Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

When calculating the income benefit for he claimant's work-related injury, the ALJ apportioned sixty-three percent of the twenty-one percent permanent impairment rating that existed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) to a pre-existing active condition, which was non-compensable. The court of appeals affirmed the workers' compensation board's decision to vacate the calculation on the ground that the ALJ should have subtracted the pre-existing active impairment rating that existed immediately before the injury from the impairment rating that existed at MMI and based the income benefit on the remainder. The employer appealed, arguing that nothing prevented the ALJ from apportioning the impairment rating at MMI based on permissible inferences drawn from the medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board and court of appeals applied the correct methodology for determining the impairment rating upon which to base income benefits.

At issue in this appeal was whether Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(6) entitled UPS Airlines to receive credit against its liability under section 342.730(1) for the payment of loss of license benefits that were the product of a collective bargaining agreement between UPS Airlines and the Independent Pilots Association (IPA), of which Claimant was a member. Claimant, a UPS pilot, sustained a work-related injury and underwent surgery. UPS paid the entire premium for the loss of license insurance plan. UPS subsequently sought leave to credit Claimant's loss of license benefits against its liability for income benefits. Reversing an ALJ's decision, the workers' compensation board found that section 342.730(6) did not entitle UPS to a dollar-for-dollar credit against Claimant's past due and future income benefits for all benefits paid under the loss of license plan. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed to the extent that UPS was not entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit; but (2) reversed with respect to the conclusion that loss of license benefits were not funded exclusively by the employer for the purposes of section 342.730(6) because they were bargained-for benefits, holding that section 342.730(6) does not entitle UPS to credit the overpayment of voluntary benefits against future income benefits. Remanded.

In this workers' compensation case, an ALJ determined that injuries Claimant sustained in an automobile accident while returning to Kentucky from yearling sales held in New York came within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. Gaines Gentry appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by awarding benefits because Claimant's injury was not work-related under the dual purpose, positional risk, or traveling employee doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ reasonably found that Gaines Gentry instructed Claimant to travel to New York in a van with its yearlings in order to attend to them; and (2) the ALJ properly concluded under he circumstances that an accident that occurred while Claimant was returning to Kentucky to resume his usual duties for Gaines Gentry was work-related.

After serving eighteen months as the superintendent of Bourbon County public schools, Appellant Arnold Carter transferred into the position of consultant to the school district pursuant to an "exit strategy." The details of Carter's resignation and consulting contract were discussed and determined in a closed session during a meeting of the Bourbon County Board of Education. Appellee Jamie Smith, a parent and concerned citizen, challenged the Board's actions as violative of Kentucky's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court found Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.801(1)(f) permitted the Board's closed session discussion of Carter's resignation but not its discussion of Carter's consulting contract and consequently voided the consulting contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Board violated the Act when it discussed Carter's resignation and consulting contract in closed session; and (2) Carter's consulting contract was voidable as a matter of law and was properly voided by the circuit court.

Appellant Charles Wilson worked at the Central City Water Works Department. During his tenure there, Wilson reported several safety issues to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Kentucky Division of Water. The mayor later terminated Wilson for personal use of his computer at the water plant and "neglect of duties, mismanagement of the water plant, and abuse of authority." The city council affirmed the mayor's decision. Wilson brought a civil action arguing that he was not a terminable "at-will" employee and that he was terminated in retaliation for notifying authorities of the Central City's violation of safety rules and regulations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Central City. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Wilson was an at-will employee and not protected by the Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that cities are not "employers" under the Whistleblower Act, and city employees are therefore not protected by the Act.

Claimant worked for Employer as an underground coal miner. Claimant filed claims for work-related injuries and filed an occupational hearing loss claim. An ALJ tripled the income benefits awarded for Claimant's injury and hearing loss claims. The ALJ then determined that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.703(1)(d) limited the combined weekly benefits to a maximum of $473, seventy-five percent of the state's average weekly wage. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ's decision to triple the income benefits but reversed the maximum combined weekly benefit sua sponte and remanded with directions to correct the amount. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence showed that Claimant's hearing loss caused him to lack the physical capacity to perform the type of work performed at the time of injury, and therefore the evidence supported a triple benefit for the hearing loss claim; and (2) the Board did not exceed its authority by ordering the ALJ's misapplication of section 342.703(1)(d) to be corrected, as benefits under section 342.730(1)(c)(1) are limited to 100 percent rather than seventy-five percent of the state's average weekly wage.

Appellant Michael Mitchell, who had a valid license to carry a concealed deadly weapon, was employed at the University of Kentucky medical center when hospital administrators reported that Mitchell had a firearm in his employee locker. Police discovered a firearm in Mitchell's vehicle. The university then terminated Mitchell's employment for violation of its policy prohibiting possession of a deadly weapon on university property or while conducting university business. Mitchell filed suit against Appellees, the University of Kentucky and several of its employees and entities (collectively UK), claiming UK terminated his employment in violation of public policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of UK. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mitchell's discharge was contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy, i.e., the right to bear arms as evidenced by the Kentucky Revised Statutes; (2) an explicit legislative statement prohibited Mitchell's discharge, and the reason for Mitchell's discharge was his exercise of a right conferred by well-established legislative enactments; and (3) therefore, UK was not entitled to summary judgment. Remanded.

Claimant filed an application for workers' compensation, alleging injuries while working for Employer as a roofer. Having become a party because Employer was uninsured, the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) denied the claim and stated that claimant's average weekly rate was unknown. Claimant asserted that his average weekly wage must be calculated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(1)(e) because he had worked for less than thirteen weeks when the injury occurred. The ALJ applied section 342.140(1)(e) and determined that Claimant's weekly wage was $400 per week. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the average weekly rate calculation because the record contained insufficient evidence to apply section 342.140(1)(e) properly. The Board then remanded the claim for additional proceedings to include the taking of additional proof. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.285(2)(c) by remanding the claim in order to provide Claimant with a second opportunity to meet his burden of proof.

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law.

Claimant injured his shoulder during his employment. Claimant and Employer agreed to settle the matter. Claimant subsequently underwent a surgery, which Employer failed to pre-authorize. Claimant then filed several motions, including a motion to reopen. An ALJ determined (1) the surgery was reasonable and necessary; (2) Employer must pay for the procedure and related expenses; (3) the parties' settlement precluded any claim for TTD benefits relative to the surgery; and (4) Employer's failure to pre-authorize or contest the surgery within thirty days did not warrant the imposition of sanctions. The workers' compensation board reversed with respect to future TTD benefits and affirmed otherwise. The court of appeals reversed with respect to future TTD and reinstated the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of a future TTD award, holding that the terms of the parties' agreement barred a future TTD claim; and (2) reversed with respect to the issue of sanctions, holding that the case must be remanded to the ALJ to reconsider the question of sanctions based on a correct understanding of Employer's obligations and any other considerations relevant to the reasonableness of its action under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.310(1) and 803 Ky. Admin. Reg. 25:012, 2(1)(a).