Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff City of Jenks sought a declaration that the defendant, a probationary police trainee employed by plaintiff, was an at-will employee and that 11 O.S.2011, secs. 50-123, did not require plaintiff to provide a cause for the defendant's dismissal or provide him with a board of review hearing. The district court found that plaintiff met the exception to 50-123's requirement that it establish a board of review because it had entered into a collective bargaining agreement and that defendant was an at-will employee who was not entitled to a post-termination hearing under the statute, the collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of due process. The Supreme Court affirmed: "the Legislature did not intend to give probationary police trainees the right to be fired only for cause and a post-termination hearing before a board of review. When the Legislature enacted the 1995 amendment redefining 'member' in section 50-101(6), it must have overlooked the impact the new definition would have on section 50-123(B). This resulted in an ambiguity as to whether a probationary police trainee could be fired without cause and without a right to post-termination hearing. We resolve that ambiguity by finding that the term 'member' as it is defined in section 50-123 does not include a probationary police trainee." View "City of Jenks v. Stone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address two issues: (1) whether a political-subdivision employer may be required to provide workers' compensation benefits to an off-duty employee injured while providing services to a private entity; and (2) whether, under the facts presented, the claimant's salaries from his full-time employment as a deputy sheriff and his part-time job as a security officer may be combined when determining the amount of benefits to which the employee is entitled. Respondent-claimant John David Waldenville was injured while acting as a security guard for petitioner Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. Initially, Cattlemen's contended that Waldenville was an independent contractor but later conceded that it had workers' compensation coverage for him through their insurer. Nevertheless, the employer continued to assert that Waldenville was an employee of respondent, Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when injured. The trial court determined that: Cattlemen's was the employing entity when the employment-related injury occurred; Oklahoma County should be dismissed pursuant to 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 2b(G); Cattlemen's was estopped to dispute employee status based on the payment of workers' compensation premiums associated with Waldenville's employment; no evidence existed indicating that the employee was acting in his official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff at the time of the incident; and because the duties that Waldenville was carrying out at the time of his injury were the same or similar to those he executed as a Deputy Sheriff, the claimant's salaries were to be combined for establishment of weekly rates. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the "plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, mandatory, and unequivocal" language of 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 313(G) mandated that private employers, hiring off-duty municipal employees, alone shall be responsible for the payment of workers' compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring during the hours of actual employment by the private employer; and (2) under the facts of this case, claimant was engaged in the same, or substantially similar, employment to that of his profession as a Major with the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when he was injured, warranting the combination of salaries for purposes of determining workers' compensation benefits. View "Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. v. Waldenville" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma worker was killed at Employer's jobsite in Texas. The employer's insurer paid the worker's Widow death benefits provided by Texas workers' compensation law. The widow also recovered damages in a wrongful death tort action in Texas. When the Insurer sought subrogation from the widow's wrongful death damages as allowed by Texas law, she filed suit in Oklahoma to prevent subrogation. She sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of Oklahoma workers and their dependents were governed by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding the worker's injury or death in another state, and any benefits that may be paid under another state's workers' compensation law. In particular, Widow asked the Oklahoma court to enforce the provision in Oklahoma law that forbids subrogation in cases of death benefits. The trial court granted the declaratory relief sought by the widow. On appeal by the Insurer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the widow had to commence a proceeding by filing a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court before Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction over the benefits due the widow, including enforcement of the anti-subrogation provision in death benefit cases. Because she never filed a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Civil Appeals held subrogation was proper. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and vacated the appellate court in this case. View "Holley v. ACE American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

First American Cash Advance, owned by Valued Services, L.L.C. was robbed twice. The first robbery occurred on New Year's Eve 2008, and the second was in the spring of 2009. Respondent-Claimant Leslie Tregenza was the branch manager and the only employee on the premises during both robberies. A man wearing something covering his face and a ball cap committed the first robbery; in the second, two men stole all of the cash on hand in the office. These men did not have guns. However, one of the robbers threw an empty plastic cash drawer at respondent's head. She did not return to work for her employer after the second robbery. Claimant filed her Form 3 in October 2009, alleging an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. She alleged she sustained an injury to her head with psychological overlay in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and PTSD headaches. She sought permanent total disability (PTD) as a result of her injuries, claiming she was unable to work or to be out in public. The trial the court concluded respondent was permanently totally disabled and awarded her continuing medical maintenance in the nature of four annual office visits and prescription medication. The employer appealed the trial court's holding and the appellate court reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Workers' Compensation Court received competent evidence that Claimant was permanently totally disabled. The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the order of the lower court. View "Valued Services, LLC v. Tregenza" on Justia Law

Charles Sheffer, Jennifer Sheffer, and their minor son, J.S., were injured when their tractor trailer collided with a rental vehicle leased to William Garris and driven by David Billups, employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. They also sued the Buffalo Run Casino, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, and PTE, Inc. for dram-shop liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under a theory of respondeat superior and did not negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. The trial court also dismissed, sua sponte, the Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., and the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, determining that injunctions issued by the Western District of Oklahoma prohibited suit for any tort claims against a tribe or a tribal entity. Plaintiffs appealed both orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Peoria Tribe was immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims because Oklahoma state courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction as the term is used in the model gaming compact. Furthermore, the Court found that because Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal immunity from private, state court dram-shop claims and because the Peoria Tribe and its entities did not expressly waive their sovereign immunity by applying for and receiving a liquor license from the State, the tribe was immune from dram-shop liability in state court. View "Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino" on Justia Law

In 2009, respondent Adrian Melton suffered an on-the-job accident while working for his employer, Joe Brown Company, Inc. He was awarded eleven weeks of temporary total disability, granted permanent partial disability, and a psychological overlay. The employer appealed the award, which vacated some parts and sustained others. In 2011, the employer appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which vacated the permanent partial impairment award because it failed to comply with the AMA Guides (5th Edition), and that an "any competent evidence" standard of review was inconsistent with 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340, so the court used the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard which had recently been revised. Respondent petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the COCA decision, arguing that the appellate court should have used the "any competent evidence" standard. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because respondent's injury happened before the new standard went into effect, the "any competent evidence" standard should have been applied. With regard to respondent's awards of disability, the Court found that psychological overlay was not supported by appropriate expert testimony. Accordingly, the benefits as they related to the overlay were vacated. View "Joe Brown Company, Inc. v. Melton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (the Sheffer family) were injured when their truck collided with a rental vehicle leased to and driven by employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law that Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under that theory, and did not negligently entrust the rental to the employees. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded reasonable minds could have differed on whether the employees were in the course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident and whether Carolina Forge negligently entrusted the vehicle to them. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Claimant Nancy Bertrand injured her right foot when she slipped on a wet floor while employed as a child care worker for Respondent Laura Dester Center (Employer). She sought certiorari review of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which sustained the Workers' Compensation Court's (WCC) denial of her request for travel costs to and from a vocational rehabilitation facility. Claimant contended that her allowance for travel expenses was effectively eliminated under the new Workers' Compensation Code, enacted August 26, 2011, which set a minimum for reimbursement of twenty miles round-trip. Claimant's total round-trip mileage was fourteen miles for which she was previously paid prior to the effective date of the Code. The trial court ordered the new law was procedural and could be applied retroactively. But after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC ordered vocational rehabilitation before August 26, 2011, and the treatment facility was outside the city limits of Claimant's hometown. As such, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bertrand v. Laura Dester Center" on Justia Law

Petitioner Vincent James Hogg, Sr. sought review of a Workers' Compensation Court order which denied his workers' compensation benefits based upon the court's interpretation of 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). Petitioner was employed by the Oklahoma County Juvenile Detention Center when in late 2011, he sustained an injury to his right shoulder and neck while subduing an unruly and combative juvenile. Petitioner was given a post-accident drug screen and a follow-up screen the next day. Both screens showed a "positive" result for the presence of marijuana in his system. Petitioner did not dispute the test results but Petitioner denied ever smoking marijuana. The trial court ultimately found there was no evidence presented to establish Petitioner was "high," nor was there any evidence to establish the marijuana in his system was the "major cause" of the accidental injury. The trial court did, however, deny Petitioner's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits by reason of its interpretation of the newly created 85 O.S. 2011, section 312 (3). The dispositive issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. The trial court found the last sentence of paragraph 3 expressed the legislative intent of the entire paragraph without giving any weight to the other sentences in the same paragraph. In its order, the trial court indicated this sentence created an irrebuttable presumption. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court concluded that Petitioner overcame the rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hogg v. Oklahoma Cty. Juvenile Bureau" on Justia Law

Claimant Charles Prince filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court in 2009 alleging a cumulative trauma employment-related injury to his right foot, with date of last exposure in late 2008. The trial court found Claimant sustained a cumulative trauma injury to his right foot and ordered Employer, Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc., to select a physician to treat Claimant and to provide "such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, diagnostic testing and referral as may be deemed necessary by the treating physician to the claimant's right foot." The court found his date of last exposure was late 2008. Claimant sought compensation for injury to his right foot, and later for his low back arising from the same injury. The trial court of the Workers' Compensation Court denied his claim for the low back, and a three judge panel affirmed. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) vacated the panel's order, holding the order was against the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of the award for Claimant's lower back was supported by competent evidence. COCA found more evidence in support of Claimant's low back injury, but Employer presented evidence from its medical expert which denied that the injury to either the low back or the right foot arose out of Claimant's employment. "The date of the injury determines the law to be used in a workers' compensation claim and applies equally to employers and claimants alike." Based on the Supreme Court's decision in "Williams Companies, Inc. v. Dunkelgod," (2012 OK 96 (2012)), and the law on the date of Claimant's injury, the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was vacated. View "Prince v. Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc." on Justia Law