Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In a workers' compensation action, the court was asked to determine whether the future medical benefits that a compensation carrier had been relieved of paying due to a claimant's successful prosecution of a third-party action were "so speculative that it would be improper to estimate and assess litigation costs against [that] benefit to the carrier." The court concluded that they were, and held that the carrier need only pay its equitable share of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by a claimant once the claimant incurred and paid each medical expense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder in a factory while cleaning a product manufactured by his employer. The product in question was a steel "wall module" made by the third party defendant. At issue was plaintiff's claim under Labor Law 240(1) against Bechtel, the purchaser of the wall module, and defendants, the third party defendant's landlords. The court held that section 240(1) did not apply to an injury suffered while cleaning a product in the course of a manufacturing process. Such injuries could hardly be uncommon; the court inferred that it had been generally and correctly understood that the statue did not apply to them. Accordingly, plaintiff's activity was not protected under section 240(1).

These cases called upon the court to decide whether petitioners were required to exhaust an available internal appeal procedure before challenging the termination of their probationary employment at the City of New York's Department of Education (DOE). The DOE was obligated by its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the United Federation of Teachers and its own bylaws to afford probationary employees the opportunity for reconsideration of a decision to discontinue their employment. The court held that the DOE's decisions were "final and binding" within the meaning of CPLR 217(1) as of the dates when petitioners' probationary services ended. Petitioners awaited the outcome of the internal reviews provided for under the CBA and the DOE's bylaws before commencing suit. But these reviews "stem[] solely from the [CBA]" and constituted "an optional procedure under which a teacher may ask [DOE] to reconsider and reverse [its] initial decision, ... which was final and which, when made, in all respects terminated the employment of a probationer under Education Law 2573(1)(a);" they were not administrative remedies that petitioners were required to exhaust before litigating the termination of their probationary employment. As a result, petitioners' lawsuits brought more than four months after the dates when their probationary service ended, were time-barred.

Plaintiff sued defendants after he was injured while engaging in demolition work at an apartment building owned by defendant. Plaintiff claimed violations of Labor Law 200, 240(1), and 241. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his section 240(1) cause of action and the denial of his cross-motion on that claim. The court concluded that it could not say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240(1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster. Consequently, defendants have not demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment. The court agreed, however, that plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment was properly denied because genuine issues of fact remained.

Exum, an employer of Elrac, served a notice of intention to arbitrate on Elrac, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. Elrace petitioned to stay the arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, permitting the arbitration to proceed. The court affirmed and held that a self-insured employer whose employee was involved in an automobile accident could not be liable to that employee for uninsured motorist benefits, notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law.

Plaintiff, an electrician working on a construction project site, brought a personal injury suit against defendants asserting claims under Labor Law 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and common law negligence. At issue was whether defendants-property owners (property owners) were entitled to common law indemnification from defendant-general contractor (general contractor). The court held that the general contractor's demonstrated lack of actual supervision and/or direction over the work was sufficient to establish that it was not required to indemnify the property owners for bringing about plaintiff's injury. The court also held that the property owner's vicarious liability could not be passed through the general contractor, the non-negligent, vicariously liable general contractor with whom they did not contract. Therefore, the court held that, under the facts and circumstances, the property owners were not entitled to common law indemnification from the general contractor.

Petitioners, two tenured teachers in the New York City School system, commenced Article 78 proceedings against the Board of Education for orders compelling respondent to expunge "letters of reprimand" from their personnel files for failure to follow Education Law 3020-a procedures. Respondent contended that the letters were properly placed in petitioners' files because, pursuant to the 2007-2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), petitioners' union waived the section 3020-1 procedures with respect to the placement of letters of reprimand in tenured teacher's files and agreed to replace them with a different procedure described in Article 21A. The court found that there was ample basis to conclude that the union knowingly waived the procedural rights granted in section 3020-a and held that, because the letters at issue were not subject to section 3020-a procedures, petitioners were not entitled to have them expunged.

Plaintiff sued defendants over whether plaintiff had been fully paid for construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance work performed for defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiff was not licensed to do home improvement business in his individual name. At issue was whether plaintiff, by doing business in his own name and not the name on his license, violated Westchester County Administrative Code 863.319(1)(b). The court held that a licensed home improvement contractor who entered into a contract using a name other than the one on his license was not barred from enforcing the contract unless the other party was deceived or otherwise prejudiced by the misnomer. The court also held that the forfeiture of the right to be paid for work done was an excessive penalty in this case for what seemed to have been an inadvertent and harmless violation of the County Code. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division should be reversed with costs and defendants' motion for summary judgment denied.

Plaintiff sued a former employee after a number of the former employee's clients left plaintiff's wealth management and investment advisory firm for the firm that the former employee currently works at. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following question for the court: "What degree of participation in a new employer's solicitation of a former employer's client by a voluntary seller of that client's good will constitutes improper solicitation?" In answering the certified question, the court continued to apply its precedents in Von Breman v. MacMonnies and Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler and held that the "implied covenant" barred a seller of "good will" from improperly soliciting his former clients. The court also held that, while a seller may not contact his former clients directly, he may, "in response to inquiries" made on a former client's own initiative, answer factual questions. The court further held that the circumstances where a client exercising due diligence requested further information, a seller may assist his new employer in the "active development... of a plan" to respond to that client's inquires. Should that plan result in meeting with a client, a seller's "largely passive" role at such a meeting did not constitute improper solicitation in violation of the "implied covenant." As such, a seller or his new employer may then accept the trade of a former client.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.