Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between the second and seventh district courts of appeals concerning whether a certified police officer who was appointed chief of police in a township with less than 10,000 residents, a police department with less than ten officers, and no civil service commission had the automatic right upon termination to return to the position he held before his appointment as chief of police pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 505.49. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff, a former chief of police, had no right to return to the position in the police department that he held before his police chief appointment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed based upon its reading of section 505.49, holding that the former chief of police had no automatic right to return to a position that he held prior to appointment.

After Employee, an electrician, received a work-related injury, Employee sought additional workers' compensation benefits, alleging that Employer committed a violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), which proximately caused his industrial injury. The requirement in question directs employers to supply protective apparatus to employees working on specified electrical equipment. A staff hearing officer (SHO) for the Industrial Commission of Ohio granted Employee's VSSR application after finding that Employer had violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-12(A). Employer filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in finding a VSSR. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer violated section 4123:1-5-12(A) because it did not supply Employee with protective equipment for the main breaker cabinet Employer worked on when he was injured.

County Commissioners passed a resolution establishing an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP). The resolution made the plan available to all employees of Commissioners except for the sanitary engineering division. A few days before passage of the resolution, some employees of the division filed a grievance regarding eligibility for the retirement plan. None of them were members of Union, a bargaining unit of employees who worked for the sanitary engineering division, but at least four Union members attended the hearing. The county administrator determined that the division employees were not permitted to participate in the retirement plan. Union filed a taxpayer action against Commissioners, on behalf of all union-member division employees, seeking a declaration that the ERIP was in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 145.297. The trial court agreed and held for Union. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Union lacked standing to bring a taxpayer action against Commissioners, and to the extent that Union had standing in its own right, Union failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and (2) therefore, the issue of whether Commissioners' ERIP was in violation of section 145.297 was moot.

After she was told in advance that her contract for employment would not be renewed, Stacey Carna, the principal of an elementary school, requested a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract. Without meeting with Carna, the board voted not to renew Carna's contract. The common pleas court denied Carna's subsequent request for mandamus relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that after an administrator has been informed that her contract will not be renewed, upon the administrator's request for a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract, Ohio Rev. Code 3319.02(D)(4) requires the board to meet in executive session with the administrator to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal. Remanded.

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison.

Rick Warner was a construction worker who had periods of unemployment each year that were the result of seasonal layoffs. After being injured at work, Warner asked the Industrial Commission of Ohio to establish his average weekly wage (AWW) for the purpose of awarding future compensation. At issue was the treatment to be accorded those weeks of unemployment in calculating Warner's AWW. A commission staff hearing officer excluded from the wage total the amount of unemployment compensation received but included in the weekly divisor the number of weeks that Warner did not work. The court of appeals subsequently issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to further consider Warner's request. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals judgment ordering further consideration of the adequacy of Warner's job search, as, in setting the AWW, any period of unemployment due to causes beyond the employee's control shall be eliminated from the weekly divisor; and (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals judgment ordering the commission to include the amount of Warner's unemployment compensation from his wage total.

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. Employee filed a notice of appeal but failed to name as an appellee the administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Employee later filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, this time naming the administrator as a party pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. The court of common pleas dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied Employee's motion to amend his petition. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Employee's failure to name the administrator in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of common pleas of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 4123.412's requirements that a party appealing from an Industrial Commission order name the administrator as a party of the appeal and serve the administrator with notice of the appeal are not jurisdictional requirements; and (2) Employee perfected his appeal by amending the complaint to name the administrator as a party and then notifying him by serving him with a copy of the amended complaint, thus vesting the common pleas court with jurisdiction to rule on his motion to amend.

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee returned to light-duty work but complained about his job duties. Employer offered him another position within his physical limitations, but Employee resigned. Employee subsequently filed a motion for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied the request. After Employee's claim was additionally allowed for another medical condition, Employee filed a new motion for TTD benefits. The Commission awarded Employee benefits based on new and changed circumstances from the Commission's previous order. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its second order and to enter an order denying TTD compensation, concluding that the Commission had abused its discretion when it relied on the additionally allowed medical condition as a new and changed circumstance since the previous order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee did not present evidence to justify the Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) Employee was ineligible to receive TTD compensation for the period requested because his injury was not the reason that he could not return to his former position of employment.

Appellant filed for disability-retirement benefits with Appellee, the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (OP&F), claiming that he was disabled as a result of the performance of his official duties of the police department. The OP&F board denied Appellant's application for benefits. Appellant subsequently requested a writ of mandamus to compel the OP&F board to award him disability-retirement benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that the report of a psychiatrist supported the board's determination that Appellant was not permanently and totally disabled due to a psychiatric or psychological impairment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OP&F did not abuse its discretion by relying on the psychiatrist's report to support its decision; and (2) Appellant waived his argument that the OP&F board abused its discretion in denying him benefits because he was also physically disabled from continuing work.

Frank Bilaver left his job with Fluid Line Products after Fluid Line denied him an extended leave of absence. Bilaver later applied for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, which the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied after finding that Bilaver's decision to leave Fluid Line constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's decision. Bilaver appealed, arguing that his departure from Fluid Line was involuntary because he did not quit his job but was instead fired in a manner that did not comply with State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. controlled in this case, and (2) lacking evidence that Bilaver secured another job and was prevented from doing it by his industrial injury, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying TTD compensation.