Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In June 2005, the New Mexico Department of Corrections (DOC) adopted an Employee DWI Policy. The DOC hired Respondent Rudy Sais in April 2006 as a Correctional Officer I. Respondent reviewed the Policy and signed a DWI acknowledgment form, noting that he received a copy of the Policy and he understood its requirements. In 2006, Respondent was arrested on suspicion of aggravated DWI. Respondent received a seven-day suspension as a result of the arrest. The criminal charges against Respondent were ultimately dismissed without an adjudication of guilt or innocence. In 2008, Respondent was again arrested on suspicion of DWI. The criminal charges against Respondent were once again dismissed. After a DOC investigation, Respondent was dismissed based on a second offense under the Policy. Respondent appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was treated differently than other employees under the Policy. After the hearing, the ALJ submitted an extensive recommended decision to the Personnel Board that supported Respondent’s termination. The Personnel Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety and upheld Respondent’s termination. The district court reversed the Personnel Board, finding that "[t]he termination of [Respondent] was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law" because "he was not treated in a similar fashion to several other officers in similar circumstances." The DOC then petitioned for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address the important policy issues implicated "when DWI and public employment intersect, especially in light of [the] Court’s precedent on the same subject." After review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[w]hen the district court concluded that Respondent 'was not treated in a similar fashion to several other officers in similar circumstances,' the court was simply incorrect based upon the record before it."

The New Mexico Legislature passed House Bill 59 during the 2011 legislative session. The Bill sought to amend five different sections of the Unemployment Compensation Act in order to address an impending insolvency in the unemployment compensation fund. In addition to reducing benefits to the unemployed, House Bill 59 increased employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund over contributions that would be made in 2011. Governor Susana Martinez partially vetoed the Bill by striking one of the variables necessary to calculate employer contributions beginning on January 1, 2012. The Petitioners, each of whom are legislators, sought a writ of mandamus to invalidate Governor Martinez's partial veto. Because the effect of the veto was to exempt most employers from making what would otherwise be mandatory contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for calendar year 2012, the Supreme Court held that the partial veto was invalid. The Court therefore issued a writ of mandamus to order that House Bill 59 be reinstated as passed by the Legislature.

On certification from the federal district court, two questions came before the Supreme Court on whether the New Mexico Department of Labor's "Charge of Discrimination" form fairly and adequately allowed a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies and preserved the right to pursue further judicial remedies for individual liability claims under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA). In 2008, Plaintiff Michael Lobato filed two complaints with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging his employer, the New Mexico Environment Department, with discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff filed his administrative complaints by using the New Mexico Department of Labor, Human Rights Division's (NMHRD) official Charge of Discrimination form. Submitting this form to either the EEOC or the NMHRD constitutes filing with both agencies, as is noted on the form directly above the signature line. According to the instructions on the NMHRD's form, Plaintiff was required to explain the "PARTICULARS" of his charge. In December 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court stating in part that the EEOC "complaints [had been] processed to conclusion." The individually named defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing in part that Plaintiff did not exhaust his NMHRA administrative remedies and preserve his right to sue any individual defendant not specifically identified in Plaintiff's NMHRD forms. The district court denied Defendants' motion for those identified by their job positions within the "PARTICULARS" narrative and sua sponte certified two questions to the Supreme Court regarding defendants not otherwise identified in those administrative forms. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the NMHRD's Charge of Discrimination form failed to provide Plaintiff a fair and adequate opportunity to exhaust administrative remedies against individual defendants; and (2) because of this inadequacy, Plaintiff was not required to have exhausted administrative remedies against the previously unnamed individual defendants before pursuing his suit in the United States District Court.

Through its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court addressed an exception in the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) that permitted compensation for injuries incurred in travel by employees when those injuries "[arose] out of and in the course of employment." Eloy Doporto, Jr., Mike Lucas, Jose Turrubiates, and Pete Rodriguez (collectively, the Workers), employed by Permian Drilling Corporation (Permian) and insured by American Home Assurance, were involved in an automobile accident while traveling to their work site, resulting in the death of Doporto and injuries to the others.  Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the injuries suffered by the Workers arose out of and in the course of their employment because the travel was mutually beneficial to employees and employer and the Workers encountered special hazards unique to their employment while traveling, thus rendering the Workers "traveling employees" whose injuries are compensable under the Act.

Petitioners are organized labor representatives actively involved in representing public employees. They sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to prohibit the Governor from removing two members of the Public Employee Labor Relations Board. Those members had responsibility to adjudicate the merits of disputes that involved the Governor. The Governor appointed those members and now she sought to remove them. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that none of the PELRB members served at the pleasure of the Governor, though the Public Employee Bargaining Act obligates the Governor to appoint them. The Court found that constitutional due process required a "neutral tribunal with members who were free to deliberate without fear of removal by a frequent litigant" such as the Governor. The Governor was enjoined from removing the PELRB members.