Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

Several physicians who were employed by an anesthesia practice left their positions and became employees of a hospital with which their former practice had a service contract. The physicians had previously sold their ownership interests in the practice to another entity, and their employment contracts contained restrictive covenants, including non-compete and non-solicitation provisions. After the hospital indicated it might not renew its contract with the practice, the physicians and hospital administrators began discussing future employment arrangements, retaining legal counsel and entering into a common interest agreement. The hospital ultimately sent notice of nonrenewal, and the physicians resigned and signed employment contracts with the hospital. The anesthesia practice and its parent company sued the physicians and the hospital, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. The hospital also sued the practice, seeking to bar enforcement of the restrictive covenants.The Hillsborough County Superior Court (Northern District) issued several orders during discovery, compelling the hospital and physician defendants to disclose certain communications they claimed were protected by attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine, and ordering their counsel to sit for depositions. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to privilege applied to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and tortious interference, and limited the application of the common interest doctrine to communications after litigation was pending. It also ordered disclosure of some privileged communications under a theory of necessity.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege does not apply to claims of breach of fiduciary duty or tortious interference with contractual relations. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the common interest doctrine did not apply until litigation was pending, but vacated the orders permitting depositions of counsel and requiring disclosure of privileged communications under a necessity theory, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atl. Anesthesia, P.A. v. Lehrer" on Justia Law

A newspaper requested records from a school district related to an investigation into allegations that a long-time employee had sexually harassed other employees. The district hired a law firm to conduct a Title IX investigation, which resulted in a report. The district and the employee entered into a settlement agreement ending his employment, with the district paying him a lump sum and a portion of his health insurance. The newspaper sought all documents related to the investigation and settlement, but the district repeatedly denied the requests, citing statutory exemptions for confidential and personnel records.The Superior Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case after the newspaper filed suit. The court granted the district’s request for in camera review of the records, conducted the review without counsel present, and ordered redacted records to be distributed. It found that some records were protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine and exempt under RSA 91-A:5, XII. The court also found that the remaining records, including the settlement agreement, were exempt as confidential or personnel files under RSA 91-A:5, IV. The court denied the newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, concluding the district had satisfied its obligations regarding records of payments to the employee.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that in camera review without counsel present is permissible when disclosure may cause an invasion of privacy. It affirmed that records protected by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine are exempt from disclosure without a balancing test. However, it found the lower court erred in applying the exemption for confidential and personnel files, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns if identifying information was redacted. The court also held that the district must disclose unaltered records of payments made to the employee and awarded attorney’s fees and costs for that violation. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Keene Publ'g Corp. v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

AFSCME Council 93 filed a petition to certify a bargaining unit consisting of thirteen employees from the Town of Barnstead’s police and fire departments. The Town objected, arguing that the employees' duties were too dissimilar to share a community of interest. The case was submitted to the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) for a decision on the written record.A PELRB hearing officer approved the proposed bargaining unit, concluding that the employees shared a sufficient community of interest to negotiate jointly. The officer noted that all employees worked in public safety, were subject to the Town’s employment terms, and interacted with each other at work. The Town requested a review, challenging the community of interest determination. The PELRB denied the request and certified AFSCME as the bargaining unit’s exclusive representative. The Town then appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the PELRB’s decision, focusing on whether the police and fire department employees shared a community of interest under RSA 273-A:8, I. The Court found that the PELRB’s decision was primarily based on the fact that all employees followed the Town’s personnel policies, which was insufficient to establish a community of interest. The Court noted differences in work schedules, duties, responsibilities, and organizational structures between the police and fire departments. The Court concluded that the record did not support the PELRB’s finding of a community of interest and reversed the PELRB’s decision approving the proposed bargaining unit. View "Appeal of Town of Barnstead" on Justia Law

Gilbert Menke died on July 13, 2016, following a work-related injury. He was survived by his common law spouse, Maia Beh, and their daughter. Beh received a letter from the decedent’s employer’s insurer, informing her that she and her daughter might be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Beh provided the necessary documentation and requested benefits for her daughter, which were authorized by the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL). In October 2020, Beh requested to be added to the list of dependents for death benefits allocation, which the insurer denied, arguing that her request was outside the statute of limitations.The DOL ruled that Beh’s request was not a new and separate claim and was not barred by the statute of limitations. The insurer appealed to the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB), which held a de novo hearing and concluded that Beh’s request was a separate claim barred by the statute of limitations. Beh’s motion for rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that adding a dependent to an open death benefits claim does not constitute a separate claim. The court held that the New Hampshire Workers’ Compensation Law does not set a time limit for a dependent to request allocation of benefits under an open death benefits claim. The court reversed the CAB’s decision, ruling that as long as a timely claim for death benefits is filed by any dependent, subsequent requests for allocation by other dependents are not barred by the statute of limitations. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Appeal of Estate of Menke" on Justia Law

Eight former public-school teachers who retired from the Keene School District between 2012 and 2017 sought review of a decision by the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) Board of Trustees. They challenged the board's denial of their petitions for contribution and earnable compensation adjustment, arguing that the board erroneously found they consented to a 120-day delay in payment of early retirement stipends.The NHRS Board of Trustees had denied the petitions based on the finding that the petitioners consented to the delay in stipend payments. The board's decision was influenced by the fact that the petitioners did not file grievances or inquire with the NHRS about the delay at the time of their retirement. The board distinguished these petitioners from others who had successfully challenged the delay through grievances.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioners could not have consented to the delay because the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) did not authorize such a delay. The court noted that employees governed by a CBA cannot consent to terms that modify the agreement. The court also found that the petitioners were not at fault for the delay, as they were not informed that the delay would affect their pension calculations and had no reason to challenge the School District's policy at the time. Consequently, the court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petition of Retired Keene School Teachers" on Justia Law

The defendant, Benjamin Sargent, was the chief of the Litchfield Police Department (LPD) and was convicted of official oppression for violating the sexual harassment policies of LPD and the Town of Litchfield. The conviction stemmed from his communications with a probationary police officer on December 31, 2021, and January 1, 2022, during which he made suggestive comments, expressed romantic interest, and implied that she could advance in her career if she "stuck with him."The Circuit Court (Derby, J.) found Sargent guilty, concluding that he sought to benefit himself by obtaining emotional support and validation from the complainant. The court also denied Sargent's motion to dismiss, which argued that the statute was void for vagueness and overbreadth.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court had interpreted the phrase "to benefit himself" too broadly. The Supreme Court concluded that the term should be understood to mean seeking a specific advantage or gain, rather than a momentary personal, emotional, or psychological benefit. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sargent sought such a specific benefit in his communications with the complainant.As a result, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court's interpretation of "to benefit himself" was incorrect and that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Sargent acted with the purpose of obtaining a specific benefit as required by RSA 643:1. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law

Eight New Hampshire employers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) to hold department-level hearings. These employers had their applications for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries denied. The employers argued that they were entitled to a hearing under RSA 281-A:43, I(a). The DOL had denied their requests for such hearings, stating that the disputes were more appropriately heard by the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB).The employers initially appealed to the CAB and requested department-level hearings from the DOL. The DOL denied these requests, leading the employers to file a petition for original jurisdiction with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The proceedings before the CAB were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed whether the DOL is statutorily required to grant a request for a department-level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied. The court held that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers the right to a department-level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund. The court found that the statute's language supports the employers' right to such a hearing and that this interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme's purpose of encouraging employers to hire or retain employees with permanent impairments. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, compelling the DOL to hold the requested hearings. View "Petition of City of Manchester" on Justia Law

The case involves four police officers, Robert Bellenoit, Richard Brown, Gregory Ditullio, and Jacob Tyler, who were employed by the City of Manchester. Each officer was a member of a collective bargaining unit and was hired before 2008. Between 2015 and 2018, each officer was injured during their employment and filed a workers' compensation claim with the City. While these claims were being resolved, the City paid each officer accrued sick leave benefits. Once the officers were deemed eligible for workers' compensation benefits, they received payments from the City equivalent to the sick leave benefits they had previously received.In 2019, the City demanded that each officer repay the sick leave benefits they had received while their eligibility for workers' compensation was pending or being appealed. The officers argued that they had a vested right to restoration of their sick leave benefits without the requirement of repayment. The Superior Court granted the City's motions for summary judgment and denied the officers' motions, ruling that the officers did not have a vested right to restoration of sick leave benefits without the requirement of repayment.The officers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that they did not have a vested right to the restoration of sick leave credit without the requirement of repayment. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the officers did not have a vested right to the benefits provided in the pre-2008 amendment and that the post-2008 amendment applied to them. The court reasoned that the officers did not earn the benefit set forth in the pre-2008 amendment and that the post-2008 amendment became the law of the contract, governing where the collective bargaining agreement was silent. View "City of Manchester v. Bellenoit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Boucher appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Moultonborough's (Town) motion to dismiss. He contended that: (1) the court erred in finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under RSA 41:48 (Supp. 2022); and (2) he has stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Plaintiff served as a police officer for the Town for nineteen years, mostly in a full-time capacity. At the time he filed his complaint, he most recently held the rank of sergeant. Up until the final four months of his employment, no formal disciplinary actions had been taken against him while employed by the Town’s police department. Due to his past involvement in assisting local officers to form a union, and his previous support of a candidate for police chief that the Board of Selectmen (Board) opposed, plaintiff believed the Board did not support him. In early 2020, the police chief retired and was replaced by an interim police manager “who was under the direct control of the [Board].” Shortly thereafter, plaintiff became “the subject of serial internal investigations orchestrated by” the interim manager and the lower-ranking officer “for simply attempting to conduct the ordinary business of a police Sergeant.” In total, plaintiff was subjected to four investigations over six weeks. According to plaintiff, the interim manager’s conduct “was very clearly aimed at undermining and isolating him.” In May 2021, plaintiff filed suit alleging one count of “Constructive Termination in Violation of RSA 41:48.” The court reasoned that if plaintiff “considers himself a terminated officer in violation of RSA 41:48, even if only constructively, it logically follows that he is required to follow the procedures contained within RSA 41:48.” The Town represented at oral argument that there were several processes plaintiff could have followed to attempt exhaustion, including requesting a hearing before the Board, articulating the issue to the Board, or “engaging” with the Board informally. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found none of these processes were set forth in the plain language of RSA 41:48. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court erred in its dismissal of plaintiff's case, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boucher v. Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law