Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Joseph Starkey was injured while working for Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation allowed Starkey's claim for, inter alia, a sprained hip and degenerative osteoarthritis of the left hip. Builders appealed to the county court, challenging Starkey's right to workers' compensation for osteoarthritis. The trial court entered judgment for Builders, holding (1) that a claim for aggravation of a preexisting condition is separate and distinct from a claim for that underlying condition itself, and (2) administrative action on one such claim did not without more confer jurisdiction on the court to consider the other. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Starkey could participate in the fund for degenerative osteoarthritis based on evidence that his work-related injury had aggravated his preexisting medical condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because aggravation of a preexisting medical condition is a type of causation, it is not a separate condition or distinct injury as defined in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.01, and (2) an appeal taken pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 allows the claimant to present evidence on any theory of causation pertinent to a claim for a medical condition that already has been addressed administratively.

Appellant Aaron Rents, Inc. (ARI) challenged an order from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation that retroactively reclassified the jobs of certain ARI employees for purposes of workers' compensation premiums. ARI objected to the retroactive reclassification and argued that the bureau had abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain why it rejected ARI's request for prospective reclassification only. The court of appeals denied ARI's writ of mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that (1) ARI's ability to challenge the bureau's decision was compromised because the order did not explain why retroactive rather than prospective reclassification was favored and (2) further explanation was required as to why the bureau reached its decision in order for the court to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. The Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and granted a limited writ ordering the bureau to vacate its order and issue an amended order including an explanation for its decision.

Appellant Cheryl Waiters was employed by the city of Cleveland. When the city discharged Waiters from employment, the union of which Waiters was a member filed a grievance and later demanded arbitration. The arbitrator found the city had discharged Waiters without just cause and ordered that she be reinstated to employment. Waiters then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement to her former position with back pay and an award of attorney fees. The city subsequently reinstated Waiters to her former job. The court of appeals denied Waiters's writ, concluding that her claim for reinstatement was moot and that she failed to establish her entitlement to back pay or attorney fees. Waiters appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) Waiters's reinstatement claim was rendered moot when she was reinstated; (2) as a bargaining-unit employee who was represented by the union in the grievance and arbitration process, Waiters was relegated to the arbitration proceeding in which the dispute concerning the amount of back pay she would be entitled to was being decided; and (3) Waiters was not entitled to attorney fees.

Appellant Juan Lackey, who drove trucks for Penske Truck Leasing Company, injured his knee at work. After surgery was performed, Lackey returned to work and filed retirement papers with Penske. Nothing in his retirement documents indicted that Lackey's retirement was connected to the industrial injury. Following his retirement, Lackey requested temporary total disability compensation (TTC). A district hearing officer for Lackey, the state industrial commission, denied the request, finding Lackey had voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to his injury and Lackey's retirement constituted a voluntary abandonment of the entire labor market. On appeal, a staff hearing officer affirmed. Lackey appealed to the commission, and the commission denied the appeal. The court of appeals denied Lackey's mandamus action after finding the commission's findings were supported by evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lackey's retirement was unrelated to his injury, and, accordingly, Lackey could receive postretirement TTC only if he were gainfully employed elsewhere and prevented from doing that job by his industrial injury.

After appellee Mary Williams was hired as a full-time residential social worker at appellant Bridgeway, Inc., a community mental health center, Bridgeway offered Williams a promotion. The promotion was conditioned on the requirement that Williams obtain certification as a Licensed Independent Social Worker (LISW) within 15 months. Because Williams did not obtain her LISW certification within the time required, she was terminated. Williams' application for unemployment compensation was disallowed by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, which determined that Williams had been discharged with just cause. On appeal, the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The court of common pleas denied Williams's subsequent appeal. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Williams's requirement to obtain an LISW certification was not fairly applied to other program managers. Bridgeway appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that when employment is expressly conditioned upon obtaining or maintaining a license or certification and an employee agrees to the condition and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain or maintain the license or certification, an employee's failure to comply with that condition is just cause for termination for unemployment compensation purposes.

Appellant Luiz Paneto injured his left foot and ankle at work. After surgery, Paneto still used a cane to walk and had a limp. Paneto moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for scheduled loss compensation, alleging a total loss of use of his left leg. The commission denied the application after finding Paneto's loss of use was not total. After being awarded permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, Paneto reapplied for total-loss-of-use compensation, alleging his PTD award was a new or changed circumstance that warranted reconsideration of the previous denial. The commission disagreed and further appeal was refused. The court of appeals upheld the commission's order. After Paneto filed his notice of appeal the commission terminated Paneto's PTD compensation after learning Paneto concealed his full-time employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding (1) because the PTD compensation was terminated, it is not a new or changed circumstance sufficient to permit the commission to reopen the issue of scheduled loss benefits; and (2) the evidence supports the commission's determination that Paneto did not have a total loss of use, which negates the need for any further discussion.

Appellee Sutton injured his back while on the job at Tomco. Sutton reported the injury to Tomco's president, after which Sutton was fired. Sutton filed suit against Tomco asserting a statutory claim for unlawful retaliation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90 and a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court granted Tomco's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Sutton appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against Sutton on the statutory claim and reversed the judgment against Sutton on the public-policy claim, holding that the discharge violated public policy as expressed in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees; (2) Ohio recognizes a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when employees are retaliated against after they are injured on the job but before they file, institute, or pursue a workers' compensation claim; and (3) the remedies available for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against retaliatory employment actions are limited to those listed in the statute.

Appellant Jamey Baker was struck in the right eye by a piece of metal while working for appellee. After the piece was removed and the laceration of the cornea was repaired, Baker underwent cataract surgery. Immediately following the accident and prior to the cataract surgery several months later, Baker experienced an eight percent visual impairment. At issue was whether the surgical removal of the lens of an eye in the course of treatment for a workplace injury entitles the injured worker to compensation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 42123.57(B) for a total loss of sight. A staff hearing officer with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation granted an award for a total loss of vision in the right eye, and the Industrial Commission vacated the order. The court of appeals denied Baker's writ of mandamus, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court calculated Baker's loss of sight based on the percentage of vision actually lost as a result of the injury, prior to any corrective surgery. Because Baker's loss of uncorrected vision did reach the statutory threshold of twenty-five percent, Baker's injury was not compensable under the statute.