Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

David McCarty, the employee of an independent contractor, was killed during the installation of a garage door on a building at a coal mine site operated by Covol Fuels. McCarty’s estate brought a wrongful death action against Covol, alleging that Covol was negligent per se for violating certain coal mine safety statutes and regulations. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Covol on all claims, concluding that McCarty was not within the class of persons protected by Kentucky’s mine safety laws and that his death did not occur under the circumstances that Kentucky’s mine safety laws were intended to prevent. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court subsequently granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to certify the law in regards to whether the statutes and regulations relied upon by the Estate were intended to protect individuals in McCarty's situation and to prevent the type of accident that caused McCarty’s death. The Supreme Court concluded that a subcontractor injured while installing a garage door on an unfinished building at a mine site may not maintain a wrongful death action against the mine operator under a negligence per se theory for alleged violations of Kentucky mining statutes and regulations. View "McCarty v. Covol Fuels No. 2, LLC" on Justia Law

After Donald Brown had worked for Charles T. Creech, Inc. for more than sixteen years, Creech asked Brown to sign an agreement that contained a non-compete provision. Brown signed the agreement. After Brown went to work for Standlee Hay Company, Creech sued Brown and Standlee, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contract, intentional interference with existing, and prospective business contacts. The trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining Brown from directly or indirectly competing with Creech and from using information regarding Creech’s customers. The court of appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction, and the trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Standlee and Brown. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that issues of fact remained as to whether the non-compete portion of the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was not enforceable. View "Creech, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellants, three physicians, were formerly employed by The New Lexington Clinic (“NLC”) but resigned to practice at a facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, “Baptist”). NLC subsequently brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties owed in their capacity as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant on the ground that it aided and abetted Appellants’ breaches. The trial court dismissed the complaints, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the court considered controlling to all actions involving a breach of a corporate director’s duties. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, holding (1) section 271B.8-300 does not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors but codifies a standard of conduct and liability for directors derived from business judgment rule principles; (2) section 271B.8-300 did not apply in this case because preparing for and participating in a competing venture does not constitute the type of conduct addressed in the statute; and (3) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. New Lexington Clinic, P.S.C. " on Justia Law

Angela Frye filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer alleging that in 2008 she suffered a work-related injury. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Frye benefits related to the injury. In 2009, after the final hearing in the 2008 claim but before the ALJ took that claim under submission or rendered an opinion, Frye allegedly suffered a second work-related injury. In 2010, Frye filed a claim related to the 2009 accident. The ALJ dismissed the 2010 claim, concluding that Frye was required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270(1) to file her claim for benefits related to the 2009 accident and join it to her pending 2008 claim, which she failed to do. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, concluding that a claim is no longer pending for section 342,270(1) purposes after the date of the final hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in this case and under these facts, Frye's first injury claim was not pending between the date of the hearing and the date the ALJ rendered his opinion regarding that claim. Remanded. View "Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye" on Justia Law

After the foreign language taught at Knott County Central High School was switched from French to Spanish, Grace Patton, the high school's French teacher, lost her job. Patton brought suit against Appellants - the Knott County Board of Education, individual Board members, the high school principal, the superintendent, and individual members of the school's Site-Based Decision-Making Council. Appellant's complaint did not specifically identify any particular claim or cause of action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that (1) Patton's complaint had stated a claim against the school board under the whistleblower statute, and the evidence precluded summary judgment; and (2) the individual Appellants were not subject to qualified official immunity because the actions taken to Patton's detriment were ministerial, not discretionary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Patton did not state a claim under the whistleblower act and had no claim under the act under the facts as alleged; and (2) the individual Appellants were engaged in the performance of discretionary duties covered by the qualified official immunity doctrine. View "Knott County Bd. of Educ. v. Patton" on Justia Law

Appellant physicians were former employees of The New Lexington Clinic (NLC) who resigned from NLC to practice at a nearby facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, Baptist). NLC brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties, alleging that Appellants used confidential information and recruited NLC personnel while serving as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant for allegedly aiding and abetting Appellants' breaches. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the trial court considered controlling as to actions involving breach of a Kentucky corporate director's duties. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that section 271B.8-300 controlled but that sufficient facts were alleged to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) section 271B.8-300, which did not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors, did not apply in this case; and (2) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. Remanded. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. The New Lexington Clinic, PSC" on Justia Law

Claimant was working for Employer when she was seriously injured. Claimant, a janitor, became trapped in a stalled elevator and fell several stories down the shaft when Employer's security staff attempted to rescue her. An administrative law judge (ALJ) enhanced Claimant's worker's compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which penalizes an employer for an intentional failure to follow a safety protocol. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Claimant was not entitled to an award enhancement because there must be a finding that Employer "ignored or willfully overlooked a safety hazard that was reasonably foreseeable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in order to warrant enhancement under section 342.165(1), the employer must be found to have intentionally disregarded a safety hazard that even a lay person would recognize as likely to cause serious physical harm; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Employer intentionally disregarded a safety hazard in this case. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law