Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the Montgomery County Council adopted Resolution No. 17-149 (Resolution), which “changed” three contract provisions for fiscal year 2012 in the pre-existing collectively-bargained agreement (CBA) with members of the County’s police force. Specifically, the Resolution changed certain employment benefits of the CBA. The Fraternal Order of the Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 filed suit against the County and the Council, challenging the legality of the Council’s actions in adopting the Resolution and the actions of the Council and the County in implementing the changes in the resolution. The circuit court declared that the Council’s actions were permissible under the Police Labor Relations Act (PLRA), the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the CBA. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its authority under the PLRA in deciding not to fund fully - and thereby, to change - certain benefits in the CBA, where the changes were fiscal in nature and the County Executive and the FOP did not submit a re-negotiated agreement to the Council. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an hourly employee of Safeway, Inc. In 2010, in response to two writs of garnishment issued by the district court, Safeway deducted an excess of $29.64 from Plaintiff’s wages. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against Safeway on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, arguing that Safeway’s garnishment practice resulted in wrongfully excessive deductions. Ten days after the class action suit was filed, Safeway changed its payroll garnishment system to conform with the correct garnishment exemptions standards and tendered to Plaintiff the amounts that would have been paid to her had those standards been applied at the time. The circuit declined to certify the class and entered judgment in favor of Safeway. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) employees have a right of direct private action against their employer under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 3-507.2 for deducting from the employee’s wage more than is lawfully allowed; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case in denying class certification and in entering judgment for Safeway. View "Marshall v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a paid firefighter employed by Respondent, Montgomery County. Petitioner filed a claim pursuant to the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming that he sustained injuries in an accident that occurred when he was traveling to work on his motorcycle after leaving physical training. The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission disallowed Petitioner’s claim, finding that Petitioner did not sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The circuit court upheld the Commission’s decision, ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to workers’ compensation because the injury occurred while “he was coming and going” to work. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that Petitioner’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act because (1) Petitioner’s travel was incidental to his employment, which travel cannot be excluded from coverage by application of the going and coming rule; and (2) “but for” his travel between work-related sites Petitioner would not have been injured. View "Roberts v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of a State psychiatric hospital who had been laid off and were not rehired in order of seniority when the hospital later filled vacancies for positions comparable to those previously occupied by Plaintiffs. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiffs’ grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to be rehired under a reinstatement process. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals remanded the case for further factfinding, concluding (1) there is no statutory preference for reinstatement, as opposed to recruitment, in the State Personnel Management System, but if an agency decides to fill vacancies through recruitment, it must follow statutory procedures, including public notice and transparency as to the selection criteria; and (2) it was not clear whether the agency in this case complied with those criteria. The Court of Appeals affirmed by adopting the opinion of the court of special appeals and adding an endorsement to the court of special appeal’s opinion to remove any doubt as to the standing of that decision as the law of the State. View "Sturdivant v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a complaint for accounting against Petitioner, their employer, after a dispute over the terms of their employment agreement. In response, Petitioner filed a petition to compel arbitration, asserting that, because Respondents’ claims arose out of their employment agreements, the circuit court was required to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in the employment agreement. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s petition. The intermediate appellate court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, concluding that the denial of Petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration did not constitute a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an order denying a request to compel arbitration filed in an existing action is not a final judgment because the denial of the petition does not put the parties out of court or otherwise terminate the proceedings and does not deny the party requesting arbitration the means of further prosecuting or defending rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. View "Am. Bank Holdings, Inc. v. Kavanaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were employees who had been laid off from their jobs at a State psychiatric hospital and, when the hospital filled vacancies for positions comparable to those previously occupied by the laid-off employees, were not rehired in order of seniority. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiffs' grievance, concluding that they did not have a right to be rehired under a reinstatement process. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals remanded the case for further factfinding, concluding (1) there is no statutory preference for reinstatement, as opposed to recruitment, in the State Personnel Management System; but (2) if an agency elects to fill vacancies through recruitment, it must follow statutory procedure that includes public notice and transparency as to the selection criteria. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the lower court correctly analyzed the legal issue concerning the interpretation of State personnel law; and (2) because the record did not definitely answer the question whether the agency in this case was filling vacancies by a reinstatement process, rather than recruitment, remand for further factfinding was appropriate. View "Sturdivant v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

Respondents each suffered on-the-job accidents, resulting in permanent partial disability. In both cases, at least one of the Respondent's injuries was a "scheduled injury" and the other was an "unscheduled injury." The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Respondents benefits at the "second tier" rate. In making the awards pursuant to Md. Stat. Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-629, the Commission combined, in each case, the awards for the scheduled and unscheduled injuries. Both Robinson's and Anderson's employers appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commission's awards. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court's judgments, holding that the Commission could combine awards for scheduled injuries with awards for other cases to determine whether the second tier compensation rate was applicable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it is permissible under the Workers' Compensation Act to combine compensation awards in order to determine which of the three levels of compensation prescribed by Md. Stat. Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-628 through 9-630 is appropriate. View "Montgomery County v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After Respondent resigned as executive director of the Chamber of Commerce, he filed a complaint against the Chamber, alleging violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Law, among other claims. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment against the Chamber. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees under the Wage Payment and Collection Law. The circuit court denied Respondent's motion on remand after applying a fee-shifting analysis from ERISA cases. The court of special appeals reversed the denial of the motion, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the ERISA factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because ERISA and the Wage Payment and Collection Law serve distinct purposes and because their fee-shifting provisions are based on different principles, a trial court should not employ the ERISA fee-shifting test in deciding whether to award attorneys' fees. View "Ocean City Chamber of Commerce v. Barufaldi" on Justia Law

This case arose when six employees of the Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church filed workers' compensation claims, claiming they had sustained physical injury as a result of exposure to mold in the Conference's office. The employees profferred Dr. Ritchie Shoemaker as their expert to prove causation. Defendant moved to exclude Shoemaker under Frye-Reed on the grounds that his methodology to determine causation was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. On remand, after a Frye-Reed hearing, the circuit court determined that Shoemaker's methodology was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and satisfied the Frye-Reed test. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Shoemaker's technique and theory were not shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. View "Chesson v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Association of Maryland Pilots as a launch boat operator. Plaintiff was later promoted to assistant station manager. In 2008, Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis. Plaintiff sued the Association pursuant to the Jones Act, alleging negligence in regard to injuries he suffered from exposure to free silica during his employment. Whether Plaintiff's claim was properly made under the Jones Act depended on whether Plaintiff was a "seaman" at the time of the alleged negligence. To distinguish seamen from land-based workers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a seaman must ordinarily have spent at least thirty percent of work time in service of a vessel in navigation. The lower courts concluded Plaintiff was not a seaman at the time of his injury and therefore granted summary judgment for the Association. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not spend at least thirty percent of his work time performing sea-based duties, and therefore, Plaintiff was not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. View "Dize v. Ass'n of Md. Pilots" on Justia Law