Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Michigan Supreme Court
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Plaintiffs were former recipients of unemployment compensation benefits who allege that the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (the Agency) unlawfully seized their property without affording due process of law. The issue their appeal presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review centered on whether plaintiffs gave timely notice of their due-process claims to the Agency, and therefore were entitled to consideration of the merits of their claims. More specifically, the issue concerned whether plaintiffs filed notices of intention to file their claims or the claims themselves “within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.” The Supreme Court held that the “happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action” for a claim seeking monetary relief was when the claim accrued, and a procedural-due-process claim seeking monetary relief accrued when the deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurred. Here, plaintiffs were deprived of their property when their tax refunds were seized or their wages garnished. As a result, plaintiffs Bauserman and Broe timely filed their claims within six months following the deprivation of their property, while plaintiff Williams did not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Bauserman v. Unemployment Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff David McQueer brought a negligence action against his employer, Perfect Fence Company, to recover damages after he was injured on the job. Perfect Fence moved for summary judgment on the ground that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., barred plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff responded that his action was not barred because defendant had violated MCL 418.611 by failing to procure workers’ compensation coverage for him and had violated MCL 418.171 by encouraging him to pose as a nonemployee. Plaintiff additionally moved to amend his complaint to add claims of intentional tort and breach of an employment contract. Plaintiff argued that the evidence raised a question of fact about whether defendant intended to injure him in a way that brought plaintiff’s claim within the scope of the intentional tort exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the WDCA. The trial court granted Perfect Fence’s motion, concluding that the company had not violated MCL 418.611 because defendant had provided workers’ compensation coverage. The court also ruled that MCL 418.171 was not applicable to plaintiff’s claims. The court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, concluding that amendment would be futile because the undisputed facts did not demonstrate that defendant intended to injure plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The panel agreed with the trial court that defendant had not violated MCL 418.611, but concluded that plaintiff had established a question of fact regarding whether defendant had improperly encouraged him to pose as a contractor for the purpose of evading liability under WDCA in violation of MCL 418.171(4). The panel also concluded that because plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact regarding whether an intentional tort had occurred, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint. The Michigan Supreme Court held MCL 418.171 did not apply in this case: because plaintiff was not the employee of a contractor engaged by defendant, he had no cause of action under MCL 418.171. For this reason, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment only as to whether MCL 418.171 applied. View "McQueer v. Perfect Fence Company" on Justia Law

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In 2014, Bruce Millar brought an action against the Construction Code Authority (CCA), Elba Township, and Imlay City, alleging violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and conspiracy to effectuate wrongful termination and violate the WPA. Millar had performed mechanical and plumbing inspection services for the CCA, which had contracts with Imlay City and Elba Township to provide licensed inspections. Imlay City and Elba Township each wrote letters to the CCA directing it to terminate Millar’s inspection services within their communities. In response, the CCA drafted a letter to Millar stating that he would no longer perform inspections in those communities, but it was not until Millar arrived at work on March 31 that he was given a copy of the CCA. That same day, he was prevented from working in Imlay City. The circuit court granted summary judgment on all counts to defendants, ruling that the WPA claim was time-barred because the WPA violation occurred, at the latest, on March 27, when the CCA drafted its letter, and therefore Millar had filed his claim one day after the 90-day limitations period in MCL 15.363(1) had run. The court also concluded that the WPA preempted Millar’s public-policy claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the limitations period on plaintiff's WPA claim did not begin to run until the CCA letter was given to him, or March 31. Because plaintiff's complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.36.(1). View "Millar v. Construction Code Authority" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Clifton Arbuckle sustained a work-related back injury while working for General Motors Corporation (GM), and in May 1993 began receiving a disability pension. He retired that month and was subsequently awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Later, he also received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. GM and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) had executed a letter of agreement in 1990 in which GM agreed not to coordinate workers’ compensation and disability pension benefits for its employees under MCL 418.354. This letter of agreement was incorporated into the 1990 collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between GM and the UAW and was intended to remain in place until termination or amendment of the CBA, which expired in November 1993. When the CBA expired, however, the provision against coordination was continued in subsequent letters of agreement and incorporated into subsequent CBAs. In 2009, GM and the UAW adopted a formula (incorporated into the 2009 CBA) by which GM would coordinate benefits, using disability pension benefits to reduce the amount of workers’ compensation benefits for all workers and retirees, regardless of when they had retired. GM advised Arbuckle that effective January 1, 2010, his benefits would be reduced using the formula in the 2009 agreement. Arbuckle appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Agency, which ultimately concluded that GM was improperly using Arbuckle’s SSDI benefits to offset his workers’ compensation benefits, in violation of MCL 418.354(11). A workers’ compensation magistrate reversed the director’s ruling but nevertheless concluded that GM was prohibited from reducing Arbuckle’s workers’ compensation benefits by his disability pension benefits because Arbuckle had never agreed to coordination of benefits and no evidence established that the UAW had the authority to bargain on Arbuckle’s behalf after his retirement. The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) reversed in part, holding that irrespective of the UAW’s authority to bind retirees, GM was permitted to coordinate Arbuckle’s disability pension benefits. Arbuckle sought leave to appeal, but after the Court of Appeals granted his application, he died. Robert Arbuckle, the personal representative of the estate, was substituted as plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam and remanded the case for further proceedings. GM then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that GM lacked the authority to coordinate Arbuckle’s benefits under the 2009 CBA. The Court reversed and reinstated MCAC's order. View "Arbuckle v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 1993, plaintiff Dean Altobelli began working as an attorney for Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (“the Firm”). Upon joining the Firm, plaintiff signed the “Miller Canfield Operating Agreement” (“Operating Agreement”), a document governing the Firm’s internal affairs. By January 2006, plaintiff had become a senior principal at the Firm. However, in late May or early June 2010, plaintiff decided he wanted to pursue a new opportunity as an assistant coach for the University of Alabama football team. Plaintiff proposed a 7- to 12-month leave of absence from the Firm to defendant Michael Hartmann, the Firm’s CEO, and defendant Michael Coakley, who was the head of the Firm’s litigation group but was not a managing director. Plaintiff suggested that the Firm permit him to maintain his ownership interest and return to the Firm as a senior principal any time before June 1, 2011. Plaintiff avers that Hartmann initially promised plaintiff that he could spend as much time at the University of Alabama as he wanted and still receive certain allocated income from his clients. Hartmann disputed this, claiming that plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the partnership. Plaintiff claimed he was improperly terminated, and that the Firm shorted plaintiff's income as a result. Plaintiff's attempt to resolve the matter through the direct settlement and mediation process, as outlined in the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement, was unsuccessful. In November 2011, plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration as provided for in the arbitration clause. Despite having made the demand for arbitration, he filed suit alleging that the seven individuals named as defendants were responsible for engaging in tortious conduct with regard to plaintiff's request for a leave of absence and retention of his equity ownership in the Firm. Defendants moved for summary judgment and a motion to compel arbitration as required by the arbitration clause. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment too. The circuit court denied defendants’ motions and granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that plaintiff did not voluntarily withdraw from the Firm. Rather, the circuit court concluded that defendants had improperly terminated plaintiff's ownership interest without authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion regarding the motion to compel arbitration and instead held that this case was subject to binding arbitration under the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the lower courts should not have reached the merits of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition, as the motion addressed substantive contractual matters that should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Altobelli v. Hartmann" on Justia Law

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Defendant city of Lansing enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. Plaintiff Associated Builders and Contractors, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because municipalities did not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed, and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused the controlling caselaw precedent, Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit, to be “superseded.” The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes "undercut its viability." The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirmed the result. View "Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this matter focused on the application of Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) to an employee who alleged that she was terminated because she reported a coworker’s plan to violate the law. Because "a violation or a suspected violation" refers to an existing violation of a law, the plain language of MCL 15.362 contemplated an act or conduct that has actually occurred or was ongoing. "MCL 15.362 contains no language encompassing future, planned, or anticipated acts amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law." Because plaintiff in this case merely reported another’s intent to violate a law in the future, plaintiff had no recourse under the WPA. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remanded this case to that court for further proceedings. View "Pace v. Edel-Harrison" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) to a contract employee whose contract was not renewed ostensibly because of the employee’s whistleblowing activities. A contract employee whose term of employment has expired without being subject to a specific adverse employment action identified in the WPA and who sought reengagement for a new term of employment occupied the same legal position as a prospective employee. The WPA, by its express language, only applied to current employees; the statute offered no protection to prospective employees. Because the WPA did not apply when an employer decided not to hire a job applicant, it likewise had no application to a contract employee whom the employer declined to rehire for a new term of employment. "The plaintiff in this case has no recourse under the WPA because he alleges only that his former employer declined to renew his contract, not that the employer took some adverse action against him during his contractual term of employment." View "Wurtz v. Beecher Metropolitan District" on Justia Law

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Anthony Henry and Keith White filed suit against Laborers’ Local 1191, Michael Aaron (the union’s business manager), and Bruce Ruedisueli (the union’s president), alleging that their indefinite layoff from employment at the union was unlawful retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA). Henry and White had worked as business agents for the union until their terminations. They alleged that defendants asked several union members to repair the façade of the Trade Union Leadership Council building. The union recorded payments for the work as picket duty even though the members did not engage in picket duty on those days. Henry and White believed that Aaron was involved in criminal activity, including fraud, an illegal kickback scheme, and misappropriation of union funds. They also believed that the union had required members to work without proper safety precautions and without receiving union wages. Henry and White subsequently contacted the United States Department of Labor with their suspicions and informed the union of their decision to report the allegations. The Department of Labor investigated the allegations and referred the matter to an assistant United States attorney, who declined to intervene. Aaron later notified Henry and White that they had been indefinitely laid off from employment at the union. During the pendency of Henry and White’s action, Michael Dowdy and Glenn Ramsey (also business agents for the union) were terminated from their employment. Dowdy and Ramsey filed a separate WPA action against the union, Aaron, claiming that they had been terminated for their cooperation in the Department of Labor’s investigation and disclosing to investigators facts substantiating the allegations of criminal misconduct. Defendants moved for summary disposition in the Henry/White lawsuit and for partial summary disposition in the Dowdy/Ramsey lawsuit, alleging that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) preempted plaintiffs’ WPA claims and that, as a result, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court denied both motions, concluding that the WPA’s protection of an employee against an employer’s retaliatory employment actions did not contravene the LMRDA. Defendants appealed in each case, reasserting their claim of LMRDA preemption and raising the new defense that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) independently preempted the circuit court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the NLRA nor the LMRDA preempted WPA claims premised on reporting suspected criminal misconduct. The NLRA did not cover the reporting of suspected criminal misconduct, while the LMRDA does not provide a union official with discretion to cover up suspected criminal misconduct by retaliating against employees who report their allegations. However, plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation for their reporting of improper wages and an unsafe work environment cover conduct "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA and, as a result, must be litigated exclusively before the NLRB. As such, the Court affirmed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Henry v. Laborers Local 1191" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Hurticene Hardaway sued Wayne County in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment, and claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel in relation to the denial of certain lifetime benefits granted to certain former County employees. Plaintiff worked in the County's office of corporation counsel. The trial court concluded that due to language in the Wayne County Commission Resolution 94-903, plaintiff did not qualify for the benefits. The trial court ultimately granted the County's motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the language in question was ambiguous. In its review of the resolution in question, the Supreme Court concluded its language was not ambiguous, therefore affirming the trial court's interpretation and judgment. View "Hardaway v. Wayne County" on Justia Law