Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Petitioner began receiving public assistance from the City of New York. At that time, the City required that Petitioner work thirty-five hours per week in the Work Experience Program (WEP). In 2000, Petitioner left the WEP, and his benefits were terminated. In 2007, Petitioner won $10,000 in the New York State lottery. The New York State Division of Lottery and the New York State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance (OTDA) invoked N.Y. Soc Serv. Law 131-r, which authorizes the State to appropriate half of any lottery prize to reimburse itself to public assistance benefits paid to the prizewinner during the previous ten years. Petitioner filed this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding alleging that were OTDA permitted to recoup a portion of the benefits paid to him through section 131-r, then he would be paid less than minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Supreme Court ultimately granted Petitioner’s petition against OTDA and its Commissioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner was entitled to minimum wage for his hours worked as a participant in the WEP program, and the State could not retroactively deprive him of a minimum wage by recouping the funds through his lottery prize. View "Carver v. State" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was removed from his position at his place of employment and demoted, he commenced this action pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 75-b, the whistleblower statute, alleging that he was retaliated against for reporting improper governmental activity. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that Plaintiff failed to comply with section 75-b by not reporting the allegedly wrongful actions to the appointing authority before contacting the Inspector General’s office. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s good faith efforts in the manner and filing of his reporting met the requirements of section 75-b(2). After a trial on damages, Supreme Court awarded Plaintiff back pay, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs and directed Defendants to reinstate Plaintiff to his position. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff demonstrated good faith compliance with section 75-b; and (2) Plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest. View "Tipaldo v. Lynn" on Justia Law

New York City police officers and firefighters appointed on or after July 1, 2009 are tier three members of the New York City Police Pension Fund and the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund. Petitioners filed a complaint alleging that the City of New York unlawfully deducted three percent from the gross annual wages of its tier three police officers and firefighters as mandatory employee pension contributions. At issue in this case was whether N.Y. Retire. & Sox. Sec. Law 480(b) obligates a public employer to pay any portion of a tier three public employee’s statutorily required pension contribution. The Appellate Division answered that question in the positive. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 480(b) only encompasses temporary programs in place as of 1974 for tier one and two members of a public employee retirement system. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After the Town of Islip discontinued the practice of permanently assigning Town-owned vehicles, or “take home” vehicles, to certain employees, the union representing the employees declared that employee use of a Town-owned vehicle for personal purposes was a mandatory subject of bargaining and filed an improper practice charge with the New York State Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB determined that the Town violated N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 209-a(1)(d) by canceling “take home” vehicle assignments without negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that PERB reasonably determined that the Town engaged in an improper practice when it unilaterally discontinued the permanent assignment of “take home” vehicles to employees. View "Town of Islip v. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was terminated from her position as chief operating officer for Communication Action for Human Services, Inc., Plaintiff filed suit against Community Action and its chief executive officer (collectively, Defendants), alleging that she had been terminated in violation of N.Y. Labor Law 740(2), the whistleblower statute, for registering complaints with public agencies concerning policies and practices of Community Action. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, asserting that the complaint was deficient because it failed to identify the particular “law, rule or regulation” Defendants were claimed to have violated. Supreme Court left Plaintiff’s section 740 claim intact, but the Appellate Division dismissed the section 740 claim because of Plaintiff’s failure to “identify a specific law, rule or regulation that Defendants purportedly violated.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) in order to recover under a Labor Law 740 theory, a plaintiff’s complaint need not specify the actual law, rule or regulation violated; and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was sufficient to state a cause of action under section 740. View "Webb-Weber v. Cmty. Action for Human Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) from the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System and the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York (“retirement systems”) of the names of the retirement systems’ members. After the retirement systems refused to provide the names, Petitioner brought N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceedings to compel disclosure. Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 89(7) exempts from disclosure under FOIL only the home addresses, not the names, of retirees who receive benefits from public employees’ retirement systems. View "Empire Ctr. for N.Y. State Policy v. N.Y. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

This case arose out of dispute over the administration of a workers’ compensation self-insurance plan (“Plan”) administered by Herkimer County. Dozens of municipalities participated in the Plan, including the Village of Herkimer. In 2005, the County passed a resolution to terminate the plan. To ensure funding for outstanding workers’ compensation claims, the County created an Abandonment Plan that allowed municipalities to withdraw from the plan and pay a lump sum withdrawal fee. Several of the participating municipalities, including the Village, filed an action challenging the Plan and Abandonment Plan based on alleged mismanagement by the County. The County counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking to recover the withdrawal liability. The County prevailed on summary judgment as to the liability on its counterclaim for breach of contract against the Village. After a trial on damages, the jury awarded the full amount of damages sought by the County against the Village. The Appellate Division affirmed the damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the fee for the Village’s withdrawal from the Plan reflected benefits to be paid in the future and therefore should have been discounted to its current value as of the date it was due. View "Village of Ilion v. County of Herkimer" on Justia Law

Appellant was disciplined and then terminated from his employment with his Employer. The Union of which Appellant was a member filed several grievances protesting the discipline and subsequent termination, which were denied. The Union’s executive board then voted unanimously against proceeding to arbitration. Appellant commenced two separate actions against his Employer and the Union, alleging, among other claims, breach of the duty of fair representation against the Union. Supreme Court denied the Union’s motion for summary judgment as to the claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that, pursuant to Martin v. Curran, the complaint was fatally defective because it failed to allege that the Union’s conduct was ratified by “every single member” of the association. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Martin was inapplicable and, alternatively, that this precedent should be overruled. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Martin rule applied to this action and that adoption of a rule that does away with Martin was best left to the Legislature. View "Palladino v. CNY Centro, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner worked at the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) until April 1991. While employed at DEP, Petitioner was a Tier 4 New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS) member. Later in April 1991, Petitioner was appointed a correction officer at the New York City Department of Correction (DOC). Accordingly, Petitioner became a member of the Tier 3 CO-20 retirement plan established by N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law 504-a(c)(2). In July 2009, Petitioner retired from DOC. NYCERS subsequently approved Petitioner’s retirement but refused to credit his DEP service. Petitioner filed a petition against the City and NYCERS asking the court to direct NYCERS to recalculate his pension to include his DEP service. Supreme Court granted Kaslow’s petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Petitioner’s pension was defined in its entirety by section 504-a(c)(2); and (2) as a result, NYCERS properly did not consider Petitioner’s previous civilian service with DEP when calculating Petitioner's pension benefit. View "Kaslow v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), where he was eventually promoted to health facilities planner. In 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, an occupational lung disease. In 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, among other claims, that HHC had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the City Human Rights Law (City HRL). Supreme Court granted summary judgment for HHC, concluding that Plaintiff could not, even with a reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of his job. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that HHC was not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s State HRL and City HRL claims, as (1) both statutes generally preclude summary judgment in favor of an employer where the employer has failed to demonstrate that it responded to a disabled employee’s request for a particular accommodation by engaging in a good faith interactive process regarding the feasibility of that accommodation; and (2) under the facts of this case, Plaintiff presented colorable claims of disability discrimination under the City HRL and State HRL. View "Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law