Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal presented issues regarding the scope of a workers' compensation appeal in common pleas court pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. Specifically, the appeal concerned whether, in that proceeding to determine a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund, the court was limited to considering those issues that were specifically determined by the Industrial Commission below, or whether the de novo nature of the proceeding obligated the claimant to present and the court to consider all the evidence necessary for determining the claimant's right to participate. The court of appeals rejected the claimant's claim that the trial court erred in placing the burden on him to establish any injury-relatedness or causation in his section 4123.512 appeal because those issues were not considered in the administrative rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the de novo nature of a section 4123.512 appeal proceeding puts in issue all elements of a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund. View "Bennett v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers Comp." on Justia Law

This workers' compensation case came before the Supreme Court on an appeal of right from the court of appeals' judgment granting Claimant a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its August 6, 2009 order. Appellants, Industrial Commission and Claimant's employer, sought to reinstate the August 6 order, which vacated a previously allowed claim for temporary total disability compensation on the grounds that a later statement by Claimant's examining physician had repudiated that same physician's earlier certifications that the disabling injury had not yet reached maximum medical improvement. On appeal, Claimant argued that the Commission lacked adequate grounds to exercise continuing jurisdiction, which it needed in order to invalidate the earlier order. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief, finding that the subsequent repudiating opinion of Claimant's examining physician could not be relied upon by the Commission to support the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in exercising continuing jurisdiction over this case. View "State ex rel. Knapp v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between the Third and Tenth District Courts of Appeals. The issue was whether after a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund has been established, a trial court abuses its discretion under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512(F) when it awards the claimant his or her costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund. The Court held (1) when a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund is established on appeal, section 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award the claimant his or her costs; (2) under section 4123.512, a trial court is not required to apportion costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition; and (3) accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by awarding costs under section 4123.512(F) when it reimburses a claimant for costs incurred on appeal without regard to the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. View "Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether Appellant, Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS), properly denied applications for federal wage subsidies filed by Appellees, three former employees of American Standard who later were reemployed at a lower wage before they reached the age of fifty. The Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission denied Appellees' eligibility for the subsidies. The court of common pleas reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because ODJFS offered a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language in the federal statute that established the wage subsidies, ODJFS did not improperly deny the applications. View "Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Appellee was working as an apprentice lineman for Appellant, an electrical-utility construction contractor, when he came into contact with an energized line and received an electric shock, which caused severe burns. Appellee filed this action against Appellant, alleging workplace intentional tort in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01 and common law. He alleged that Appellant knew with substantial certainty that he would be injured when working alone in an elevated lift bucket near energized high-voltage power lines without the use of protective rubber gloves and sleeves. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) protective rubber gloves and sleeves are personal items that an employee controls and do not constitute "an equipment safety guard" for purposes of section 2745.01(C), and an employee's failure to use them, or an employer's failure to require an employee to use them, does not constitute the deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard; and (2) consequently, Appellee failed to establish a rebuttable presumption of intent pursuant to section 2745.01(C), and Appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co." on Justia Law

Appellant unsuccessfully sought postretirement total disability compensation (TTC). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application after finding that she had voluntarily abandoned the work force when she took disability retirement for a condition that was unrelated to her workplace injury. The court of appeals agreed and denied Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc. and State ex rel. Pierron v. Indus. Comm'n, holding that the Commission did not did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reinstate TTC, as Appellant voluntarily removed herself from the work force by taking disability retirement because she still had the physical ability to work. View "State ex rel. Rouan v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This matter was before the Supreme Court on a motion for reconsideration filed by Appellant, Acordia of Ohio, LLC (the LLC). The Supreme Court granted the motion. In Acordia I, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that while the noncompete agreements of employees (Appellees), who were originally employed by a contracting employer, transferred by operation of law following merger with the LLC, the language found in those agreements precluded the LLC from enforcing them as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting employer. Upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the language in Acordia I stating that the LLC could not enforce the employees noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the original contracting company's shoes was erroneous; and (2) the LLC here may enforce the noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting companies, provided that the noncompete agreements are reasonable under the circumstances of this case. View "Acordia of Ohio, LLC v. Fishel" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an application for permanent total disability (PTD). The Industrial Commission of Ohio found Appellant was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied her request for PTD. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's allowed conditions did not foreclose sustained remunerative employment was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to view Appellant's rehabilitation efforts favorably; and (3) the Commission did not improperly factor the economic climate into the PTD equation. View "State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

This was an original action in mandamus by relator, JobsOhio, asking the Supreme Court to (1) find that legislation authorizing the creation of JobsOhio to promote economic development in the state and to assume responsibility for the merchandising and sale of alcohol in the state was constitutional, and (2) compel respondent, the Ohio Department of Commerce director, to execute an agreement to transfer the state's liquor business to JobsOhio. The Supreme Court dismissed the cause because it did not properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the court, as it essentially sought either a declaratory judgment or an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the statute rather than presenting a justiciable controversy. View "State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman" on Justia Law

Bay Mechanical & Electrical Corporation, a specialty mechanical contractor, challenged a sales-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner with respect to Bay's purchase of allegedly taxable employment services. During the audit period, Bay purchased the services from two entities. Bay treated the personnel supplied by the entities as "permanent-assignment" employees, and therefore regarded the attendant employment services as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(JJ)(3). The commissioner denied the exemption on the ground that the evidence offered by Bay was insufficient to prove entitlement to the exemption. The board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it upheld the tax commissioner's sales-tax assessment against Bay because the contracts and testimony offered by Bay did not satisfy the one-year and permanent-assignment criteria of section 5739.01(JJ)(3). View "Bay Mech. & Elec. Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law