Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the minimum monthly salary referenced in La.R.S. 33:1992 included the supplemental amount paid by a municipality for purposes of calculating wage differentials for higher-ranking firefighters. current and former firefighters for the City of West Monroe filed suit against the City, alleging that the pay practices in use violated La.R.S. 33:1992. Particularly, Plaintiffs argued the base salary which was used to compute percentage differentials for higher ranking firefighters, failed to include the city supplemental pay of $300 per month. They contended the correct minimum monthly salary was $1,800, reflecting a $1,500 base salary in addition to a $300 supplemental salary. Without the supplement, the first year firefighters’ pay would not meet the minimum wage required by federal law. The City argued the proper minimum monthly salary was $1,500 because the city supplement was only a temporary monthly payment given to first-year firefighters. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the interplay between La.R.S. 33:1992 and R.S. 33:2002 necessitated the exclusion of the enhanced amount of $300 from the base pay of a firefighter when calculating the pay differentials. Thus, the Court reversed the grant of partial summary judgment as to liability against the City of West Monroe and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit in its entirety. View "West Monroe Firefighters Local 1385 v. City of West Monroe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development's (DOTD) writ application to consider whether the Office of Workers' Compensation hearing officer erred in requiring a vocational rehabilitation counselor to comply with the so-called "Crain Brothers conditions," drafted by claimant's counsel, before the counselor could commence or continue to provide vocational rehabilitation services to the claimant. Upon review, the Court held that the hearing officer erred in imposing these conditions ostensibly as a prophylactic measure without an evidentiary showing that any of the imposed conditions were reasonably necessary to resolve or rectify a "dispute . . . concerning the work of the vocational counselor" as provided in La. Rev. Stat. 23:1226(B)(3)(a). Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts' rulings, and remanded the case to the Office of Workers' Compensation. View "Hargrave v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of the City of Bossier City to determine the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 33:2501(C)(1); specifically, whether the statutory authority of the Bossier City Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board to modify discipline was conditioned upon a finding that the appointing authority acted in bad faith or without cause. After review, the Court found that a municipal fire and police civil service board has the statutory authority to review and modify the discipline imposed, even when the appointing authority acts in good faith for cause. View "City of Bossier City v. Vernon" on Justia Law

Claimant Henry Marange filed a disputed claim for compensation against his employer, Custom Metal Fabricators, Inc. asserting he injured his back in a work-related accident. Custom Metal answered the petition, and denied Claimant's allegation. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held that Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a workplace accident occurred. Upon review of the facts in record, the Court concluded that the court of appeal erred in reversing the OWC's judgment.

Claimant James Mercer, was injured in an accident during his employment with Defendant, Nabors Drilling, USA, L.P. Claimant received workers' compensation disability and medical benefits. As a result of his accident, Claimant also filed suit against a third-party tortfeasor. Nabors intervened, seeking recovery of the workers' compensation benefits it paid to claimant. Without prior approval by Nabors, Claimant settled the tort suit with the third-party tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the workers' compensation benefits paid by Nabors. Subsequently, Claimant reimbursed Nabors for the full amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, deducting a proportionate share for attorney fees and costs. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether whether the court of appeal erred in reversing a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held the employer was entitled to a credit against future medical benefits. Upon review, the Court concluded that OWC correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and therefore reinstated the OWC's judgment.

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits.

Claimant Jerry Benoit worked for Turner Industries for twenty-seven years. For ten of those years he worked as a general laborer for a Lake Charles Citgo refinery, where Turner was contracted to perform general maintenance. Claimant's duties included cleaning chemical discharges and oily waste which collected in the drainage ditches, sewers, and processing units at the refinery. In the course of this work, he was exposed to any number of potentially dangerous or carcinogenic chemicals, including high levels of benzene. In July 2006, Claimant fell ill. He was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML), known to be linked to high levels of benzene exposure. Despite the medical evidence linking Claimant's cancer to the chemicals he was exposed to at work, his claim for medical benefits was denied. The eventual medical bills totaled over $625,000. Medicaid paid for $203,124.68. The remaining $422,043.59 was "written off" by the medical care providers. Turner paid nothing. Claimant's family filed suit in 2007. The Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC) awarded Claimant total medical expenses and attorney fees. Turner appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the OWC judgment in its entirety. Upon review of the correctness of the OWC award of medical expenses, the Supreme Court concluded the OWC erred in awarding the "written off" medical expenses: "Claimant would receive an improper windfall if he was allowed to recover for medical expenses which have been reduced by health care providers as a result of their contractual arrangements with Medicaid." The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Desi Fulmer was an employee with the State Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and was injured in the course and scope of his employment. Central to the case was whether an injured, state-employed seaman could sue under the State's "Jones Act" in state court or whether provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act applied. Upon consideration of the trial record and applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that under the Jones Act, the State waived its sovereign immunity from suits for injury.

Plaintiff B.W. Greemon was a paramedic with the Bossier City Fire Department. In 2007, he responded to a call to assist an apparently intoxicated Eric Holloway who was in police custody. At the scene, Plaintiff was informed that the Mr. Holloway had consumed as many as 18 beers and was possibly a diabetic. Plaintiff evaluated Mr. Holloway and authorized his transport to jail. Mr. Holloway was transported and booked into jail where he was found dead the next morning. A complaint was filed against Plaintiff for clearing Mr. Holloway's transport to jail rather than to a medical facility. After an investigation, Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Bossier City. Plaintiff subsequently filed a civil service appeal, which was then submitted to the Civil Service Board. One Board member moved to enter into executive session, and another member "seconded" the motion. No formal vote on the motion to enter executive session was reflected in the hearing transcript, but the presiding board member clearly directed that the Civil Service Board enter the executive session, which was then closed to the public. After the session, the Board returned to an open session. The Board then publicly voted 3 to 2 to uphold Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff then appealed the Board's decision to district court, alleging that the closed executive session was a violation of the State Open Meetings Law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff failed to bring a timely claim under the Open Meetings Law, and that the district court erred in granting him summary judgment under that law. The Court reversed the lower court's voiding of the Civil Service Board's action, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.