Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Claimant Randy Lewis sought benefits for work-related lumbar spine injuries sustained in 2001 and 2002 and a work-related cervical spine injury sustained in 2005. An ALJ awarded 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $315 per week for the lumbar injuries beginning in 2004 and 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $498 per week beginning in 2007. Employer filed a petition for reconsideration, noting that the combined weekly benefits would equal $813 during the weeks they overlapped and that Claimant was not entitled to receive combined weekly benefits totaling more than $607, the maximum benefit that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(a) allowed for total disability. The ALJ granted the petition and amended the claims, concluding that the separate partial disability awards did not entitle Claimant to receive at any time combined weekly benefits that exceeded the maximum for permanent total disability. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the maximum benefit permitted by section 342.703(1)(a) applies to multiple partial disability awards and does not entitle a worker to be compensated at one time for more than total disability.

Appellants had worked for thirty-seven and thirty-four years, respectively, in underground coal mines. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed decisions to dismiss both Appellants' applications for benefits because the "consensus readings" of their X-rays interpreted them to be negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis. On review, two separate court of appeals' panels held that the "consensus procedure" required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316 for proving the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and the clear and convincing standard the statute required to rebut such a consensus were unconstitutional because such provisions denied the claimants and other workers who suffered from coal workers' pneumoconiosis equal protection under the law by placing a more stringent burden of proof on them than those who suffered from pneumoconiosis from other sources. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and affirmed, concluding that there was no rational basis or substantial and justifiable reason for the disparate treatment of coal workers in this instance, and the arbitrary distinction requiring coal workers to meet a higher standard of proof in pneumoconiosis cases than other workers violated the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.

Plaintiff, an employee of the Court of Justice, brought an action against the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), alleging violation of her due process rights and of the state's whistleblower statute in the termination of her employment. The circuit court dismissed her claims as being barred under the doctrine of res judicata because the issues in question had already been decided in federal court. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the circuit court judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims founded on the potential violation of her due process rights under the state Constitution where there was nothing in the record below, or in the federal action, indicating there was a finding of whether Plaintiff's position with the AOC was tenured or at will, and if tenured, whether she was afforded her rights under the administrative procedures of the AOC; and (2) reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the Kentucky whistleblower statute on the basis of issue preclusion where the final decision of the federal courts was deprived of one of the required tests in order for issue preclusion to apply to the state court action. Remanded.

On April 1, 2005, Employee was injured during the course of his employment. Due to the injury, Employee never returned to work. Employee received workers' compensation benefits from April 2, 2005 through April 14, 2007. When the workers' compensation benefits ceased, Employee applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Commission based Employee's unemployment benefits on an extended base period comprised of the first three quarters of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2006. Employee appealed, arguing that the extended base period should be based upon the four calendar quarters of the year 2004 because those were the most recent four quarters which fairly reflected the wages he earned prior to his injury. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of "extended base period" as defined in section 341.090(2). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute as written by the General Assembly in calculating Employee's unemployment benefits.

Shortly after announcing her intention to seek election to the office of county clerk, Appellant Stacie Cook was discharged from her position as a deputy clerk by the incumbent county clerk, Appellee Lisha Popplewell, who also intended to seek election to the clerk position. Following Cook's defeat in the primary election, she brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Popplewell and the county, alleging that she had been discharged in violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court dismissed Cook's complaint by summary judgment, ruling that Cook's interest in being a candidate enjoyed no constitutional protection. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reason to deviate from settled law concluding that there is no constitutional right to candidacy.

Appellants, a county fiscal court, a county fire district, and ten municipal corporations, appealed from a final order of the circuit court that held (1) the state labor cabinet had jurisdiction to pursue an administrative agency action against Appellants to collect, on behalf of firefighters employed by Appellants, unpaid overtime compensation; and (2) the Appellant municipalities were not cloaked with governmental or sovereign immunity from such claims. The Supreme Court granted Appellants' motion to transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the relevant statutes directing city and county governments to pay their employees in a prescribed manner necessarily implies a waiver of immunity from liability to the employees for non-payment; and (2) the labor cabinet was authorized to proceed with its action against Appellants to recover the unpaid portion of the firefighters' overtime pay for firefighters pursuant to Commonwealth, Labor Cabinet v. Hasken.

Employee, who resided in Kentucky, worked for Employer as a tractor-trailer driver, hauling automobiles. Employee fell and injured his right foot while unloading a car in New Jersey. Employer, which had no corporate offices in Kentucky, denied Employee's claim for benefits, asserting that Kentucky lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over the claim because the employment was not principally localized in any state and the contract for hire was made in Missouri. The ALJ agreed with Employer and dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Employee's contract for hire was not made in Kentucky. The Workers' Compensation Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ applied the law correctly and based the finding on substantial evidence.

Miguel Rivera, a fifteen-year-old unauthorized alien, sought workers' compensation benefits from Abel Verdon Construction for injuries sustained when he fell through a hole in the second floor of a home that Verdon was constructing. The ALJ found Rivera to be Verdon's employee and awarded Rivera partial disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed Rivera's partial disability award. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Verdon's argument that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) preempts the application of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, which provides workers' compensation coverage to employees without regard to the legality of the employment relationship, to this claim based on the claimant's status as an unauthorized alien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employment relationship existed between Rivera and Verdon and that the IRCA does not preempt a workers' compensation law that covers unauthorized aliens.

Claimant Anthony Traugott, a Kentucky resident, filed an application for benefits alleging that he injured his left arm in Missouri while working for defendant-employer under a contract of hire. The employer was headquartered in Rhode Island and had no office in Kentucky. The employer denied the claim on the grounds that Kentucky lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over the matter under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.670. The ALJ dismissed the claim based on findings that the claimant's employment was not principally localized in Kentucky and that the contract for hire was not made in Kentucky. The claimant appealed, and the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, noting that the claimant failed to petition for reconsideration and that the record contained substantial evidence to support the ALJ's legal decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the claimant maintained that the court erred by failing to find that contract for hire was made in Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the record contained no evidence to support claimant's argument.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision in which the Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") held that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by denying future medical benefits for claimant's work-related injury but that the evidence did not compel an award of permanent income benefits. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported an award of future medical benefits and whether the evidence compelled the ALJ to find that claimant's injury produced a permanent impairment rating and entitled him to permanent income benefits. The court held that KRS 342.020(1) entitled claimant to be awarded future medical benefits where evidence that he required no medical treatment as of the date he reached maximum medical improvement or the date that his claim was heard was an improper basis to deny future medical benefits. The court also held that the evidence the injury warranted a permanent impairment rating was not so overwhelming as to render the decision that was made unreasonable.