Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a claim by a former professional football player (the athlete) for benefits under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act based on an injury during pre-game warm-up at the employer's stadium in Maryland. The employment agreement contained a forum selection clause providing, inter alia, that claims for workers' compensation benefits should be governed by Virginia law and that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission should have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve such claims. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission decided that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the athlete's claim, that the athlete had sustained an accidental injury arising out of the course of his employment, and that the athlete's disability was causally related to his accidental injury. The circuit court upheld the decision. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the forum selection clause in the employment contract was ineffective to divest the Commission of the ability to exercise jurisdiction; and (2) injuries occurring while playing and practicing professional football are accidental injuries and thus compensable under the Act. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa" on Justia Law

Respondent was injured in an automobile collision involving Norman Iglehart while both were acting within the scope of their employment with the Board of Education of Prince George's County. The workers' compensation commission awarded Respondent compensation. Subsequently, Respondent filed a complaint against Iglehart and the Board (collectively, Petitioners) seeking damages as a result of Iglehart's negligence and the respondeat superior liability of the Board. The trial judge dismissed the Board from the action but directed it remain a party for the purposes of potential indemnification of Iglehart required under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-518(h). The judge then ordered that judgment be entered against Iglehart and the Board. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 5-519 contains an indemnification provision that allows an injured party to bring a tort suit against the county board of education employee who caused the injury, and accordingly, the injured party must join the employer board as a defendant in the action; and (2) this statutory scheme does not violate the exclusivity rule stating that an injured employee's sole remedy against her employer is through the Workers' Compensation Act. View "Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. (FOP) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Montgomery County following the County's unilateral decision to discontinue a long-standing practice of allowing shop stewards to sit in on disciplinary interrogations for training purposes. The County filed a motion to dismiss the grievance, arguing that arbitration of the issue was preempted by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The arbitrator determined the grievance was not preempted and denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's decision and granted summary judgment on behalf of the FOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the LEOBR was not implicated by the steward training grievance and, therefore, did not preempt its arbitration under the CBA. View "Montgomery Co. v. FOP Lodge 35" on Justia Law

Respondents in this case were an instructional aid and teacher employed by the public school system. Petitioner, the Department of Human Resources, received reports accusing Respondents of committing child abuse and later issued a finding of "child physical abuse - unsubstantiated." As a result, neither Respondent was named as the alleged abuser, but Respondents' names were entered into the central registry of child abuse investigations. Respondents requested an appeal regarding the decision of 'unsubstantiated' child physical abuse, but the Department denied the requests. Respondents subsequently filed mandamus actions, which the circuit court dismissed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Department failed to interpret Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1(c) properly, and that individuals who are investigated by a local department, with a resultant finding of "unsubstantiated," have a right to appeal regardless of any additional findings of actual responsibility.

Appellant Nancy Forster was terminated from the position of state public defender by the board of trustees of the state office of public defender. Forster subsequently filed a wrongful discharge action against the office of the public defender without first appealing administratively her termination. The circuit court dismissed Forster's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Forster appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously granted the State's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the merits of Forster's claim, holding that Forster failed to exhaust the available and primary administrative remedy provided to at-will, executive service State employees under Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 11-305, even though she was not given written notice by the board of trustees of the availability of that avenue of appeal, as section 11-305 does not require the appointing authority to provide notice of the available administrative appeal.

Deputy Erick Gindlesperger of the county sheriff's office filed a subpoena request seeking to compel Sheriff Darren Popkin to produce documents prior to a disciplinary hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The hearing board denied the request, and Gindlesperger field a motion for show cause order. The circuit court determined that Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 3-107(d) entitled Gindlesperger to pre-hearing production of various enumerated documents. Sheriff Popkin appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error when it ordered the pre-LEOBR hearing production of the enumerated documents, as section 3-107(d)(1) does not provide for compelling production of records and documents by subpoena in advance of an LEOBR disciplinary hearing.

In December 2008, State Employee was notified that her employment was terminated. Employee submitted a timely written appeal of her termination to the secretary of her agency. In August 2009, when Employee received no response to her repeated requests for a decision, Employee sought to have the matter appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). The Secretary forwarded the appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ dismissed the appeal pursuant to several provisions of the State Personnel Management System. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was how the provisions of the State Personnel Management System are to be implemented when, as here, a terminated employee notes a timely appeal to the head of the principal unit and the head of the principal unit fails within fifteen days thereafter to issue a written decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a state employee in this circumstance must assume at the end of the fifteen-day period that the appeal has been denied and take any further appeal within ten days thereafter.

Respondents Wayne Singleton and his eight-year-old son were passengers in a bus when the bus left the road and collided with a tree. Respondents sued Petitioner, the District of Columbia, alleging that it was liable vicariously for the negligence of its assumed employee, the driver. Respondents produced at trial only themselves as witnesses and argued that res ipsa loquitur supplied an adequate inference of negligence to complete their prima facie case. The trial judge granted the District's motion for judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, Respondents failed to show that they were entitled to an inference of negligence, as Respondents' evidence failed to demonstrate that negligence on the part of the bus driver was more probably than not the cause of the accident or to eliminate other potential causes of the accident.

On two separate occasions, Respondent Edy Sanchez filed for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission while previous orders, in the same claim, were pending on appeal in the courts. The Commission decided that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Respondent's requests because of the pending appeals. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not retain jurisdiction pending an appeal because the issues raised in the new filings did not fit within the jurisdictional provisions of Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-742. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had jurisdiction over Respondent's new issues under section 9-736(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-736(b), the Commission retains jurisdiction to hear new issues while other issues in the same claim are pending on appeal, so long as no evidence was taken or decision made on the new issues in the hearing from which the appeal was taken; and (2) section 9-742 was not intended to reduce the Commission's ongoing jurisdiction to grant relief, notwithstanding the appeal.

After Hospital declined to renew the privileges of Physician due to repeated complaints about Physician, Physician sued for damages. Hospital claimed immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA). The circuit court granted summary judgment to Hospital, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer whether in the context of a summary judgment proceeding, the presumption of HCQIA immunity is rebutted upon the showing of material facts in dispute regarding the physician's reporting of substandard medical care and attempts to improve the quality of the care in the hospital system. The Court affirmed, holding (1) evidence of retaliation will not prevent summary judgment on HCQIA immunity unless it can permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that (i) the defendant failed to comply with the standards for immunity set forth in 42 U.S.C. 11112(a), or (ii) the action was not a "professional review action" under 42 U.S.C. 11151(9); and (2) in this instance, Physician did not produce evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that Hospital failed to satisfy the standards for immunity set forth in HCQIA, and therefore, summary judgment was warranted.