Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

When David Goldan began working as an independent contractor insurance agent for Farmers Insurance Exchange, Farmers and Goldan entered into an Agency Appointment Agreement defining the parties’ rights and obligations. After Farmers terminated Goldan, Farmers sued Goldan alleging that Goldan breached his contractual duties and fiduciary responsibilities under the Agreement by soliciting and servicing the insurance business of policyholders within a year of his termination. Goldan counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that Farmers terminated him without cause. The jury ruled in favor of Goldan on all issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) by denying Farmers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the question of damages; (2) in denying Farmers’ motion for sanctions based on Goldan’s alleged discovery violations; and (3) in concluding that damages should not be limited to a three-month notice period allowed in the contract for terminations without cause. View "Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Goldan" on Justia Law

Larry Reinlasoder, the former chief of police for the City of Colstrip, sued Colstrip for wrongful discharge. In its defense, Colstrip contended that it had fired Reinlasoder for good cause. The jury returned a verdict for Reinlasoder. Colstrip appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law where Reinlasoder failed to contest that he had sexually harassed an employee. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Colstrip, holding that judgment as a matter of law was appropriate in this case because the undisputed facts precluded Reinlasoder from establishing an absence of good cause, the crucial element of his wrongful discharge claim. View "Reinlasoder v. City of Colstrip" on Justia Law

Maggie Petaja was terminated from her position with Lewis and Clark County when she was age fifty-nine. After unsuccessfully pursuing relief on the administrative level, Petaja, a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Montana Public Employees’ Association (MPEA), filed a discrimination claim against the County. Petaja also filed suit against MPEA, alleging breach of the duty of fair representation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the County on the discrimination claim and against MPEA on the breach of the duty of fair representation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the jury verdict finding MPEA breached its duty of fair representation; (2) the jury verdict was not contrary to the instructions and law; and (3) the district court correctly found that it had no legal authority to award attorney fees. View "Petaja v. Mont. Pub. Employees’ Ass’n" on Justia Law

The Denturist Association of Montana (Association), on behalf of denturist Carl Brisendine, filed suit against the Board of Dentistry, challenging the validity of A.R.M. 24.138.2302(1)(j) (Rule J), the latest in a long line of legal disputes between the two. "Wiser v. Montana," (129 P.3d 133 (Wiser I)) and "Wiser v. Board of Dentistry," (Wiser II)) either implicitly or explicitly claimed that the Board's promulgation of Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with statute. The Wiser I plaintiffs (comprised of every denturist in Montana) made their claims "on behalf of the profession of denturitry." Wiser I plaintiffs lost their challenge to the Board's authority. The Wiser II plaintiffs, comprised of a smaller group of denturists, attempted to distinguish themselves from the Wiser I plaintiffs, but the Court saw no distinction in their capacity to challenge the Board’s promulgation of Rule J as individuals rather than as representatives of a group. The Court barred the Wiser II plaintiffs’ claims on res judicata grounds. In this case, Brisendine’s complaint contains three counts: Count 1 Rule J was discriminatory and restrained trade, and that the Board violated Montana law by discriminatorily applying its disciplinary rules: being unduly harsh on denturists while giving leniency to dentists. Counts II and III alleged Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with various statutes. Brisendine moved for summary judgment on Count II, and the Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. The District Court, citing Wiser I and II, held Brisendine’s claims were barred by res judicata as a matter of law. Brisendine appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that privity existed between the litigants in the Wiser cases and Brisendine. Because privity exists and the other elements of claim preclusion were not contested with respect to Counts II and III, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board on those claims on res judicata grounds. Brisendine's claim in Count I was an entirely different claim than those made in the Wiser cases, and the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Board on this claim. View "Denturist Assoc. v Montana DOL" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff’s employment with Butte-Silver Bow County was terminated, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the County alleging several counts. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on most of Plaintiff’s claims. The court, however, denied summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the County violated Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-904(1)(b), holding that factual questions remained as to whether the County had good cause for Plaintiff’s termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment in the County’s favor with respect to Plaintiff’s claims that the County violated Montana’s open meeting laws and public participation laws; (2) granting summary judgment in the County’s favor with respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim; (3) ruling that the County did not discharge Plaintiff in violation of its own policies or for refusing to violate public policy; and (4) concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to a trial on her claim that the County terminated her employment without good cause. View "Moe v. Butte-Silver Bow Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked within the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Public Health and Human Services and constituted the majority of Compliance Specialists, Pay Band 6, employed by the State. Plaintiffs, who belonged to a Union, filed a grievance with the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) alleging that their pay was not “internally equitable” in comparison with Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists in other state agencies. A Hearing Officer issued a recommended order holding that Plaintiffs were aggrieved and awarded damages. BOPA, however, rejected the recommended order and dismissed the grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs had no independent right to internally equitable pay with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists, but, instead, internal equity was a factor to be considered during the collective bargaining process. The district court vacated and reversed BOPA’s final order, agreeing with the Hearing Officer that Plaintiffs had a right to pay that was internally equitable with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and reinstated BOPA’s final order, holding that the statutory factor of “internal equity” is not a stand-alone right that may be pursued independently and in preemption of the work of the collective bargaining process. View "Mashek v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured while working for Employer. Plaintiff’s injury was caused by the use of her personal vehicle. Plaintiff was able to recover benefits under her auto insurance policy but also sought benefits under Employer’s commercial auto policy. Employer’s insurer (Insurer) denied coverage. Plaintiff brought a claim for coverage, arguing that she was a named insured under Employer’s policy and that she was occupying a temporary substitute for an insured vehicle at the time of her injury. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff was a named insured under Employer’s commercial auto policy; but (2) reversed the district court’s order granting Insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s pickup was a temporary substitute for a covered auto and directed the district court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her coverage claim, as the evidence was sufficient to establish that Plaintiff’s pickup was a temporary substitute for an insured vehicle, entitling her to judgment on her coverage claim.. View "Stonehocker v. Gulf Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought disclosure of a settlement agreement entered into by a Cascade County detention officer, Cascade County, and the officer’s collective bargaining unit (the Union). The only barrier to disclosure of the settlement agreement was the resistance of the Union. The district court ultimately granted Plaintiff’s motion and ordered the County to disclose the settlement agreement. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for an award of costs and attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 2-3-221. The request was directed solely against the Union. The district court awarded Plaintiff his costs but denied his request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees because the sole entity from which the fees were sought - the Union - is not a public or governmental body subject to Mont. Const. art. II, 9. View "Shockley v. Cascade County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition for a hearing in the Montana Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) asking the court to order Teck American, Inc. to continue to provide medical benefits for a knee injury he sustained while working for Teck. The WCC found that Plaintiff was entitled to medical benefits, that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred due to a superseding intervening cause, that Teck was equitably estopped from denying medical benefits on Plaintiff’s claim under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-704(1)(d), and that Teck’s statute of limitations and statute of repose defenses were moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff and Teck formed an enforceable contract when both parties agreed to close several of Plaintiff’s claims in exchange for a lump sum payment and lifetime health benefits for his knee and back injuries; and (2) the WCC did not err in concluding that Teck cannot deny medical benefits to Plaintiff on the basis of section 39-71-704(1)(d). View "Newlon v. Teck American, Inc." on Justia Law

After Jon Cruson resigned from his position with Missoula Electric Cooperative, Inc., he filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry’s Unemployment Insurance Division (Department). The Department ultimately granted Cruson unemployment insurance benefits beginning on the date of his resignation. The Hearings Bureau reversed, concluding that Cruson was disqualified from receiving benefits because the reason he offered for quitting did not constitute good cause attributable to his employment. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. The district court denied Cruson’s appeal, determining that the Board correctly applied the law to the facts when it determined that Cruson did not voluntarily leave his employment with good cause attributable to his employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and its legal conclusion that “good cause attributable to the employer” had not been shown was correct. View "Cruson v. Missoula Elec. Coop." on Justia Law