Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Matthew Stanford volunteered with the US Army Cadet Corp. (USACC). Stanford also participated in a program administered by Bluegrass Area Development District (Bluegrass). While accompanying the USACC cadets on a field trip, Stanford fell from a zip line and suffered a permanent injury that rendered him a quadriplegic. An ALJ granted Stanford benefits, finding Stanford was primarily an employee of USACC, who served as a subcontractor for Bluegrass, and accordingly, Bluegrass would be responsible for the payments because USACC did not carry workers' compensation insurance. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded (1) Bluegrass could not be held responsible for paying Stanford's benefits, and instead, USACC was liable, and (2) Stanford was working as a USACC employee at the time of the accident. The court of appeals affirmed and ordered the Uninsured Employers' Fund to reimburse Bluegrass for the medical expenses Bluegrass paid on behalf of Stanford. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bluegrass shared responsibility with USACC as Stanford's employer and may be held responsible to pay his workers' compensation benefits. Remanded for a recalculation of which employer - Bluegrass or USACC - was liable for what proportion of Stanford's benefits. View "Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Stanford" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from an opinion of the court of appeals which affirmed an order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for review of a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC). In addition to denying Appellant unemployment benefits, the KUIC ordered Appellant to reimburse $12,785 in benefit payments he had already received. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition for review because it did not comply with the verification requirement contained in Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.450(1), and thus the court concluded that its jurisdiction was not invoked within the twenty-day limitations period provided for filing such an action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant failed to comply with the verification provision of section 341.450(1), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy; and (2) Appellant did not comply with the verification requirement, as his attorney's signature on the petition did not constitute "certification." View "Taylor v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee's employment was terminated by Employer after Employee refused to sign an agreement acknowledging her repeated tardiness violated Employer's code of conduct. Employee subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which was denied on grounds that Employee's discharge was for work related misconduct. A referee with the division of unemployment insurance reversed the determination. The unemployment insurance commission reversed the referee's decision, concluding that Employee was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was fired for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the commission's conclusion that Employee was not terminated for tardiness but, rather, for refusing to sign the agreement was clearly erroneous; (2) there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that Employee was repeatedly tardy; and (3) therefore, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.370(6), the commission did not err in denying unemployment insurance benefits. View "Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether a state employee, after receiving notice of her employer's intent to dismiss her, waived her right to a pre-termination hearing by repeatedly engaging in conduct that delayed the hearing. The Kentucky Personnel Board concluded that the employee did not waive her right to a pre-termination hearing, and that her dismissal therefore violated her right to due process. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employee was not deprived of her constitutional rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to her dismissal, as the employee constitutionally waived her right to a hearing by applying for FMLA leave in a deliberate attempt to delay the pre-termination hearing, after previously postponing the hearing twice, which constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that hearing. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Wade" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured during the course of his employment. When his workers' compensation benefits ceased, Appellee applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission determined that Kan. Rev. Stat. 341.090, which permits the use of an "extended base period" that captures earnings leading to equitable unemployment benefits, required that the extended base period may include only the four calendar quarters that immediately precede the base period. Pursuant to this extended base period, Appellee was awarded benefits of $149 per week. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the extended base period need not be limited to the four quarters that immediately precede the base period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute in calculating Appellee's unemployment benefits. View "Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law

This case presented two constitutional questions related to Kentucky's prevailing wage law. The first question was whether the law violates procedural due process by failing to afford contractors a hearing before the Labor Cabinet assesses back wages and civil penalties and demands their payments. The second question was whether the law improperly delegates legislative or judicial authority to the Labor Cabinet by failing to define the categories of workers to which it applies. The circuit court found that the law does not violate due process or improperly delegate legislative or judicial authority. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law does not violate either the Kentucky or U.S. Constitutions. View "Teco Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2003, for which he was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits followed by 425 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. In 2007 Claimant sustained another injury. After finding the effects of the 2003 injury caused Claimant's 2007 injury, an ALJ increased Claimant's partial disability benefit at reopening and tripled the entire income benefit awarded for his injury. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the finding of increased impairment as well as the finding that Claimant lacked the physical capacity at reopening to perform the type of work performed at the time of his injury; and (2) the combined effects of the impairment present at the time of the initial award and the additional impairment present at reopening entitled Claimant to triple benefits based on the whole of his disability for the balance of the compensable period. View "James T. English Trucking v. Beeler" on Justia Law

An ALJ determined that Claimant sustained a work-related hearing loss and that Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.7305(4) placed the entire liability for income and medical benefits with Appellant, the last employer with whom Claimant was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained substantial evidence that testing revealed a pattern of hearing loss compatible with that caused by hazardous noise exposure and contained substantial evidence that Claimant sustained repetitive exposure to hazardous noise in the workplace, including his final employment with Appellant; and (2) Kan. Stat. Rev. 342.7305(4) does not permit apportioning liability among employers in such cases. View "Greg's Constr. v. Keeton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law