Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Plaintiff's Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B claims, holding that tolling does not apply to the time limits established in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 5, including the requirement that claims be pursued by first filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) "within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination."Approximately one year after his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the MCAD alleging sexual harassment, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4 (16A), and retaliation, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to add his chapter 151B claims. The motion judge granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that this Court's emergency orders issued during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic applied only to courts, not the MCAD, and that equitable tolling did not apply. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that tolling did not apply to the time limits in this case. View "Dunn v. Langevin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decision of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this age discrimination action, holding that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact regarding whether he was terminated due to discriminatory animus.Plaintiff sued Defendant, his former employer, after he was laid off in a reduction in force. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, determining that Plaintiff could not show that Defendant's stated justification for his termination was pretextual. The appeals court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings, holding that Plaintiff produced evidence from which a jury could find that he was selected for the reduction in force as part of a corporate strategy to lay off older workers. View "Adams v. Schneider Electric USA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the single justice of the appeals court reversing the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and vacated the injunction, holding that the single justice abused her discretion in enjoining Defendants from enforcing their December 2021 amended COVID-19 vaccination policy.Plaintiffs - the Boston Firefighters Union, the Boston Police Superior Officers Federation, and others - filed a complaint challenging Defendants' unilateral amendment of the COVID-19 vaccination policy for all city of Boston employees, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior court denied Plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief, but a single justice of the appeals court reversed and ordered the entry of a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the single justice abused her discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction because the potential harm to the city resulting from the spread of COVID-19 clearly outweighed the economic harm to employees. View "Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, Internat'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge allowing the State police's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff's request for back pay under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 59 (the Perry Law), holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to back pay or other relief under the terms of the Perry Law.Perry Law mandates back pay for a State employee who has been indicted on criminal charges due to job-related misconduct and, consequently, suspended from his position without pay if the charges are subsequently terminated without a finding or verdict of guilty. At issue was whether Plaintiff, who had been suspended from his position without pay pursuant to article 6.2 of the State police rules and regulations, was entitled to back pay under the Perry Law. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) when the colonel of the State police opted to suspend Plaintiff, he had discretion to choose whether to invoke the Perry Law or to proceed under article 6.2, which is unique to the State police; and (2) because the colonel decided to suspend Plaintiff in accordance with article 6.2 Plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the Perry Law. View "Perez v. Dep't of State Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the trial judge granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Local 192 (NEPBA), denying the city of Chelsea's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and confirming the underlying arbitration award in this labor dispute, holding that the trial court did not err in confirming the arbitration award.After NEPBA replaced another union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the emergency dispatchers in the city, NEPBA sought to arbitrate a grievance regarding an emergency dispatcher's termination following the change in union representation. While the NEPBA and city bargained to a new contract, employees had been working under the city's prior collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the former union. Because the CBA contained an arbitration provision, the arbitrator ruled that the dispute was arbitrable. The superior court confirmed the decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the dispute was arbitrable. View "City of Chelsea v. New England Police Benevolent Ass'n, Local 192" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari challenging that municipal court judge's finding that the Boston retirement board did not err in revoking Plaintiff's retirement allowance pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(3) and (4), holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiff, a former corrections officer who was found to be permanently disabled after suffering a work-related injury, was ultimately convicted of workers' compensation fraud and larceny for falsely certifying over a period of seven years that he was not able to work. Thereafter, the board revoked Plaintiff's retirement allowance. The municipal court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's ensuing petition for a writ of certiorari, holding that the board did not err in determining that the requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(3) and (4) were satisfied here. View "Mahan v. Boston Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conclusions of the retirement board of Lexington (board), a magistrate in the Division of Administrative Law Appeals, the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, and the superior court that payments in lieu of vacation time did not constitute regular compensation, holding that there was no error.In 2012, Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission issued guidance to local retirement boards stating that payments for unused vacation time may be considered as regular compensation, and therefore counted for the purpose of calculating a member's retirement benefit, if they met two requirements. Shortly before his retirement, Appellant asked the board whether the payments he had received in lieu of taking vacation time would be considered as regular compensation for the purposes of calculating his retirement allowance. The board answered the question in the negative, and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that payment in lieu of unused vacation time requiring periodic election by an employee does not qualify as regular compensation. View "O'Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for recovery of damages when an employer violates the federal overtime law, 29 U.S.C. 207, precludes an employee from alternatively pursuing remedies under the wage act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, for the untimely payment of overtime wages due solely pursuant to the FLSA.Plaintiffs, employees of Defendant, brought this action alleging violations of the FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages, violations of the wage act for failure to pay the FLSA overtime wages in a timely manner, and violations of federal and state minimum wage laws. The motion judge allowed summary judgment as to Defendant's liability under the federal overtime law and wage act. After a trial, the trial judge awarded damages. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial judge's trebling of damages pursuant to the wage act was error; (2) the jury instructions for the calculation of overtime wages under the FLSA contained a methodological error; and (3) Defendant's remaining claims lacked merit. View "Devaney v. Zucchini Gold, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper measure of damages for the private right of action for Wage Act violations under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 150 when the employer pays wages after the deadlines provided in the aCt but before the employee files a complaint is treble the amount of the late wages, not trebled interest.When Plaintiff was discharged from her employment with the City of Methuen the City owed her almost $9000 for accrued vacation time. While the Act required the City to pay this amount to Plaintiff on the day of her termination the City did not pay her until three weeks later. One year later, the City paid Plaintiff an amount representing the trebled interest for the three weeks between Plaintiff's termination and the payment of Plaintiff's vacation pay. Plaintiff subsequently brought this lawsuit. The superior court judge concluded that Plaintiff was only entitled to treble interest for the three-week delay in receiving her vacation pay. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding that late-paid wages are "lost wages" for purposes of the Wage Act. View "Reuter v. City of Methuen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court answered two questions of law concerning the authority of counsel or the courts to protect the interests of putative class members when the named plaintiff has died, no party has been substituted for the named plaintiff and no motion has been made to certify the putative class.Charles Kingara brought this lawsuit alleging both class and individual causes of action arising under the wage act, the minimum fair wage law, and the overtime law. Before Kingara's counsel had filed for class certification Kingara died. Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to order notice to putative class members informing them of Kingara's death and inviting them to join the action. After the motion was granted, Defendants filed a petition for interlocutory relief, which resulted in the questions of law before this Court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the circumstances, counsel had no authority to act on behalf of Kingara or the putative class, but the courts may act to protect the interests of the putative class members when those individuals would face significant prejudice without notice. View "Kingara v. Secure Home Health Care Inc." on Justia Law