Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Ellen St. Louis appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) that denied her claim for unemployment benefits. Early 2009, Petitioner received a disciplinary notice stating that her conduct was not in line with company policy because she appeared to be asleep at work and was argumentative when her trainer instructed her regarding her faulty soldering work. Subsequently, Petitioner informed a human resources representative that she was having difficulties breathing and that she was depressed. The human resources representative recommended she take medical leave. Petitioner claims that when she returned to work she could no longer perform soldering work because the fumes caused headaches, and caused her to shake, cough, and have difficulty breathing. The record indicated that she never provided Insight Technology with any medical records or doctor's instructions regarding her breathing problems or opinions regarding her inability to do soldering work. Petitioner was ultimately terminated for poor work performance. She applied for unemployment benefits but was denied. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Board, Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the record supported the determination that Petitioner was terminated for misconduct, and that there was no error in the Board's decision.

In this personal injury case, Plaintiff Alfred Ocasio appealed a judgment entered in favor of Defendant Federal Express Corporation (FedEx). Plaintiff was a mail handler who pulled by hand, large, heavy canisters filled with mail from delivery tractor-trailer trucks. One day as he was pulling canisters from a FedEx tractor-trailer truck, he accidentally stepped into and caught his leg in a gap between the rear of the truck and the loading dock. When a canister he had been pulling continued to roll toward him, the bones of his trapped leg were shattered. He argued on appeal that the Trial Court erred when it allowed the jury to apportion fault to his employer, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and when, despite the jury's $1,445,700 verdict in his favor, it entered judgment for FedEx after comparing the fault allocated to him to the fault allocated to FedEx. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "while it was not error to allow the jury to apportion fault to the USPS, it was error to deny the plaintiff any recovery against FedEx. We, thus, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand."

Petitioner James Margeson appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) that denied him reimbursement for medical treatment and workers' compensation benefits. Petitioner conducted a "bed check" at a state youth center when he twisted his knee. The Center contended that Petitioner's injury was precipitated by a pre-existing war wound. The CAB rejected the Center's version of Petitioner's injury. However, the CAB did not award Petitioner reimbursement, finding that Petitioner "did not encounter any greater risk of his employment than in his everyday life and the stairs were merely an incident or an occasion that accompanied the injury." The CAB denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the parties agreed that Petitioner was injured at work. The parties disputed whether his injury arose out of his employment. The Court adopted an "increased-risk" test for injuries attributable to neutral risks such as the unexplained fall at issue in this case: "the injury must actually result from the hazards of employment and not merely from the bare existence of employment." The Court reversed and remanded the CAB's decision to make specific findings as to whether Petitioner's injury was a "neutral risk" and if so, that record reflects the medical and legal causation of the injury.

Petitioners Matthew Kennedy and the Hinsdale Federation of Teachers appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) that denied their unfair labor practice claims against Respondent, the Hinsdale School District (District). Mr. Kennedy was a music teacher for about ten years and a member of the teachers' union. The District and Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that contained a grievance procedure that provided for binding arbitration. The only matters excluded from the grievance procedure were management prerogatives and teacher non-renewals. Citing a lack of student participation, the District notified Mr. Kennedy that it would not renew his contract. Before the 2009-2010 school year, the District eliminated the Hinsdale band program and entered into an agreement with Brattleboro High School where interested students from Hinsdale could participate in Brattleboro's music offerings. Petitioners filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the PELRB alleging multiple violations of the CBA. The PELRB dismissed Petitioners' claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that the District illegally outsourced its band program to Brattleboro, and challenged the District's reasons for its "reduction-in-force" claim. The Supreme Court could not conclude that the PELRB's decision was erroneous or that it was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PELRB's decision to dismiss Petitioners' complaint.

Respondent Judith McGann was terminated as superintendent of Petitioner School Administrative Unit #44 (SAU). During the evidentiary portion of the SAU Board's termination hearing, SAU called an expert witness. Ms. McGann requested access to the expert's file. The moderator of the hearing denied Ms. McGann's request. Following the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Ms. McGann. On appeal to the Board of Education, Ms. McGann argued that the SAU violated her due process rights by denying her access to the expert's records. The Board ordered SAU to produce the expert's work file, and recommended that the SAU's decision be vacated and remanded for a new hearing. The SAU sought review of the State Board of Education's decision ordering it to produce the expert's file. The Supreme Court noted that due process requirements for binding administrative procedures are quite different from those binding judicial procedures. The Court did not find that the SAU Board violated Ms. McGann's constitutional due process rights in the course of the termination hearing. The Court found that the Board gave Ms. McGann "extensive opportunity" to meaningfully cross-examine the expert despite not having his file. The Court dismissed Ms. McGann's appeal, reversed the Board's order to produce the expert's file, and affirmed the SAU's decision to terminate Ms. McGann's employment as superintendent.