Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employee was injured while in the course and scope of his employment. Employee's industrial claim was allowed for certain injuries. Fourteen years later, Employee successfully requested compensation for the total loss of the functional use of his right arm. Based on the Industrial Commission's award for loss of use, one year later Employee filed a motion for compensation for statutory permanent total disability. A staff hearing officer denied the application. The court of appeals granted Employee's writ of mandamus, concluding that the loss of use of Employee's arm could not be relitigated and that the Commission was bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel to issue the award. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the writ of mandamus, holding (1) the Commission must conduct an independent evaluation of the facts when considering an application for statutory permanent disability under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.58(C) even if a prior award for the same body parts has been given pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(b); and (2) the evidence in the record supported the basis for the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Coleman v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

Employee was involved in a motor-vehilce accident while operating a one-ton dump truck within the course of his employment by Employer. Employee applied for and received benefits for his physical injuries. Employee subsequently requested an additional allowance for posttraumatic-stress disorder (PTSD) that arose contemporaneously as a result of the accident. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC) allowed Employee's additional claim. The trial court held that Employee's PTSD was not compensable because it did not arise from his physical injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a claimant's PTSD to qualify as a compensable injury under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.01(C)(1), the claimant must establish his PTSD was causally related to his compensable physical injuries and not simply to his involvement in the accident; and (2) the court of appeals appropriately determined that the record contained competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Employee's physical injuries did not cause his PTSD and that Employee's PTSD was, therefore, not a compensable injury under section 4123.01(C)(1). View "Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co. " on Justia Law

Appellants were five upper-level employees of the Ohio Department of Natural Resource's Division of Wildlife (DOW). The Ohio inspector general (OIG) asked a deputy inspector to investigate alleged misconduct of a DOW wildlife officer. The inspector interviewed Appellants. The OIG's subsequent investigative report concluded that Appellants failed to report the wildlife officer's criminal conduct to the appropriate authorities. A grand jury later indicted each appellant on obstructing justice and complicity in obstructing justice. Appellants filed motions to suppress or, alternatively, dismiss, on the ground that their statements to the investigator were coerced by threat of job loss and were therefore inadmissible under Garrity v. New Jersey. The trial court suppressed Appellants' statements as compelled and therefore inadmissible under Garrity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Appellants' statements during the OIG investigation required suppression because Appellants answered questions after receiving a warning that they could be fired for failing to do so, and statements extracted under these circumstances cannot be considered voluntary within the meaning of Garrity. View "State v. Graham" on Justia Law

In 1990, Employee was working for Employer when she injured her left ankle. By 2009, Employee had multiple surgeries and was taking approximately fourteen medications. That same year, a Dr. Randolph concluded Employee required no further medical treatment for her 1990 industrial injury and other allowed conditions in her claim and that her current medications were no longer necessary. Employee subsequently filed a motion with the Industrial Commission for the loss of use of her left arm. Based on Dr. Randolph's addendum to his original report, a hearing officer denied Employee's motion for compensation for the loss of use of her arm. Employee filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied, concluding that Dr. Randolph's second and third reports, issued as addenda to his original report, constituted some evidence upon which the Commission could rely to support its decision denying Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the addenda of Dr. Randolph constituted some evidence to support the Commission's decision to deny Employee's request for compensation for the loss of use of her left arm, the Commission did not abuse its discretion, and the court of appeals properly denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Kish v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

Relators in this case were instructors who were hired to instruct students in the Jefferson County's virtual learning academy (VLA), a cyber school for grades K-12. In 2008, the State Teachers Retirement Board of Ohio (STRS) determined that the VLA instructors were independent contractors instead of employees and refunded all contributions made by Jefferson County Educational Service Center Governing Board (Jefferson County ESC) on the VLA instructors' behalf. Relators sought writs of mandamus to compel the STRS to accept employer and employee contributions to its retirement fund and to compel the Jefferson County ESC to make employer contributions to the retirement system on their behalf. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relators failed to establish that the STRS abused its discretion in determining that they were not "teachers" within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 3307.01(B)(5) because the instructors were independent contractors, and not employees, of the Jefferson County ESC. View "State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Ret. Bd. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured during the course and scope of his employment. Appellant filed a motion for temporary total disability compensation, which a hearing officer granted. The Industrial Commission later terminated temporary total disability compensation based on the report of doctor who stated that the allowed conditions in Appellant's workers' compensation claim had reached maximum medical improvement. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the Commission acted contrary to law when it relied on the report of the doctor. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the doctor's report constituted some evidence upon which the Commission could rely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctor's report was sufficiently reliable to constitute some evidence to support the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Coleman v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

Relator, a trucking company, sought a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) Registrar and the Department of Public Safety Director, to provide an unredacted, noncertified copy of the driving records of the trucking company's employee at cost. This case was consolidated with a direct appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals involving the same parties and the same issues but a different driving record. The BMV refused to provide the copies at cost but instead, following the BMV rule, required Relator to specify the basis for its entitlement to an unredacted copy and to pay a $5 fee for a certified copy. Relator claimed it should be able to receive an unredacted copy at cost under the Public Records Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District in one case and denied the writ in the other case, holding (1) the BMV properly promulgated the rule at issue under its rule-making procedure; and (2) therefore, disclosure of the records was prohibited under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act and its counterpart in Ohio unless Relator could demonstrate a permissible use. View "State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin" on Justia Law

A truck driver (Driver) was injured in 2005 in a traffic accident for which he was cited. Because it was his third moving violation in one year, Driver was dropped from his employer's liability insurance policy, and consequently, the employer fired him. The Industrial Commission initially concluded that Driver was not eligible for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation because his discharge was a voluntary abandonment of employment. A year later, a staff hearing officer approved a request for TTD compensation, concluding that Driver's discharge was not voluntary abandonment under the recently decided State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm'n. The Commission invalidated the hearing officer's decision. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to award benefits or to reconsider the denial of benefits in accordance with Gross. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Driver was discharged for the same misconduct that caused his industrial injury, the discharge was not tantamount to a voluntary abandonment of employment that precludes TTD compensation; and (2) the Commission abused its discretion when it reconsidered the order on the basis of res judicata. View "State ex rel. Haddox v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Employee worked in the aisle of a warehouse where he sustained injuries when a co-worker operating a sideloader struck him. Employee sued Employer, asserting the company had deliberately intended to injure him by directing him to work in the aisle with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to occur. The trial court granted Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Employee failed to show Employer intended to injure him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact that Employer objectively believed the injury to Employee was substantially certain to occur. At issue on appeal was the recently enacted statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01(A), which specifies that an employer is not liable for an intentional tort unless the employee proves the employer had the intent to injure or believed the injury was "substantially certain" to occur. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by ignoring the statutory definition of "substantially certain" and holding Employer could be held liable for Employee's injuries if "objectively believed" the injury was substantially certain to occur; and (2) no evidence existed that Employer deliberately intended to injure Employee by directing him to work in the warehouse aisle. View "Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc." on Justia Law