Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Laul Deng (“Aker”) sued his former employer, Norton Healthcare, Inc., for racial discrimination in terminating his employment. Specifically, Aker alleged that Norton’s failure to reinstate him after termination of his employment was retaliation for filing a pro se discrimination complaint. The trial court granted Norton summary judgment on all of Aker’s claims. Despite acknowledging that Aker never applied for any position with Norton, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the futile-gesture doctrine excused the requirement that Aker show that he applied for a position in order to establish a prima facie claim for employment discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in invoking the futile-doctrine theory sua sponte; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Norton as a matter of law. View "Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Deng" on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer for three months as a bulldozer operator. On April 16, 2012, Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer, alleging cumulative trauma and an injury date of February 7, 2012. Before his employment with Employer, Employee had worked as a bulldozer operated for other employers for approximately thirty years. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Employee sustained cumulative trauma injuries that became manifest on February 7, 2012, while he was employed by Employer, and that he was permanently and totally disabled. The Workers’ Compensation Board vacated and remanded, concluding (1) February 7, 2012 could not be the date of manifestation, and (2) Southern Kentucky Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Campbell required apportionment of liability based upon the percentage of Employee’s impairment attributable to the three months he worked for Employer. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the decision of the ALJ, holding (1) there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation to support the ALJ’s award; (2) the date of manifestation was February 7, 2012, as stipulated by the parties; and (3) Kentucky Southern Concrete was inapplicable. View "Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Appellant was injured in the course of her employment with Appellee. Appellant was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, including lifetime medical benefits for treatment of the injury. In 2012, Appellee filed this medical-fee dispute to contest the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment being provided by Appellant’s treating physician, as well as the relatedness of the treatment to the 1989 work injury. An administrative law judge found that the treatment was compensable, and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence compelled a finding that the treatment at issue in this medical dispute was non-compensable. View "Kingery v. Sumitomo Elec. Wiring" on Justia Law

David McCarty, the employee of an independent contractor, was killed during the installation of a garage door on a building at a coal mine site operated by Covol Fuels. McCarty’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Covol, alleging that Covol was negligent per se for violating certain coal mine safety statutes and regulations. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Covol on all claims, concluding that McCarty was not within the class of persons protected by Kentucky’s mine safety laws and that his death did not occur under the circumstances that Kentucky’s mine safety laws were intended to prevent. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court subsequently granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to certify the law in regards to whether the statutes and regulations relied upon by the Estate were intended to protect individuals in McCarty's situation and to prevent the type of accident that caused McCarty’s death. The Supreme Court concluded that a subcontractor injured while installing a garage door on an unfinished building at a mine site may not maintain a wrongful death action against the mine operator under a negligence per se theory for alleged violations of Kentucky mining statutes and regulations. View "McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC" on Justia Law

After Donald Brown had worked for Charles T. Creech, Inc. for more than sixteen years, Creech asked Brown to sign an agreement that contained a non-compete provision. Brown signed the agreement. After Brown went to work for Standlee Hay Company, Creech sued Brown and Standlee, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contract, intentional interference with existing, and prospective business contacts. The trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining Brown from directly or indirectly competing with Creech and from using information regarding Creech’s customers. The court of appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction, and the trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Standlee and Brown. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that issues of fact remained as to whether the non-compete portion of the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was not enforceable. View "Creech, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellants, three physicians, were formerly employed by The New Lexington Clinic (“NLC”) but resigned to practice at a facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, “Baptist”). NLC subsequently brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties owed in their capacity as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant on the ground that it aided and abetted Appellants’ breaches. The trial court dismissed the complaints, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the court considered controlling to all actions involving a breach of a corporate director’s duties. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, holding (1) section 271B.8-300 does not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors but codifies a standard of conduct and liability for directors derived from business judgment rule principles; (2) section 271B.8-300 did not apply in this case because preparing for and participating in a competing venture does not constitute the type of conduct addressed in the statute; and (3) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. New Lexington Clinic, P.S.C. " on Justia Law

Angela Frye filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer alleging that in 2008 she suffered a work-related injury. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Frye benefits related to the injury. In 2009, after the final hearing in the 2008 claim but before the ALJ took that claim under submission or rendered an opinion, Frye allegedly suffered a second work-related injury. In 2010, Frye filed a claim related to the 2009 accident. The ALJ dismissed the 2010 claim, concluding that Frye was required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270(1) to file her claim for benefits related to the 2009 accident and join it to her pending 2008 claim, which she failed to do. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, concluding that a claim is no longer pending for section 342,270(1) purposes after the date of the final hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in this case and under these facts, Frye's first injury claim was not pending between the date of the hearing and the date the ALJ rendered his opinion regarding that claim. Remanded. View "Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye" on Justia Law