Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Heier appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision affirming the termination of his employment with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding Heier was unlawfully disciplined multiple times for one instance of misconduct, and the Court ordered Heier reinstated with backpay. View "Heier v. N.D. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab. " on Justia Law

James Mickelson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits. He argued WSI erred in deciding he did not suffer a compensable injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded WSI misapplied the definition of a compensable injury, and the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mickelson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Cornel Kilber appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Grand Forks Public School District No. 1 ("District") decision to discharge him from his teaching position with the District for conduct unbecoming the position of a teacher. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Kilber was not denied a fair discharge hearing and that any claimed procedural errors that occurred during the hearing were harmless.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis Meier appealed a judgment dismissing his appeal from an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision. The ALJ affirmed a decision by the Department of Human Services to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Plaintiff did not properly perfect his appeal because he failed to serve the notice of appeal and specifications of error on Human Resource Management Services.

Plaintiff-Appellant Danni Lynch appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her action against The New Public School District No. 8 for breach of contract, damage to professional reputation, intentional infliction of emotional harm and negligent infliction of emotional harm. Appellant had taught fifth grade classes at Stony Creek school for eighteen years. In 2008, she was informed she would be transferred to Round Prairie school to teach second grade. She sent a letter to the District's superintendent asking why she was being transferred. The District responded that the decision to transfer her was made "to promote the best interests of the students" and that the decision would not be changed. Appellant did not show on the first day she was to teach second grade; the District construed Appellant's letter explaining why she was a no-show as a resignation. Appellant then filed suit against the District. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Appellant was not entitled to a notice of nonrenewal; (2) the District did not violate its grievance procedures; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to compel discovery. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Appellant Robert Johnson appealed a district court's judgment affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision that North Dakota Workforce Safety Insurance (WSI) was not liable for his right shoulder condition, and that he had a retained earnings capacity of $290.00 per week. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "a reasoning mind" reasonably could have found Appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his right shoulder pain was substantially accelerated or substantially worsened by his work injury and vocational training, and that WSI proved Appellant had a retained earnings capacity of $290.00 per week. Accordingly, the Court affirmed WSI's judgment.

Appellant Beverly Fetzer appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order denying her request for benefits. While walking down a hallway on her employer's premises and during work hours, Appellant thought she heard someone call her name. Turning in response, she caught her foot and fell, fracturing her left hip and wrist. No cause of the fall was apparent. Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with WSI, and WSI denied her claim. Appellant submitted a request for reconsideration; WSI issued an order consistent with its prior decision, determining Appellant’s injury "occurred in the course of, but did not arise out of" her employment. WSI added, "Mere walking, without more, is not an activity that is sufficiently linked to Claimant's employment so that the injury can be deemed to have arisen from employment." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “If merely being at work was sufficient to show causation, the legislature need not have required the 'arising out of' test." Appellant was unable to prove a causal connection between her employment and injury.

Richard and Elaine Benson, Bill and Mary Bliven, Don and Annette Feist, Pat Lynch, and Lloyd and Donna Tribitt ("Bensons") appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed their claim that SRT Communications, Inc.,was contractually obligated to provide them post-retirement health and medical benefits. The Bensons are four retired employees of the Minot telephone business, their spouses, and Pat Lynch, the widow of a deceased retiree, Thomas Lynch. Richard Benson, Bill Blevin, Don Feist, Lloyd Tribitt, and Thomas Lynch worked for NSP before it sold its telephone business to Minot Telephone in 1991, and they all retired from Minot Telephone between 1991 and 1994, before Souris River purchased Minot Telephone from Rochester. With the exception of Don Feist, the retired employees belonged to Local Union No. 949 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers when the labor union and NSP entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 1991. Feist previously had been a member of the labor union, but did not belong to the union when it entered into the 1991 collective bargaining agreement with NSP. The district court concluded the 1991 collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1993, and although SRT Communications continued to provide post-retirement health benefits to the Bensons for over fourteen years after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, it did so as a matter of business discretion and not because of a contractual obligation. The district court dismissed the Bensons' claims against SRT Communications. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the Bensons' action was governed by federal law and they failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact.

Appellant Valerie Joy Tronnes appealed a judgment that affirmed the Job Service of North Dakota's decision to deny her claim for unemployment benefits. In 2002, Appellant began working part-time at the Wal-Mart Vision Center. In 2010, Appellant received her paycheck (via a debit-card style card), and purchased a few items at Wal-Mart's customer service center. The amount of the purchase was mistakenly credited to Appellant's account by a different employee rather than deducted, which resulted in a substantial benefit to Appellant. Appellant met with the vision center manager about the extra money on her card, but later testified she believed the amount to be correct. The store gave Appellant the option of resigning as a result of her spending the extra money, but believed the paid time off she was given ( a "D-day"-- so named to give Appellant a day to decide whether to remain employed at Wal-Mart) meant she would be fired soon. Store management negotiated a payment plan for Appellant to repay the amount she was credited and allowed her to return to work. Ultimately the "repayment plan" took the form of the store withholding Appellant's subsequent paychecks to cover the indebtedness. Appellant did not report to work after that payday, and subsequently filed for unemployment benefits. The Job Service determined Appellant was ineligible for benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence in the record supported the Job Service's denial of benefits to Appellant.

Appellant Richard Dregseth appealed a district court's judgment that dismissed his equitable claims against Appellee Randy Brown. Appellant argued that the district court erred in failing to make findings of fact, failed to reject testimony and dismissed his promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. In 1999, Appellant left his job at Bremer Bank to work for Appellee Brown at Capital Harvest, Inc., a captive finance company for AGSCO, Inc., a corporation owned Brown. Appellant worked for Brown until 2003, first at Capital Harvest then at AGSCO. In 2005, Appellee and two former Capital Harvest employees, John D. Erickson and Jon A. Ramsey, sued Brown and Capital Harvest for breach of contract, fraud, deceit, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty. Appellee claimed he was entitled to be paid the value of an ownership interest in Capital Harvest that Brown promised to provide as part of his compensation. Prior to trial, the district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims except for breach of contract and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part of the first appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Appellant's deceit and equitable claims. On rehearing, the district court then dismissed the remaining claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In this case before the Supreme Court, the Court found that the district court's findings and conclusions were based on evidence from all of the witnesses, including Appellant, Brown and the economists who testified on behalf of both parties. Therefore the Court concluded the district court did not err relying on that evidence, nor did it err concluding under the facts of this case that Brown was not unjustly enriched by not paying Appellant for the value of the ownership interest in Capital Harvest that was not transferred by Brown. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no error to make findings of fact, to reject testimony or in dismissing Appellant's claims.