Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine whether the Superior Court erred by declining to validate a restrictive covenant contained in an employment agreement, solely because the restrictive covenant was not expressly referenced in an initial offer letter which conditioned employment on the execution of the employment agreement. Upon concluding the Superior Court did not properly characterize the offer letter, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pulse Technologies v. Notaro" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted 24 Pa.C.S. 8507(e) to require that the Public School Employees' Retirement System nomination of benefits form be completed in its entirely in the member/decedent's own hand in order to effectuate a valid change of beneficiary. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court erred, and held that the Board correctly determined that under the facts of this case, section 8507(e) allowed for distribution of retirement benefits at issue to the appellant. View "Snizaski v. Public School Employees' Retirement Board" on Justia Law

Appellant Sabrina Bowman appealed a Superior Court’s order affirming the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which granted Sunoco, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed appellant's negligence claim. Appellant was employed as a private security guard with Allied Barton Security Services. In exchange for employment, she signed a Workers' Compensation Disclaimer whereby she waived her right to sue Allied's clients for damages related to injuries covered under the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellant was later injured when she fell on ice and snow while working at one of Sunoco's refineries. She filed a workers' compensation claim and received benefits. Thereafter, appellant filed a negligence claim against Sunoco, alleging failure to maintain safe conditions caused her injury. After discovery revealed the disclaimer and appellant's receipt of benefits, appellee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating appellant's claim was barred by the disclaimer. Finding no error in the Superior Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bowman v. Sunoco, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant Dorothy Robinson was a police officer for the City of Pittsburgh. In 1997, she sustained a work-related injury, and the City placed her on light-duty. In 2001, while traveling for treatment of her injury, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident in which she sustained new injuries. After the accident, Claimant did not return to her light-duty position nor was she offered any other light-duty work. In late 2004, Claimant received a disability pension. In connection with Claimant’s claim of entitlement to a disability pension, she was examined by three physicians who certified that Claimant was unable to perform her pre-injury job as a police officer. Nearly three years later, an independent medical examiner concluded that although Claimant was not fit to perform her prior job as a police officer, she could perform modified-duty work. The City filed a Petition to Suspend Compensation Benefits, asserting that Claimant was capable of working, "but has voluntarily removed herself from the work force as she has not looked for or sought employment in the general labor market." Claimant filed a response, denying the averments of the suspension petition and asserting that she remained attached to the workforce and had registered for work with the Pennsylvania Job Center. She further claimed that she was not presently working only because of the unavailability of work and because the City had eliminated her light-duty position. The Workers' Compensation Judge denied the suspension petition, concluding that Claimant had not voluntarily removed herself from the workforce. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the assignment of the burden of proof when the employer sought to modify or suspend a claimant's benefits on the basis that the claimant had retired. The Commonwealth Court plurality devised a "totality of the circumstances" test and concluded that the City failed to show that the injured worker had voluntarily withdrawn from the workforce. The City appealed, but the Supreme Court concurred with the Commonwealth Court and affirmed. View "City of Pittsburgh v. WCAB (Robinson)" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a doctor who treats prison inmates has a common law duty to warn corrections officers that a particular inmate has a communicable disease. Appellee Michelle Seebold filed suit against Appellant Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS"), alleging a single cause of action expressly grounded in negligence. Appellee worked as a corrections officer at the prison and was assigned to strip search its female inmates before and after they received visitors. The complaint asserted that approximately twelve inmates were infected with methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). As a result of Appellee's contact with the inmates, she averred, she became infected. Appellee contended that PHS's staff knew or should have known of the infections and owed a duty of reasonable care to "the staff and inmates at SCI Muncy to warn them of and protect them from acquiring an MRSA infection from those inmates known to be carrying the bacteria in a communicable state." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellee had not asserted a cause of action under Commonwealth case law, and "[i]n the absence of policy arguments or a request for an opportunity to develop a record, the [trial] court did not err in applying the default approach of declining to impose upon professional undertakings new affirmative common-law duties running to third-parties to the professional relationship." The Court reversed the superior court and reinstated the trial court's order. View "Seebold v. Prison Health Services" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the "voluntary layoff option" proviso ("VLO Proviso") contained in Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law ("UC Law"), permits employees to receive unemployment compensation benefits when they accept an early retirement plan offered pursuant to an employer-initiated workforce reduction. Upon application of our rules of statutory construction, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and concluded that the UC Law does not preclude application of the VLO Proviso to early retirement plans offered pursuant to employer-initiated workforce reductions. View "Diehl v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a superior court order that reversed an order denying appellee's petition for post conviction relief and for remanding for an evidentiary hearing. Appellee Joseph Abraham was accused of soliciting a former student for sex, and for allegedly sexually assaulting her. When the allegations surfaced, the then 67-year-old Appellee retired from teaching and began receiving pension payments. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellee pled guilty to corruption of a minor and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age. He was sentenced to probation; no direct appeal was filed. Because the crime of indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age is one of the enumerated offenses in the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA), appellee forfeited his pension when he pled guilty to this charge. He filed a motion to withdraw his plea nunc pro tunc, alleging he was not informed of his right to seek withdrawal of his plea or of the possible sentences he faced. The trial court denied the motion. Appellee filed a timely PCRA petition alleging plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him he would forfeit his pension upon pleading guilty. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed. "Because counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advise a defendant regarding the collateral consequences of a plea, appellee's ineffectiveness claim fails." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court granting appellee a PCRA hearing on the issue of prejudice, and remanded the case to reinstate the PCRA court's order denying appellee relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Abraham" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a Workers' Compensation employer's insurance carrier should be reimbursed from the Supersedeas Fund for specific payments made to a claimant prior to the ultimate grant of supersedeas. The question turned on whether the relevant payments constituted payments of "compensation" within the meaning of Section 443 of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), 77 P.S. 999(a), or, as argued by Appellant Bureau of Workers' Compensation, whether the payments are not reimbursable because they constitute payment of legal costs associated with obtaining a claimant's third-party tort settlement under Section 319 of the WCA, 77 P.S. 671. After review, the Court found no language in either Section 443 or Section 319 that would transform the relevant payments into something other than compensation merely because the amounts of the payments were calculated to compensate the claimant for the costs of recovering the third-party settlement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. View "Bureau of Workers' Comp, Aplt v. WCAB(Excelsior Ins.)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether the immunity provisions of Section 23 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act 44) applied to "subrogation and/or reimbursement claims sought against an employee who has entered into a third[-]party settlement with a Commonwealth [p]arty such as Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ('SEPTA')." Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of Act 44 at issue in this case barred any claim made by the employer for the recoupment of workers' compensation benefits it paid. View "Fraizer v. W.C.A.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a labor arbitration award, issued pursuant to the Public Employe Relations Act ("PERA"), and reinstating an employee discharged for acts constituting sexual harassment, violated well-defined and dominant public policy. Concluding that it did, the Court affirmed an order of the Commonwealth Court, and vacated the award. View "Phila. Housing Authority v. AFSCME" on Justia Law