Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A worker alleged that he suffered a back injury while employed at a meat processing company. The employer’s workers’ compensation insurer investigated the claim and issued a written denial, stating that the injury was not work-related. The worker requested a hearing to challenge the denial. After this request, the insurer required the worker to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) by a physician of its choosing. The IME report supported the insurer’s denial, concluding that the worker’s preexisting condition, not a work injury, was the major cause of his disability. The worker’s own physician disagreed with the IME’s findings. The worker then requested authorization for a worker requested medical examination (WRME), citing the conflict between the IME and his physician’s opinion.The Workers’ Compensation Division’s Medical Resolution Team denied the WRME request, reasoning that the IME had been conducted after the insurer’s initial written denial. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld both the denial of compensability and the denial of the WRME request, relying on the IME report as persuasive evidence. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s decisions. The worker’s estate, after his death, pursued judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board’s denial of the WRME request and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the insurer’s denial was “based on” the IME report.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the statutory interpretation of ORS 656.325(1)(e). The court held that whether a denial of compensability “is based on” an IME report should be determined at the time the WRME request is decided, not at the time of the initial hearing request. Because the insurer relied on the IME report to defend its ongoing denial, the worker was entitled to a WRME. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the Workers’ Compensation Board, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teitelman v. SAIF" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a nurse, the plaintiff, and her former employer, the defendant hospital. The plaintiff alleged that her termination was in retaliation for her complaints about safety issues. She brought five claims for relief, but only three statutory claims went to the jury: whistle-blower retaliation, unlawful retaliation, and unlawful employment practice. The jury found in favor of the defendant on the first two claims and in favor of the plaintiff on the third claim. The trial court entered a general judgment reflecting these verdicts.The defendant appealed the general judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a "cat's paw" jury instruction, which allowed the jury to impute the bias of the plaintiff's coworkers to the defendant. The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was improper and reversed and remanded for a new trial. The trial court then vacated the general judgment and ordered a retrial of all three claims, including those on which the defendant had prevailed. The defendant appealed this order, but the Appellate Commissioner dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case to determine whether the trial court's order was appealable under ORS 19.205(3). The court concluded that, after the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the general judgment, there was no longer a general judgment in place. Therefore, the trial court's order determining the scope of the retrial was not an order made "after a general judgment" and was not immediately appealable under ORS 19.205(3). The orders of the Court of Appeals were affirmed. View "Crosbie v. Asante" on Justia Law

Plaintifff Pattyann Larsen filed employment discrimination and other claims against her former employer shortly after her debts had been discharged by the federal bankruptcy court, but she had failed to list those claims as assets in her bankruptcy case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the bankruptcy trustee—not plaintiff— was the real party in interest. The court then denied plaintiff’s motion to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff and dismissed the case based on its conclusion that plaintiff’s attempt to pursue this action in her own name was not an “honest and understandable mistake.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying substitution. THe Oregon Supreme Court reversed: under ORCP 26 A, a motion to substitute the real party in interest as the plaintiff, if granted, would require plaintiff to amend the complaint under ORCP 23 A. “We have interpreted the standard specified in that rule—leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’—to mean that leave to amend should be granted absent any unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party. The text, context, and legislative history of ORCP 26 A confirm that the standards governing leave to amend the pleadings under ORCP 23 A also apply in deciding whether to allow substitution of the real party in interest under ORCP 26 A.” Defendant did not contend that it would be unfairly prejudiced if the bankruptcy trustee were to be substituted as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that, because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it abused its discretion in denying substitution and dismissing this case. View "Larsen v. Selmet, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Oregon legislature intended to create an exception to ORS 656.018, the so-called “exclusive remedy” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, for injured workers whose claims have been deemed noncompensable on “major contributing cause” grounds. While employed by defendant Shore Terminals, LLC as a terminal operator, plaintiff Danny Bundy was assigned to stay and monitor the air quality from malfunctioning machinery without being given safety equipment, and he was exposed to dangerous levels of diesel, gasoline and ethanol fumes. After that incident, defendant initially accepted a workers’ compensation claim for "non-disabling exposure to gasoline vapors." Later, plaintiff asked defendant to accept and pay compensation for additional conditions arising out of the same incident, including "somatization disorder" and "undifferentiated somatoform disorder." Defendant specified that it was treating each of plaintiff’s subsequent requests as a "consequential condition claim" and was denying those claims on the basis that plaintiff’s work exposure was not the major contributing cause of the subsequent conditions. Plaintiff challenged those denials through the workers’ compensation system, but he was unable to establish that the work incident was the major contributing cause of his somatoform disorders. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately issued a final order determining that the disorders were not compensable conditions because plaintiff failed to establish that his work-related incident was the major contributing cause. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Workers’ Compensation Law generally immunized covered employers against civil liability for injuries arising out of a worker’s employment. Plaintiff argued, however, that his case fell within a statutory exception to that rule and that the trial court and Court of Appeals, both of which ruled in defendant’s favor on that legal question, erred in concluding otherwise. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s statutory argument failed, and that the trial court and Court of Appeals therefore did not err. View "Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Claimant Hipolito Coria sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing a penalty that the Workers’ Compensation Board imposed on respondent SAIF for unreasonable claims processing. The board imposed the penalty pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a), which provides, in part, that, if an “insurer . . . unreasonably refuses to pay compensation,” the insurer “shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due,” plus penalty-related attorney fees. On review, the parties disagreed about the board’s reason for imposing the penalty. They also disagreed about many of the procedural and substantive legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the board’s imposition of the penalty was not supported by substantial reason because the board’s order failed to “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them.” Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the board to explain its reasoning; necessarily, the Court did not reach the parties’ arguments about the legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). View "SAIF v. Coria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lindsay Buero brought a class action against defendants Amazon.Com Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc. in Oregon state court, alleging, among other things, that defendants had violated Oregon’s wage laws by failing to pay employees for time spent in mandatory security screenings at the end of their work shifts. Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the time spent in the security screenings was not compensable. In support of that argument, defendants cited Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, (574 US 27), a case involving a similar claim against defendants, in which the United States Supreme Court held that, under federal law, time spent in the security screenings at issue in that case was not compensable. The district court agreed with defendants, noting the similarities between Oregon administrative rules enacted by the state’s Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) and federal law. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed a motion asking that court to certify a question to the Oregon Supreme Court on whether time spent in security screenings is compensable under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded Oregon law aligned with federal law regarding what activities were compensable. Therefore, under Oregon law, as under federal law, time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings before or after their work shifts is compensable only if the screenings are either: (1) an integral and indispensable part of the employees’ principal activities or (2) compensable as a matter of contract, custom, or practice. View "Buero v. Amazon.com Services, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed this class-action complaint against defendants, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court granted review of the matter, finding that plaintiff and defendants executed a contract—the “Driver Services Agreement” (DSA)—for plaintiff to provide delivery services for defendants. The DSA stated that drivers are independent contractors. The DSA includes a section on dispute resolution. That section provides that any party “may propose mediation as appropriate” as a means for resolving a dispute arising out of or relating to the DSA. It then provided that, if the parties did not pursue mediation or mediation failed, “any dispute, claim or controversy” arising out of or relating to the DSA—including disputes about “the existence, scope, or validity” of the DSA itself—would be resolved through binding arbitration conducted by a panel of three arbitrators. The DSA also included a savings clause, which allowed for the severance of any invalid or unenforceable term or provision of the DSA. On review, plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement within the DSA was unconscionable because it required him to arbitrate his wage and hour claims but prohibited the arbitrators from granting him relief on those claims. Plaintiff based his argument on a provision of the arbitration agreement that stated that the arbitrators could not “alter, amend or modify” the terms and conditions of the DSA. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant’s reading of the DSA, as did the Supreme Court: read in the context of the DSA as a whole, the provision that the arbitrators may not “alter, amend or modify” the terms and conditions of the DSA “is not plausibly read as a restriction on their authority to determine what terms are enforceable or what law is controlling.” View "Gist v. Zoan Management, Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered on the loss of use or function of claimant’s right knee, specifically, reduced range of motion and decreased stability in that knee, that was determined to be entirely related to causes other than claimant’s compensable workplace injury. In addition, claimant had loss of use or function of that same knee, surgical value and chronic condition loss, that was related to the workplace injury. In claimant’s view, she was entitled to the full measure of impairment for all new findings of loss: the reduced range of motion, the decreased stability, the surgical value, and the chronic condition. On judicial review, the Court of Appeals agreed with claimant, holding that “claimant’s impairment ‘as a whole’ included her whole-person impairment, of which the work injury is a material contributing cause, as well as her impairment due to loss of range of motion and stability.” SAIF disagreed and sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that findings of loss due entirely to causes other than the compensable injury did not satisfy the statutory definition of “impairment” and, accordingly, should be excluded from an injured worker’s permanent partial disability award. The Supreme Court agreed with SAIF: claimant was not entitled to compensation for the reduced range of motion and decreased stability findings of loss. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the order of the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. View "Robinette v. SAIF" on Justia Law

This case involved the definition of the term "impairment" in the context of Oregon's workers' compensation statutory scheme, and whether claimant Marisela Johnson’s loss of grip strength (that was determined to be caused in material part by an accepted, compensable condition and, in part, by a denied condition. Claimant contended that ORS 656.214 entitled an injured worker to compensation for the full measure of impairment due in material part to, and resulting in material part from, the compensable injury, including any impairment stemming from the denied condition, if applicable. SAIF Corporation disagreed, arguing that the definition of impairment did not include loss caused by a denied condition because it was not “due to” the “compensable industrial injury.” The Oregon Supreme Court concluded claimant was entitled to the full measure of her impairment. View "Johnson v. SAIF" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law