Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employee was terminated from her employment after her driver's license was suspended due to her epilepsy. Employee filed this action against Employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Employee in the amount of $11,250 for compensatory damages. Employee filed a motion for additur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The circuit court sustained Employee's motion and gave the parties thirty days to accept a higher amount of compensatory damages or elect a new trial on these damages only. Employer would not agree to an enhanced compensatory damage award, and the circuit court ordered a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Employee's motion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. View "Badahman v. Catering St. Louis" on Justia Law

Two cities separately appealed judgments entered against each city and in favor of the Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 ordering the public employer to adopt collective bargaining procedures. In a consolidated opinion in the two cases, the Supreme Court held (1) the right to organize and bargain collectively recognized in the Missouri Constitution inherently imposes a duty on each city to bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representative elected by its police officers and sergeants with a goal of reaching an agreement; (2) the cities here were not excused from carrying out this duty because the public employees represented by the union were not covered by the procedures codified in the public sector labor law; but (3) nevertheless, because the cities may not be able to meet their duty without establishing a framework, the trial courts erred in ordering them to do so. Furthermore, the Court entered judgment ordering the cities to recognize the union as the collective bargaining unit for the cities' police officers and sergeants and to begin to meet and confer with the union for collective bargaining. View "E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield" on Justia Law

The American Federation of Teachers, its St. Louis affiliate, and individual representatives appealed the trial court's summary judgment declaring that the board of education of the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the individual members of the board had no duty to "meet and confer" or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Mo. Const. art. I, 29 provides that all employees, public and private, have a right to organize and to bargain collectively, it necessarily requires the board to meet and confer with the union, in good faith, with the present intention to reach an agreement. Remanded. View "Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

As a state employee, Laurel Beard was a member of the Missouri State Employees' Retirement System (MOSERS). Beard filed for retirement but died before her annuity start date. Following Beard's death, Plaintiffs, Beard's assigned heirs, requested MOSERS to distribute Beard's retirement benefits to them as Beard's designated beneficiaries. MOSERS' board of trustees determined Plaintiffs were not entitled to retirement or survivor benefits because Beard died prior to her annuity starting date and did not have a surviving spouse or dependent children. Plaintiffs filed suit, seeking review of the MOSERS decision denying benefits. The trial court entered judgment in favor of MOSERS. Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the trial court wrongly interpreted Mo. Rev. Stat. 104.1030 in denying them retirement benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly applied the plain language of section 104.1030; and (2) section 104.1030 is constitutional for vested members of MOSERS who have filed for retirement but die before their annuity start date. View "Beard v. Mo. State Employees' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Whelan Security Company appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Charles Kennebrew and W. Landon Morgan on its action to enforce the non-compete agreements it had with Kennebrew and Morgan. On appeal, Whelan claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that the non-competition and non-solicitation clauses were invalid as overbroad and unreasonable as to time and space. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed, holding that the non-compete agreements were unreasonable as written but modified the terms of the agreements to give effect to the intent of the parties in entering the non-compete agreement; and (2) because genuine factual issues existed, entry of summary judgment was improper. Remanded. View "Whelan Security Co. v. Kennebrew" on Justia Law

The Missouri Department of Corrections appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Respondent on her claim of disability discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). On appeal, the Department claimed the trial court erred in overruling its objection to Respondent's verdict director because it did not include an essential element of her discrimination claim and erred in calculating punitive damages under Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.265. The Supreme Court reversed because the verdict-directing instruction did not require the jury to find that Respondent was disabled, an essential element of her MHRA claim. The Court also held that the trial court's calculation of punitive damages was the correct application of section 510.265. View "Hervey v. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

This workers' compensation appeal raised the question of whether the fifteen-percent statutory violation penalty under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.4 applies to an employee's (claimant) compensation award from the Second Injury Fund (SIF). The ALJ here refused to award the claimant additional benefits, determining that the fifteen-percent penalty under section 287.120.4 was not applicable to enhance the claimant's award. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission found that the fifteen-percent penalty applied to the compensation awards entered by the ALJ. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the section 287.120.4 penalty was inapplicable to the award that claimant received from the SIF. View "Hornbeck v. Spectra Painting, Inc." on Justia Law

Ruth Mendenhall appealed a summary judgment in favor of Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford on her equitable garnishment claim seeking insurance coverage for the death of her husband, Len Mendenhall. The trial court's judgment was premised on the conclusion that Len was an "employee" under the terms of the Hartford policy and, therefore, was excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, given the facts of this case and the policy language, Len was not an "employee" but was instead a "temporary worker" subject to coverage under the terms of the Hartford policy. View "Mendenhall v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford" on Justia Law

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah. View "Gervich v. Condaire, Inc." on Justia Law

Arnaz Crawford was fired from his job in January 2009. Crawford subsequently applied for Social Security disability benefits (SSDI benefits) due to a mental condition, but the social security administration (Administration) denied the claim. Meanwhile, Crawford applied for state unemployment benefits. The division of employment security (Division) awarded unemployment benefits to Crawford until March 20, 2010. On March 2, 2010, the Administration determined Crawford had been disabled and eligible for SSDI benefits since January 29, 2009. The Division subsequently determined (1) Crawford was unable to work from December 20, 2009 to March 20, 2010 and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits; and (2) Crawford had received $3,080 in benefits that he was ineligible to receive. The labor and industrial relations commission (Commission) affirmed the determination that Crawford was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the Commission's decisions to the extent they authorized the Division to collect the overpayment from Crawford; but (2) otherwise affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Crawford v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law