Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Richard Dregseth appealed a district court's judgment that dismissed his equitable claims against Appellee Randy Brown. Appellant argued that the district court erred in failing to make findings of fact, failed to reject testimony and dismissed his promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. In 1999, Appellant left his job at Bremer Bank to work for Appellee Brown at Capital Harvest, Inc., a captive finance company for AGSCO, Inc., a corporation owned Brown. Appellant worked for Brown until 2003, first at Capital Harvest then at AGSCO. In 2005, Appellee and two former Capital Harvest employees, John D. Erickson and Jon A. Ramsey, sued Brown and Capital Harvest for breach of contract, fraud, deceit, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty. Appellee claimed he was entitled to be paid the value of an ownership interest in Capital Harvest that Brown promised to provide as part of his compensation. Prior to trial, the district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims except for breach of contract and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part of the first appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Appellant's deceit and equitable claims. On rehearing, the district court then dismissed the remaining claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In this case before the Supreme Court, the Court found that the district court's findings and conclusions were based on evidence from all of the witnesses, including Appellant, Brown and the economists who testified on behalf of both parties. Therefore the Court concluded the district court did not err relying on that evidence, nor did it err concluding under the facts of this case that Brown was not unjustly enriched by not paying Appellant for the value of the ownership interest in Capital Harvest that was not transferred by Brown. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no error to make findings of fact, to reject testimony or in dismissing Appellant's claims.

Appellant Edith Johnson appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dismissing her claim for benefits from Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI). On appeal, Appellant argued the ALJ improperly set aside the parties' stipulated specification of issues and abused its discretion by dismissing her claim for benefits as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the ALJ dismissed the action as a sanction after Appellant refused to comply with WSI's discovery request and the ALJ's decision granting WSI's motion to compel discovery. In deciding to dismiss Appellant's claim, the ALJ noted Appellant did not offer a defense for failing to comply with discovery and made it clear that she would rather have the matter dismissed than comply with discovery. The ALJ found Appellant almost invited dismissal by failing to respond to WSI's motion for sanctions, moving to reconsider the order granting WSI's motion to compel, and submitting two proposed orders with one granting the motion to reconsider and the other granting WSI's motion to dismiss. "While the ALJ should not be guided solely by the parties' requests and must exercise its own judgment in determining an appropriate sanction, under the facts of this case [the Court] conclude[d] the ALJ did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [Appellant's] claim."

Defendant-Appellant Nodak Mutual Insurance Company appealed from a judgment awarding Plaintiff-Appellee Barry Myaer $34,933.24 plus interest in his breach of contract action against Nodak. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in ruling Plaintiff was entitled to deferred commissions payable to him in December 2009, but did err in ruling those commissions could exceed 10 percent under the terms of the parties' contract.

Plaintiff-Appellant Leah Richard appealed the dismissal of her claims for negligent hiring, supervision and retention, and assault and battery against Washburn Public Schools (the District). Petitioner, a sixteen-year-old student at Washburn High School, began working as a part-time custodian for the District. Gary Fuchs was the head custodian and her supervisor. Plaintiff alleged that during her employment with the District, which ended in 2003, Fuchs subjected her to "inappropriate conduct . . . including sexual comments and touching." In April 2006, Plaintiff sued the District seeking damages based on claims of negligent hiring, supervision and retention of Fuchs, and assault and battery. The court dismissed the negligent hiring claim, concluding Fuch's conduct was not foreseeable as a matter of law because Plaintiff produced no evidence showing the District knew or should have known Fuchs would harass or physically touch co-workers. The court dismissed the assault and battery claim, concluding it was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Although the court determined genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Plaintiff's claims for negligent supervision and retention, the court dismissed those claims on the ground they were precluded by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for negligent hiring and assault and battery, which she did not challenge on appeal. The Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for negligent supervision and retention because the trial court erred in concluding those claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act.

Claimant Claud Sloan appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Workforce Safety & Insurance (WSI) order awarding him additional permanent impairment benefits. In December 1985, Sloan sustained a compensable work-related injury while employed at a coal gasification plant in Beulah, North Dakota. WSI awarded Sloan permanent impairment benefits for his injury and has issued several permanent partial impairment orders since his original injury. Effective April 1, 2009, WSI promulgated N.D. Admin. Code 92-01-02-25(4) to address pain impairment ratings. Based on the newly adopted rule, WSI reviewed Sloan's pain rating and determined he had sustained an eight percent impairment for pain which, when combined with his prior impairment ratings, totaled a whole body impairment rating of 38 percent. On June 11, 2009, WSI issued an order awarding Sloan additional permanent impairment benefits, based on his combined whole body impairment of 38 percent for his cervical spine, depression, dysphagia, and chronic pain. Sloan requested a rehearing. At a November 2009, hearing before an administrative law judge, a staff attorney for WSI appeared as the only witness and testified regarding the WSI's promulgation of N.D. Admin. Code 92-01-02-25. The ALJ subsequently issued an order affirming WSI's June 2009 order awarding Sloan additional permanent impairment benefits. Sloan appealed to the district court, which affirmed the order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded WSI's promulgation of administrative rules for assessing pain impairment did not conflict with its statutory authority and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Plaintiffs Lee Brandvold, Steve Bigelow, Dwight Johnson, Nikki Johansen, and Bruce Peterson (collectively "Brandvold") appealed a district court judgment dismissing their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2009, the school board of the District voted to close the elementary school located in Ryder as part of an overarching reorganization plan. In February 2010, Brandvold filed a petition in district court alleging that the reorganization process had been tainted by fraud because the Berthold Public School District had not disclosed during its reorganization process information about certain outstanding debts it owed on lease-purchase transactions. Brandvold sought a declaration that the reorganization was invalid and that the District be dissolved and the former districts be reinstated. Brandvold also sought an injunction prohibiting the District from closing any school within the District. The District moved for judgment on the pleadings for Brandvold's failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. On appeal, Brandvold challenged only the dismissal of the request for declaratory relief, not the dismissal of the request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the alleged irregularities in the reorganization process were rendered moot by the completion of a District-wide election: "[c]onstruing the petition in the light most favorable to Brandvold and accepting the allegations in the petition as true, we conclude no justiciable controversy was presented and the district court did not err in dismissing the petition ."

Petitioner Toni Weeks appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) that reduced her disability benefits. Petitioner was injured at work after being exposed to anhydrous ammonia while employed by Dakota Gasification Company, in Beulah, North Dakota. In 2009, WSI received confirmation that on November 1, 2009, Weeks' social security disability benefits would convert to social security retirement benefits. WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue or reduce benefits, in which Petitioner was informed that her permanent total disability benefits would end on October 31, 2009, and she would receive an "additional benefit payable" beginning November 1, 2009. Petitioner requested reconsideration. In November 2009, WSI issued an order denying Petitioner further disability benefits after October 31, 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because Petitioner failed to adequately brief her argument that WSI's reduction of her wage loss benefits violated equal protection under the federal and state constitutions, the Supreme Court declined to address her argument and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner Maria Willits appealed the decision of the Job Service North Dakota ("Job Service") that denied her application for unemployment benefits after Job Service found she voluntarily left her employment without showing good cause attributable to her employer. In October 2003, Petitioner began working full time as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for Circle of Nations School, a boarding school for Native American children located on federal property in Wahpeton. According to Petitioner, she became concerned that one staff member she had trained was not proficient in English. After a different staff member committed a medications error in late October 2009, Petitioner met with the dean of students of the school and expressed concerns about training the two staff members to administer medications because she did not believe they were qualified and would pose a risk to the student population. Petitioner told the dean that she would not re-certify the two staff members but would train others. Petitioner subsequently contacted the State Board of Nursing and inquired whether she could conduct medication administration training as an LPN. She was informed that she was not authorized to train staff to administer medications and that she needed to be supervised by a registered nurse or licensed practitioner. According to Petitioner, she concluded her work at the school was outside the scope of her nursing license. Petitioner's concerns were discussed with the school's administrators. In November 2009, Petitioner informed the school through a phone message that she quit her employment. By then, the school had obtained the services of a doctor to oversee nursing activities. The Supreme Court affirmed Job Service's decision, concluding "a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that [Petitioner] did not make a reasonable effort to preserve her employment relationship and, consequently, that she left her employment without good cause attributable to her employer."

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathleen Godon appealed the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint for breach of contract against the Defendant-Appellee Kindred Public School District. Plaintiff entered into a teaching contract with the School District for the 2008-2009 school year. In addition to the teaching contract, Plaintiffâs employment was subject to a professional negotiation agreement between the Kindred School Board and the Kindred Education Association. This more extensive agreement provides other terms of employment, including the base salary for a teacher in the District and the types and amounts of leave a teacher receives. The agreement did not provide for unpaid leave, but before the start of the school year, Plaintiff asked the District administration to allow her to take a week off work for travel. The District approved her request but required that she take unpaid leave for the days she could not apply personal leave. Plaintiff agreed to these terms. When school was not scheduled to be in session because of spring break, the District held school to make up for a storm day cancellation. Plaintiff did not work that day. While Plaintiff was away, the District cancelled school to allow employees and students to respond to imminent flooding in the Red River and Sheyenne River valleys. The District paid all teachers who did not request leave for this period as if school had been in session. Of four teachers who had previously requested and were granted leave during the flood cancellation period, only Plaintiff challenged the District's decision and filed a grievance. She claimed she should have been paid like all other teachers in the District who did not teach during the flood period. The District denied her grievance. Plaintiff brought suit in district court, alleging the District breached her teaching contract and violated her equal protection rights under the North Dakota Constitution. The district court ruled in favor of the District, finding that Plaintiffâs teaching contract was amended when the District granted her request for leave to travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held Plaintiff's arguments as without merit. The Court affirmed the District and the district court's decisions.

Appellant Richard Landrum appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of Appellee Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) which denied him benefits. Appellant received pain management care sporadically for a series of work related injuries stemming from 1990 until 2001. In 2001, Appellant began to see Dr. John Daugherty for pain from headaches, low back and leg problems and vision problems. In 2002, Dr. Daugherty prescribed Viagra to treat Defendant's sexual dysfunction. WSI questioned the Viagra prescription's connection to the 1990 work injury, and Dr. Daugherty sent WSI a letter indicating a causal connection between the work injury and Appellant's sexual dysfunction. WSI denied payment for the Viagra, ultimately issuing an order denying benefits for the Viagra. Appellant sought reconsideration of the order and requested a formal hearing, after which an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined WSI was not liable for the Viagra because another Workers' Compensation Commission already awarded benefits for the Viagra. In April of 2009, WSI determined Appellant's vision problems were not causally connected to the 1990 work injury. Accordingly, WSI refused to pay for treatment regarding Appellant's vision problems. Appellant asked WSI to reconsider this denial of benefits. In the meantime, after a review of Landrum's medical records by WSI's independent medical consultant, WSI also denied benefits concerning Landrum's headaches. An ALJ held a formal hearing where Dr. Peterson testified why Landrum's 1990 work injury was not the cause of his headaches and vision problems. Ultimately, the ALJ upheld WSI's decision denying payment for Appellant's treatment for his headaches and vision problems. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ALJ's order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued WSI's 2009 denial of benefits for his headaches and vision problems is barred by administrative res judicata because WSI considered, or should have considered, these benefits during the proceeding in 2004 when WSI refused to pay for Viagra. The Supreme Court concluded that administrative res judicata did not bar WSI from denying further benefits and that a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that Appellant failed to prove his work injury was a substantial, contributing factor to his headaches and vision problems.