Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

While employed by a company now known as Asurion Services, LLC, Christy Harris filed industrial injury claims for two different incidents. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company adjusted Harris’s workers’ compensation claims until it was declared insolvent. Montana Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) subsequently assumed the handling of Harris’s claims. Thereafter, MIGA notified Asurion that it would seek reimbursement for the benefits it paid to Harris pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 33-10-114(2). Asurion filed a declaratory judgment action against MIGA. The district court granted motion for Asurion based on the exclusivity provision of the Montana Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), concluding that because Asurion met its obligation to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, it had no payment obligations to Harris, and therefore, Mont. Code Ann. 33-10-114(2) did not afford MIGA relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Asurion provided workers’ compensation coverage in accordance with the Act, Asurion was not required to reimburse MIGA for benefits paid to Harris. View "Asurion Services, LLC v. Montana Insurance Guaranty Ass’n" on Justia Law

Charlene Berdahl, a court reporter, filed a sexual harassment complaint against Judge George Huss, a district judge, with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB). Huss’s attorney requested that the State agree to defend and indemnify Huss regarding Berdahl's HRB claims. Berdahl and Huss subsequently entered into a stipulated judgment resulting from the State’s refusal to defend and indemnify. The State filed this action seeking declarations that the State had no duty to defend or indemnify Huss against the claims and that Huss had entered a settlement without the consent of the State, which was unenforceable against the State. Berdahl counterclaimed seeking declarations that the State was responsible for the stipulated judgment entered by Berdahl and Huss and that the State was liable under the principle of respondent superior. The district court rejected Berdahl’s request for a declaration and held that the State owed no duty to defend or indemnify Huss. The court further reasoned that Berdahl’s exclusive remedy regarding her respondent superior claim was under the Montana Human Rights Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the State bore no obligation to pay the stipulated settlement between Huss and Berdahl. View "State v. Berdahl" on Justia Law

Charlotte Suzor injured her knees in a workplace accident in 1982 and settled her workers’ compensation claims in 1987 with her self-insured employer, reserving the right to seek future medical benefits for ongoing complications from her injury. In 2009, Suzor broke her hip after her knees gave out. Suzor’s physical filed a claim with Sedgwick Claims Management Services (Sedgwick), the third-party administrator for the workers’ compensation plan now funded by her employer’s successor in interest, International Paper Company (International). After Sedgwick denied the claim, Suzor sued International, Sedgwick, and two of Sedgwick’s employees (collectively, Defendants), alleging bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants did not owe Suzor a fiduciary duty; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Suzor’s jury instruction on causation; (3) the mistaken association of a wrong juror questionnaire with a juror was not a structural error necessitating a new trial; (4) the jury’s award of no damages was supported by sufficient evidence; and (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees. View "Suzor v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law

After the Cascade County Board of Commissioners terminated Stacey Bird from her position as the County’s human resources director, Bird filed a wrongful discharge claim against the County and the Board. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County had good cause to terminate Bird. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the County on Bird’s claim that the County terminated her employment without good cause, as the County met its initial burden of showing good cause for Bird’s termination, and Bird failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County had legitimate business reasons for discharging her. View "Bird v. Cascade County" on Justia Law

After she was demoted from her position with the Montana Department of Transportation, Sheila Cozzie filed a grievance. Following a contested case proceeding, the hearing examiner recommended that Cozzie’s grievance be denied. Cozzie appealed to the full Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA). The BOPA voted to grant Cozzie’s grievance and issued a final decision reinstating Cozzie. On appeal, the district court ruled that BOPA acted outside the scope of review, concluding that the BOPA improperly struck findings of fact and incorrectly modified conclusions of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by affirming the evidentiary ruling made by the hearing examiner; and (2) did not err by reversing the BOPA’s just cause decision. View "Department of Transportation v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The underlying claim in this case, which had been appealed on three previous occasions, concerned an exclusion in the State’s health benefit insurance plan, which allowed the State to coordinate benefits in violation of Montana’s made whole laws. Jeanette Diaz, Leah Hoffman-Bernhardt, and others similarly situated (collectively, Diaz) filed suit alleging that third-party administrators and the State (collectively, Defendants) had violated employees’ made whole rights under Montana law. During the various appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court certified and defined a class and that the district court correctly denied the State’s motion for summary judgment. In this, the fourth appeal, Diaz appealed a district court order determining the manner in which prejudgment interest on payments due to class members was to be calculated. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order declaring interest to begin thirty days following the Court’s decision in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana v. Montana State Auditor. Remanded for the district court to correct the date to be applied for determining the calculation of prejudgment interest. View "Diaz v. State" on Justia Law

Appellee filed an action against Missoula Electric Cooperative (MEC), asserting age discrimination in the hiring process. A Human Rights Bureau Investigator granted summary judgment for MEC, concluding that, as a matter of law, Appellee could not prove a case against MEC. The Human Rights Commission overturned its Hearing Examiner’s decision. The district court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly reversed the Hearing examiner’s decision because genuine issue of material fact existed, thus precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err by determining that the Hearing Examiner improperly granted summary judgment to MEC. View "Missoula Electric Cooperative v. Jon Cruson Inc." on Justia Law

After Lisa Warrington accepted an offer of employment with Great Falls Clinic (the Clinic), she signed a written employment contract. On Warrington’s last day at her former job, the Clinic informed her it would not employ her after all. Warrington filed an action against the Clinic, asserting breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and found that the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (the Act) did not apply. The Clinic petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, arguing that the district court made a mistake of law by concluding that the Act did not apply to the relationship between Warrington and the Clinic. The Supreme Court accepted the petition for supervisory control, affirmed the district court’s determination that the Act does not apply to the relationship between the parties, and affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Warrington on the breach of contract claim. View "Great Falls Clinic LLP v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Jason Talbot was seriously injured in Montana when he was struck by a vehicle driven by an employee of WMK-Davis, LLC. At the time of the accident, Talbot was employed by Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. Talbot, who was a resident of Oklahoma, filed a workers’ compensation claim in Oklahoma. Talbot then filed a complaint in Yellowstone County against WMK-Davis’s employee. Cudd, in turn, successfully moved to intervene in order to assert a workers’ compensation subrogation lien against Talbot’s potential tort recovery. Such an action is allowable under Oklahoma law, but Oklahoma law directly conflicts with Montana’s rule that a party may not subrogate until the injured worker has been whole. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Talbot, concluding that Montana applied and Cudd was prohibited from asserting a workers’ compensation subrogation lien in the underlying action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Montana courts will not conduct a choice of law analysis when determining the validity of a workers’ compensation subrogation lien; and (2) because the Montana Constitution applies in this case, and Cudd stipulated that Talbot will not be made whole under Montana law, Talbot was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Talbot v. Cudd" on Justia Law

This case concerned three retirement plans established by the Montana Legislature under the Montana Public Employee Retirement System (PERS). Plaintiffs, who elected to participate in the Defined Contribution Retirement Plan (DC Plan) and Montana University System Retirement Plan (University Plan), filed suit against the State and PERS, alleging that they were treated unequally from similarly-situated participants in the Defined Benefit Retirement Plan (DB Plan) and that requiring State employers of DC and University Plan participants to contribute to the trust that funds the retirement benefits of all DB Plan participants (DB Trust) violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) participants in the DB Plan, DC Plan, and University Plan are not members of similarly situated classes under an equal protection analysis, and (2) employer contributions to the DB Trust that are calculated based on the salaries of DC and University Plan participants do not violate substantive due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Wrzesien v. Mont. Pub. Employee Ret. Admin." on Justia Law