Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Oliver Arlington was employed by Miller's Trucking as a log truck driver and loader operator pursuant to an oral employment agreement. For his work, Miller's paid Arlington twenty-five percent of the "load rate" as calculated by Miller's. Arlington, however, asserted that according to the parties' oral agreement, he should have been paid a salary in the form of annual wages. Arlington filed a wage claim, seeking the pay he alleged he was owed in regular and overtime wages. The Department of Labor and Industry's bureau dismissed Arlington's claim for lack of merit and lack of sufficient evidence. On appeal, a bureau hearing officer dismissed Arlington's claim. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to require Miller's to produce material requested by Arlington and in refusing to admit tendered evidence, prejudicing the substantial rights of Arlington, and the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's judgment; and (2) the hearing officer and district court incorrectly determined that Arlington engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of the operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce and thus was exempt from overtime requirements. Remanded.

Employee, a truck driver, resigned from his employment with Employer after he developed arthritis. Employee later filed an occupational disease claim, which the Montana State Fund (MSF) denied. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) concluded that Employee's job duties were the major contributing cause of his arthritic condition, and therefore, Employee was suffering from an occupational disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Grande was suffering from a compensable occupational disease arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment, as the WCC's findings of fact were supported by substantial, credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct.

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary.

Randall Simms was injured during his employment. The Montana State Fund (MSF) provided workers compensation to Simms' employer, and later, paid continuing medical benefits for Simms. MSF subsequently utilized the services of a special investigative unit (SIU) to investigate Simms for fraud. The SIU took multiple videos of Simms in public places. The videos were deemed confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) by the district court. The court allowed them to be used in relation to Simms' workers' compensation claim in any manner consistent with the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and workers' compensation court (WCC) procedures. Simms appealed, arguing that MSF did not having standing to file an action for dissemination under the Montana Criminal Justice Information Act of 1979, and that the district court inadequately balanced the demands of individual privacy against the merits of disclosure, did not follow established rules of statutory construction, and improperly identified and weighed the competing interests at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err when it authorized MSF to disseminate the CCJI under the Act, and the court correctly interpreted the statute and adequately engaged in the statutorily mandated balancing of competing concerns.

James Whealon was employed by the Anaconda School District pursuant to a series of employment contracts. Upon retirement, Whealon filed a formal grievance, asserting that, under the terms of his contract, he was entitled to payment of his health insurance premiums by the District until he reached the age of sixty-five. The District denied his claim. The County Superintendent granted summary judgment to the District, holding that the language of the contract was unambiguous and that Whealon was not entitled to the claimed benefits beyond the date of his retirement. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the language of the contract was ambiguous. The district court reversed and reinstated the County Superintendent's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err in holding that a county superintendent has authority to grant summary judgment; and (2) the district court did not err in reinstating summary judgment in favor of the district where the language of the agreement was unambiguous and the District was entitled to judgment.

Edna Banco filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for an occupational disease (OD) in her right shoulder. Banco worked concurrently at 4B's Restaurant and the Child Development Center on Malmstrom Air Force Base (CDC). 4B's was insured by Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation (Liberty). Liberty denied Banco's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) found (1) Banco was last exposed to work of the same type and kind that gave rise to her shoulder condition while she was working at CDC; and (2) thus, since Banco was not last exposed at 4B's, Liberty was not liable under the "last injurious exposure" rule set forth in In re Mitchell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC had substantial credible evidence upon which to find Banco was last injuriously exposed at CDC to working conditions of the type and kind that led to her OD, and thus, Liberty was not liable for Banco's OD.

In previous workers' compensation cases, the Montana Supreme Court had determined that its decisions apply retroactively to claims that are not "final" or "settled" at the time the decision was issued. Under statute, two types of claims fall under the definition of "settled," (1) claims where there has been a formal settlement agreement, and (2) claims that are "paid in full." In this case, the workers' compensation court (WCC) defined "paid in full" to mean that an injured worker received all the applicable benefits prior to a new judicial decision and had not received subsequent benefits on his or her pre-judicial decision claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC properly applied retroactivity law in formulating its definition of "paid in full."

Heather Weber filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) to recover for personal injuries allegedly received during the course and scope of her employment with BNSF Railway Company, alleging BNSF breached its duty under FELA, violated the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), and violated the Safety Appliance Act (SAA), federal regulations, and other standards. The district court found BNSF not negligent. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Weber's LIA claim because Weber presented sufficient evidence that presented a factual issue whether the LIA had been violated and whether that violation played a part in causing Weber's injuries; and (2) the district court did not err in granting BNSF's motion to exclude testimony from Weber's treating physician about the results of a positron emission tomography (PET) scan performed on Weber. Remanded.

Norma Jean King worked for the Hays/Lodge Pole School District for more than thirty-five years, holding positions of elementary school teacher, elementary school principal, and high school principal. After serving as the high school principal for three years, the school district board of trustees reassigned her to an elementary school teaching position. On appeal, the county superintendent and, subsequently, the state superintendent affirmed the board's reassignment decision. The district court reversed the state superintendent's ruling, holding that the state superintendent erred in ruling that a principal position was comparable to a teaching position. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the positions of teacher and principal were not comparable positions of employment under the applicable statutes. Remanded.

After a Montana DOT (MDT) investigation, employee Richard Kershaw was demoted with a lower rate of pay. After resigning, Kershaw filed a complaint in district court, asserting wrongful discharge without good cause under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), wrongful discharge under the WDEA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment to MDT all three claims, ruling that Kershaw was precluded from bringing a constructive discharge under the WDEA because the claim was subject to the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) grievance procedure and that the IIED claim was precluded by Kershaw's failure to pursue a BOPA grievance procedure. Kershaw moved to amend his complaint to include additional tort claims, and the district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that the preclusion of Kershaw's claim from the WDEA did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection and to a jury trial; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kershaw's motions for leave to amend the complaint.