Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employee was suspended from his position with City and, therefore, was not working when City discharged him. Employee subsequently filed an action against City for retaliatory discharge under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. Employee alleged he did not learn he had been discharged until almost six weeks after the date City claimed the discharge occurred. The trial court ruled the allegation was not relevant to, and did not delay the commencement of, the ninety-day period following the discharge for the employer to receive written notice of Employee's claim that his discharge had been retaliatory under section 4123.90. The court, therefore, found Employee's ninety-day notice letter untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in general, "discharge" in section 4123.90 means the date the employer issued the notice of employment termination, not the date of the employee's receipt of that notice or the date of the employee's discovery of a section 4123.90 cause of action; but (2) the facts of this case may require an exception to the general rule. Remanded. View "Lawrence v. Youngstown" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment denying the request of Appellant for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, Columbus State Community College, to provide access to its complaint files, litigation files, and certain e-mails, and to award statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not establish by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that Columbus State violated Ohio Rev. Code. 149.43 by denying her record requests and that the court of appeals did not err by (1) denying Appellant's request for access to the requested complaint and litigation files, as Appellant's request was overbroad; (2) denying Appellant's request for e-mails based on her claim that Columbus State had violated section 149.43(B)(2) by not initially organizing its records so that work-related e-mails could be retrieved based on sender and recipient status, as section 149.43(B)(2) does not expressly require public offices to maintain e-mail record so they can be retrieved based on sender and recipient status; and (3) determining that Columbus State had complied with section 149.43(B)(2). View "State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Certain individuals who worked for American Chemical Society (ACS) founded Leadscope Inc. and later received a patent for technology similar to that on which they worked while at ACS. ACS filed a lawsuit against Leadscope. A newspaper subsequently published an article about the suit quoting ACS's counsel. In pertinent part, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Leadscope on its counterclaims for defamation and unfair competition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld the appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's denial of ACS's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the unfair competition claim, holding (i) a party alleging a claim for unfair competition must show the action is baseless and the opposing party had the intent to injure the party's ability to be competitive, and (ii) the jury instructions here did not meet that test, but the jury could not reasonably have made any other determination with proper instructions; and (2) reversed the appellate court's finding that the trial court properly overruled ACS's motion for JNOV on Leadscope's counterclaim for defamation, holding (i) ACS's statements were not defamatory, and (ii) a client is vicariously liable for its attorney's defamatory statements only if the client ratified the statements. View "Am. Chem. Soc'y v. Leadscope, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a classified civil-service employee, filed a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Miami County Sheriff's Office and Sheriff Charles Cox, to reinstate him pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 145.362 to his previous deputy-sheriff position and salary or to a similar position and salary and to award him back pay and benefits. The court of appeals held that Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of a civil-service appeal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR) from the sheriff's office's refusal to perform the requested actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) classified civil-service employees like Appellant have an adequate remedy by administrative appeal to SPBR from an employer's refusal to reinstate them to their salaries and former positions; and (2) Appellant waived his claim that the collective-bargaining agreement between the sheriff's office and the employee union prevented him from instituting an appeal to SPBR. View "State ex rel. Byers v. Sheriff'Âs Office" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Five years later, Employee was fired for violating the company's attendance policy. Employee's termination was later the basis for the Industrial Commission of Ohio's denial of his request for temporary total disability compensation (TTC). The Commission found that Employee's discharge amounted to a voluntary abandonment because it was consequence of behavior that Employee willingly undertook. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the deliberate misconduct necessary to support a finding of voluntary abandonment could not be imputed to Employee. The Supreme Court affirmed and issued a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and returned the cause to it for further consideration, as the hearing officer did not carefully examine the totality of the circumstances in finding that a simple allegation of misconduct existed to preclude temporary total disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant worked in the classified position of human-services hearing manager with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). In December 2004, Appellant was assigned additional duties. Appellant was not informed that the assumption of these duties would move his position to the unclassified service. In December 2005, ODJFS suspended Appellant for violations of the code of conduct and subsequently removed him from his position. Appellant appealed his removal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), basing his appeal on Ohio Rev. Code 124.11(D), which grants state employees who move from classified positions to unclassified the positions the right to resume the classified position held before the appointment to the unclassified position. The SPBR found that Appellant was an unclassified employee when he was suspended and dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its director to reinstate him to his previous classified position of human-services hearing manager or a substantially equal position, without the duties assigned to him in December 2004 that moved his position into the unclassified service. Remanded.

In 2008, Craig Ali was a police officer for appellant, the village of Oakwood. That spring, his department assigned him to perform traffic-control duties on a highway-construction project overseen by appellee, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. Ali was injured while performing those duties. At issue was which entity was Ali's employer for purposes of his workers' compensation claim. A district hearing officer with the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Kokosing was Ali's employer at the time of injury. A staff hearing officer reversed, finding the correct employer was Oakwood Village. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission, when confronted with two potential employers, may, but is not required to, use any of the State ex rel. Lord v. Daugherty and Fisher v. Mayfield factors it believes will assist analysis; (2) therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion by not directly discussing the three enumerated Lord/Fisher factors; and (3) the staff hearing officer's decision was supported by evidence in the record.

Appellee received temporary total disability compensation (TTC) for a period of a year and a half during which time Appellee also helped his wife with her business. Appellee was not paid for his services. Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio learned of these activities, determined that they constituted "work," and concluded that TTC should not have been paid. Accordingly, the TTC award was vacated and overpayment was declared. In addition, the Commission found McBee had committed fraud by submitting disability paperwork during the relevant time period, in which Appellee certified he was not working. The court of appeals overturned the finding of fraud after concluding that the evidence did not prove McBee knew that his unpaid activities for his wife's company constituted "work" for purposes of TTC eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that McBee knowingly misled the Commission because there was no evidence McBee knew his unpaid activities constituted work that would preclude TTC.

Appellant had an allowed workers' compensation claim arising from a 2002 injury. Appellant retired from Appellee a year later and never worked again. In 2009, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) after finding, among other things, that Appellant had abandoned the work force for reasons unrelated to his injury. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying TTC. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not credibly assert that he had lost income due to his industrial injury, and therefore, the Commission did not err in denying TTC.

At issue in this appeal was whether a court should enforce several employees' noncompete agreement transfers by operation of law to the surviving company when the company that was the original party to the agreement merged with another company. Here the trial court concluded that the employees did not intend to make the noncompete agreements assignable to successors such as the surviving company. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in this case, the language the agreement dictated that the surviving company could not enforce the agreement after the merger as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original company.