Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) determined that Douglas County committed a prohibited labor practice when it increased union members' monthly health insurance premiums without negotiating. The County appealed, contending that the parties' collective bargaining agreement authorized its unilateral action and that its action did not change the status quo. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed (i) the CIR's determination that the County committed a prohibited labor practice in failing to negotiate health insurance premium increases; and (ii) the CIR's decision not to award attorney fees; but (2) reversed and vacated those portions of the CIR's orders requiring the County to reimburse union members for increased insurance premiums deducted from their wages, plus interest.

The Douglas County Health Center Security Union (Union) filed a petition before the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) alleging that its employer, Douglas County (County), had engaged in certain prohibited practices. The CIR found the County had engaged in a prohibited practice when it failed to negotiate its intention to contract out bargaining unit work to a private security company. The CIR ordered the parties to recommence negotiation and awarded the Union attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the CIR with directions to vacate its order and dismiss the Union's petition, holding that the issue of the subcontracting of bargaining unit jobs resulting in the elimination of bargaining unit jobs was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the County and Union and presented an issue of contract interpretation over which the CIR lacked jurisdiction.

Appellant David Pittman brought a negligence action against Western Engineering Company and Evert Falkena (collectively, Appellees) after David's wife, Robin Pittman, died in a work-related accident while working for Western on a road construction crew. David's sole theory of liability was bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed David's claim with prejudice, determining that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) David's negligence action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act because David accepted payment releasing Western, thus barring his action against Western by operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-148; and (2) this employer immunity extends to Falkena, a fellow employee of Robin, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-111.

Roger McCannon died in an accident while working for Appellee T.O. Hass Tire Company. Christy Spitz, with whom McCannon lived for several years, sought workers' compensation death benefits. The trial judge dismissed Spitz' claim that she was McCannon's surviving spouse after applying Colorado law to find that Spitz was not McCannon's common-law wife. The review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that the vast majority of objective evidence showed that Spitz and McCannon did not intend to create a common-law marriage and did not conduct their affairs as though a common-law marriage existed.

Appellant William Sellers injured his left knee in the course of his employment with Reefer Systems and sought workers' compensation benefits. The Nebraska workers' compensation court determined that Sellers was entitled to future medical care for the knee injury. A review panel of that court affirmed the award but modified it to exclude knee replacement surgery at present, as the evidence as of the date of trial did not support such a finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the modification did not limit Sellers' ability to claim workers' compensation benefits relating to any future knee replacement surgery, and thus, the compensation court review panel did not err in affirming the award as modified.

Adam Martensen filed a negligence action against Rejda Brothers, alleging that he was injured in an accident when he was working in a pasture on a ranch owned and operated by Rejda and that Rejda, as his employer, was negligent when it failed to make a timely effort to search for, discover, and rescue him. The court entered judgment in favor of Martensen and awarded damages of $750,000, plus taxable court costs and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court did not err when it concluded Rejda owed a duty to Martensen; (2) found no prejudicial evidentiary rulings; (3) determined that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; (4) affirmed the award based on the jury verdict and the award of taxable costs; and (5) reversed the amount of prejudgment interest awarded, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-103.02(1). Remanded for a recalculation of prejudgment interest.

On March 21, 2006, Julie Lovelace was injured in the course of her employment with the City of Lincoln. Lovelace continued to work after her injury up until June 22, 2006, the date of the surgery on her knee. Lovelace returned to work on October 2, 2006 until November 6, 2007, when she was again injured. Lovelace had another surgery on her left knee on December 19, 2007. Lovelace did not return to work, and the City subsequently terminated her employment. Lovelace sought payments for temporary total disability. The workers' compensation court found Lovelace had been temporarily totally disabled from June 22, 2006 through October 1, 2006, and again from December 19, 2007 through August 19, 2009, and thereafter became permanently and totally disabled. A three-judge panel of the compensation court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lovelace was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the period of time after she was injured and while she was working between October 2, 2006 and December 18, 2007; and (2) Lovelace was entitled to permanent total disability payments from December 19, 2007 onward.

Mack Downey and his wife sued Western Community College area, which operates Western Nebraska Community College, after Downey suffered injuries from a fall that occurred while he was replacing a scoreboard at the College. Downey's employer, Ferguson Signs, was named as a plaintiff to preserve a subrogation interest for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found that the College was liable for a portion of Downey's injuries and apportioned liability to Downey and Ferguson Signs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded, holding (1) the court did not err in finding the College liable; (2) the court correctly denied the College's claim for indemnity; but (3) the court erred in apportioning negligence to Ferguson Signs where Ferguson Signs was not a "released person" within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,185.11. Remanded for the court to reapportion Ferguson Signs' share of the negligence to Downey and the College.

Before Appellee began work as a certified nurse aid at Hospital, she failed to disclose on a preemployment questionnaire a work-related injury she received in 2001. In 2008, while working at Hospital, Appellee injured her back. Appellee subsequently petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge dismissed the petition, concluding (1) Appellee had willfully misrepresented her work-related injury history when she failed to disclose information about her previous injury; and (2) the hospital could deny benefits because of Appellee's misrepresentation pursuant to Hilt Trucks Lines, Inc. v. Jones. The Workers' Compensation Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial judge erred in finding a causal connection between Appellee's misrepresentation and her 2008 injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court's decision in Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. was clearly erroneous, and it was therefore overruled. Remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Appellee was entitled to benefits without regard to Hospital's misrepresentation defense.

Employee of Union Pacific Railroad Company brought an action against Union Pacific, claiming that Union Pacific's negligence resulted in toxic fume exposures that led to health problems for Employee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, finding that under McNeel v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., Employee had not presented sufficient evidence of causation because he had not identified a specific toxin to which he was exposed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because although McNeel was applicable to Employee's case, Employee presented sufficient evidence of a toxic exposure to present a genuine issue of material fact. Remanded.