Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing the decision of Supreme Court granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoining enforcement of New York City Administrative Code 10-181, which makes criminal the use of certain restraints by police officers during an arrest, holding that Administrative Code 10-181 does not violate the New York Constitution on either preemption or due process grounds.After Administrative Code 10-181 became law Plaintiffs - law enforcement unions - commenced this action seeking a declaration that the local law was unconstitutional because it was field and conflict preempted by a combination of state laws and that it was void for vagueness and seeking to enjoin the law's enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of section 10-181. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 10-181 was a valid exercise of the City's municipal law-making authority because the legislature has not preempted the field; and (2) Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their vagueness challenge. View "Police Benevolent Ass'n of City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting in part Petitioners' combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge Local Law No. 2 and its transfer of police disciplinary authority to the Police Accountability Board (PAB), holding that the appellate division did not err.In 2019, the City of Rochester approved Local Law No. 2 creating the PAB, a body of nine residents of the City granted the exclusive authority to "investigate and make determinations respecting" any police officer accused of misconduct, including the power to impose disciplinary sanctions such as dismissal if the officer is found guilty. Because these disciplinary procedures deviated from the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect, Petitioner commenced this action challenging Local Law No. 2's transfer of police disciplinary authority to the PAB. The Court of Appeals held that the portion of the local law addressing police discipline exceeded the City's authority under the Municipal Home Rule Law and was invalid. View "Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that this dispute over an exempt class employee's termination was not arbitrable, thus reversing the order of the appellate division and denying a petition to compel arbitration, and that the Town of Monroe was free to terminate the employee without cause.In 2012, the Town appointed Employee to an exempt class civil service position. Three years later, the Town entered a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a Union that defined the bargaining unit to include Employee's position, permitted the Town to "terminate employees for just cause," and supplied procedures culminating in binding arbitration. In 2017, the Town terminated Employee, and the Union filed a grievance. When the Town refused to address the grievance the Union brought this action to compel the Town to arbitrate the dispute. Supreme Court denied the Town's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable because granting the relief sought would violate a statute, decisional law, and public policy. View "Teamsters Local 445 v. Town of Monroe" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that tier three police officers in the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF) who might otherwise be eligible for retirement credit under certain statutory provisions may not use those provisions to apply prior non-police service toward their retirement eligibility.Plaintiff commenced an action seeking a declaration that the City of New York and other related parties (collectively, the City) violated sections of the Retirement and Social Security Law and the New York City Administrative Code by refusing to permit tier three officers to obtain credit toward retirement eligibility for prior non-police service. The appellate division concluded that the City was statutorily required to allow tier three officers to credit non-police service toward their retirement eligibility. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and dismissed the proceeding, holding that the plain language of N.Y. Ret. & Soc. Sec. Law 513(c)(2) limits eligible prior service for those officers to police service. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Civil Service's (DCS) unilateral implementation of application fees for promotional and transitional civil service exams was not a term and condition of employment, as defined in N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 201(4), and therefore, the State had no obligation to negotiate those fees under the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 200 et seq.The State offers the subject exams to provide qualified State employees an opportunity to seek other public employment. For at least ten years, DCS waived the application fees for employees represented by Respondents to take the exams. In 2009, DCS began assessing fees for the exams but did not collectively bargain with Respondents regarding the imposition of the fees prior to taking the action at issue. Respondents filed improper practices charges with the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that by unilaterally imposing the fees the State violated Civil Service Law 209-a(1). PERB determined that the subject was mandatorily negotiable and that the State's past practice of not charging such fees was enforceable. The Appellate Division dismissed the State's ensuing petition seeking to annul PERB's determinations. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that PERB's determination conflicted with Civil Service Law 201(4) and this Court's precedent. View "State v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's order granting the petition filed by the City of Yorkers pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 75 to permanently stay arbitration of the underlying labor dispute, holding that grievances like the present one are arbitrable so long as no public policy, statutory, or constitutional provisions prohibit them and they are reasonably related to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The underlying dispute between City of Yonkers and its firefighters concerned whether Yonkers must make certain types of payments to firefighters who were permanently disabled for work-related injuries and who qualified for benefits under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2). Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed a grievance alleging that Yonkers violated the CBA and then served a demand for arbitration. Yonkers responded by filing a petition to permanently stay arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that this grievance was arbitrable. View "City of Yonkers v. Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals concluded that "regular salary or wages" within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2) includes monetary compensation to which current firefighters are contractually entitled based on the performance of their regular job duties but does not include monetary compensation based on the performance of additional responsibilities beyond their regular job duties.In this case stemming from a dispute between the City of Yonkers and dozens of their firefighters who were permanency disabled and retired as a result of work-related injuries the parties disputed whether certain compensation outlined in their collective bargaining agreements constituted "regular salary or wages" for the purpose of calculating the retirees' supplement under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2). The Court of Appeals held (1) Yonkers's determination that holiday pay and check-in pay should be not included in the supplement was based on an error of law; and (2) substantial evidence supported Yonkers's conclusion that night differential should not be included when calculating the supplement. View "Matter of Borelli v. City of Yonkers" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division and reinstated the original award for workers' compensation benefits in this case to the decedent's minor son, holding that N.Y. Work. Comp. Law (WCL) 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonschedule award to remain payable following an injured employee's death.After he sustained an injury in a work-related accident Eric Watson was classified as having a nonscheduled permanent partial disability and received a weekly award for 350 weeks. After 311 weeks Watson died due to unrelated causes. Claimant, Watson's son, sought accrued unpaid amounts of Watson's award, including benefits for the weeks remaining before Watson's award was expected to reach the statutory durational cap. A workers' compensation law judge award unpaid amounts for the 311 weeks precedent Watson's death but denied Claimant the award for the remaining weeks. The Workers' compensation Board affirmed. The appellate division modified the award by ruling that Claimant was entitled to an additional posthumous award for the remaining cap weeks. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that WCL 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonscheduled award to remain payable following an injured employee's death. View "Green v. Dutchess County BOCES" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Serv. 200 et seq., requires a municipality to engage in collective bargaining over the procedures for terminating municipal employees after they have been absent from work for more than one year due to an injury sustained in the line of duty.Plaintiff, a professional firefighter, sustained injuries in the line of duty that were determined to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law. One year later, the City of Long Beach notified Plaintiff that it was evaluating whether to exercise its right to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's union (Union) responded by sending a demand to negotiate the City's procedures for terminating its members covered by the protections of N.Y. Civ. Serv. 71. The City refused, resulting in the Union filing an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB determined that the City had an obligation to engage in collective bargaining prior to imposing procedures for terminating employees covered by section 71. Supreme Court dismissed the City's subsequent petition seeking to annul PERB's decision. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Taylor Law requires public employers to bargain over the predetermination procedures used in implementing Civil Service Law 71. View "City of Long Beach v. New York State Public Employees Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when an employer pays premiums to a mutual insurance company to obtain a policy for its employee and the insurance company demutualizes, the employee is entitled to the proceeds from demutualization.Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC) issued professional liability insurance policies to eight medical professionals who were litigants in the cases before the Court of Appeals on appeal. The premiums for the policies were paid by the professionals' employers. After MLMIC demutualized and was acquired by National Indemnity Company, MLMIC sought to distribute $2.502 billion in cash consideration to eligible policyholders pursuant to its plan of conversion. At issue was the employers' claim of legal entitlement to receive the demutualization proceeds. The Supreme Court held that, absent contrary terms in the contract of employment, insurance policy, or separate agreement, the employee, who is the policyholder, is entitled to the proceeds. View "Columbia Memorial Hospital v. Hinds" on Justia Law