffered by the employee and the employment or the conditions of employment. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decree of the appellate division and remanded, holding that Petitioner's injuries were compensable under the street-peril doctrine. View "Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a sergeant with the police department, applied for accidental disability benefits for post traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder. The Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (retirement board) denied Petitioner's application. The superior court affirmed the retirement board's decision on the basis of his conclusion that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because Petitioner failed to timely file her appeal and because the facts would not justify equitable tolling of the deadline for filing an appeal. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the superior court and remanded with directions that Petitioner's appeal be considered as timely pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to toll the deadline. View "Rivera v. Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to eight felony counts relating to his unethical conduct as a member of the town council. On the day of his sentencing, the U.S. district court entered an order of forfeiture requiring Defendant to forfeit $46,000 to the federal government, representing the bribe money Defendant received to perform official acts as town council member. While Defendant was employed, he had contributed $30,554 to the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI). While a member of the town council, Defendant had contributed $5,490 to the Municipal Employees' Retirement System (MERS). Both ERSRI and MERS were administered by the Retirement Board of ERSRI (Board). After the Board refused to refund Defendant's contributions to ERSRI, Defendant filed a complaint against the Board, contending that the Board was obligated to return his contributions to him. The trial justice (1) revoked Defendant's MERS pension in its entirety, and (2) ordered the Board to return to Defendant the contributions he had made to ERSRI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because the federal court issued neither a judgment nor an order of restitution against Defendant, the Board had no statutory basis upon which it could refuse Defendant's demand for a return of his contributions. View "Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of Employees' Ret. Sys. of R.I." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while he was working for Defendant. Plaintiff began receiving partial disability benefits. Several years later, Plaintiff was notified that his benefits would be terminated. Plaintiff filed a petition requesting continuation of his benefits and/or a finding that he was totally disabled. After a trial, the workers' compensation court (WCC) denied the petition. The appellate division of the WCC affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari and affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to partial incapacity benefits because, contrary to Plaintiff's position, his failure to regain his earning capacity did not constitute a "material hinderance" to his finding employment suitable to his limitations within the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws 28-33-18.3(a)(1); and (2) section 28-33-18 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Rhode Island Constitution. View "Nichols v. R&D Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as a school bus driver, broadcasted that the bus she was driving, which was full of elementary-school children, had been struck by gunfire and that panic had spread among the children. Displeased with the manner in which Plaintiff handled the situation, the Town of Johnson school department requested that Plaintiff no longer be assigned to transport Johnson students. Eventually, Plaintiff left her employment. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination against members of the Johnson public schools (Defendants), alleging that Defendants wrongfully requested that Plaintiff be terminated from her employment. In response to the trial justice's remarks, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to include a claim of tortious interference, which the trial justice denied. Thereafter, the superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint without specific findings. Remanded. View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the City of Newport provided health insurance benefits to its retired firefighters. After the City decided to modify those benefits, Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, ALF-CIO (Union) filed grievances and sought arbitration. The City responded by seeking relief in the superior court to determine the arbitrability of disputes over changes to these benefits. The superior court determined that this dispute was not arbitrable. The Union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare, and therefore, such disputes must be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration. View "City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendant, the Cranston School Department, seeking grievance arbitration of adverse actions taken against them as to their respective coaching positions at Cranston West High School. Plaintiffs, both of whom were teachers at Cranston West, separately filed grievances against Defendant in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was in place between the Cranston Teacher's Alliance and the school department. Defendant responded that the CBA did not apply to Plaintiffs in their capacity as coaches, and it refused to submit to arbitration. Plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to binding arbitration as guaranteed by the CBA. The superior court ruled in favor of Defendant, determining that Plaintiffs, in their capacity as coaches, were not entitled to avail themselves of the CBA's grievance procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was correct in determining that Plaintiffs' coaching positions were contractually distinct from their teaching positions and did not constitute professional employment; and (2) Plaintiffs in their coaching capacities had no right to pursue relief based on the rights bargained for by the alliance on behalf of its teacher-members and as contained in the CBA. View "Sacco v. Cranston Sch. Dep't" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roderick McGarry appealed a final judgment in favor of Defendant Town of Cumberland School Department which granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of his age. After a jury trial, the verdict was returned in plaintiff's favor. However, the trial justice granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff contended the trial justice's post-trial Rule 50 ruling was in error and argued that the jury verdict should be reinstated. Specifically, plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred by granting judgment as a matter of law because: (1) defendant failed to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff; and (2) the trial justice erred in ruling that an adverse inference resulting from the spoliation of evidence, without additional extrinsic evidence, could not satisfy plaintiff's burden of proof (plaintiff contended that he did present such extrinsic evidence). Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed the superior court, and partly reversed. The Court found the trial justice erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court agreed with the trial justice in granting defendant's motion for a new trial. The case was remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.

Defendant Brown University appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of Plaintiff Beverly Haviland in her action for declaratory relief. The issue arose over placement of Haviland in a tenured teaching position as a condition to the employment contract her husband, another tenured professor would receive. The husband would not accept a position with Brown unless the university made room for his plaintiff. Through a series of letters ad negotiations, plaintiff accepted Brown's offer of employment. When her contract was due for renewal, issues arose over promises made in those letters and negotiations that became the subject of this dispute. Brown contended that there was no justiciable issue in this case because plaintiff could not demonstrate an injury in fact, as she did not face any actual or imminent loss of employment. Brown also asserted that the trial justice erred in determining the existence of an implied-in-fact contract between the plaintiff and Brown because insufficient evidence was presented to establish an enforceable promise of de facto tenure. Further, Brown contended that no tenure-like standard of review applied to plaintiff because only the Brown Corporation was vested with the authority to grant tenure and none of the University administrators who communicated with plaintiff were vested with actual or apparent authority to provide the plaintiff with de facto tenure. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Brown's arguments and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in this case.