Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this employment case was whether the State was immune from claims under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in state court. The district court denied the State's posttrial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial asserting Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity after a jury awarded damages to a state employee based on a claim for violating the FMLA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the cloak of immunity granted to the State precludes state employees from suing the State for monetary relief when denied self-care leave under the FMLA; (2) nevertheless, states are bound to follow the self-care provisions of the FMLA, and state employees who are wrongfully denied self-care leave are still permitted to seek injunctive relief against the responsible state official; and (3) the U.S. Department of Labor may bring actions for damages or an injunction on behalf of an employee against a state for violating the self-care provisions. Remanded.

Employee sought workers compensation benefits after receiving two injuries at her place of employment. While working for Employer, Employee received a salary increase of $1000. Although Employee received a salary increase of $1000 per month for more than a year, Employer claimed the increase was supposed to have been $1000 per year. The deputy commissioner calculated a weekly compensation rate based on the $1000 per month raise Employer actually paid Employee. The district court reversed and instead used the $1000 per year figure Employer claimed was accurate. The court of appeals reversed and determined that the $1000 per month raise should be included in the calculation of Employee's compensation rate. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a factual determination as to Employer's claim that it accidentally overpaid Employee $916 per month.

The Employment Appeal Board (Board) denied Willie Hall's application for unemployment insurance benefits. Hall filed a petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the decision of the Board and assessed costs against Hall. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment as it related to court costs, holding (1) pursuant to Iowa Code 96.15(2), any individual claiming benefits shall not be charged fees of any kind, including court costs, in a proceeding under the statute by a court or an officer of the court; and (2) therefore, the district court erred by requiring that Hall pay court costs.

Employee injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Employer offered Employee light-duty work in Des Moines, which was 387 miles from Employee's residence. Employee declined Employer's offer to perform light-duty work, and as a result, Employer suspended Employee's workers' compensation benefits. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim. The workers' compensation commissioner concluded (1) Employer improperly suspended temporary disability benefits where Employer failed to offer Employee suitable work because the job was located a great distance from Employee's residence; and (2) Employee experienced a sixty percent industrial disability. The district court reversed in part, concluding that Employer offered Employee suitable work and thus, Employee forfeited his right to benefits during his period of refusal. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the commissioner did not err in finding Employer failed to offer Employee suitable work; and (2) the commissioner's findings with respect to the extent of Employee's industrial disability were supported by substantial evidence.

Employee filed a petition with the state workers' compensation commissioner, alleging that he suffered an injury to his shoulder while working for Employer and that his injury caused a permanent disability. The workers' compensation commissioner concluded that Employee failed to prove his claimed permanent disability was causally related to his work injury. The district court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because an award for partial permanent disability for an unscheduled injury under Iowa Code 85.34(2)(u) is determined by industrial disability, rather than by functional impairment, the commissioner used the correct standard to determine the causal relation between the work injury and the alleged disability; and (2) furthermore, substantial evidence supported the commissioner's findings.

Employer placed a security camera in his workplace to monitor Employee. Employer later installed the camera in the bathroom. Employee and her co-worker discovered the camera and brought suit against Employer for invasion of privacy. Specifically, the employees alleged that Employer's actions fell under the intrusion upon seclusion alternative of the invasion-of-privacy tort. The district court granted Employers' motion for summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence supporting the element of intrusion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and reversed the district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Employer based on the reasoning in Koeppel v. Speirs. Remanded.

Employer secretly installed surveillance equipment in a workplace bathroom. Employee filed a claim for damages against Employer for invasion of privacy and sexual harassment. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer on both claims, holding, inter alia, that although Employer intended to view Employee in the bathroom, the tort of invasion of privacy required proof the equipment had worked and Employer had viewed the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed, finding the evidence of intrusion was sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted further review on the issue involving invasion of privacy and affirmed, holding that the district court erred in granting Employer's motion for summary judgment where an electronic invasion occurs under the intrusion on solitude or seclusion component of the tort of invasion of privacy when the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the electronic device or equipment used by a defendant could have invaded privacy in some way.

Employee injured her right ankle when she slipped and fell during the course of her employment. Employer later terminated Employee's employment. Employee filed a claim with the workers' compensation commission seeking benefits as a result of her alleged injuries. The commissioner ruled in favor of Pease, concluding that she suffered an injury to the body as a whole and that her work injury was a substantial contributory factor in her state of depression. The commissioner awarded Pease permanent total disability, accrued benefits, and reimbursement for medical expenses. The district court affirmed the commissioner's findings of fact with respect to the causation of Employee's mental and physical injuries and held that substantial evidence supported the commissioner's findings regarding disability. The court of appeals reversed the award, finding substantial evidence did not support the commissioner's findings on causation. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the commissioner's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.

Employee filed a personal injury lawsuit against a company under common ownership with Employer and ultimately settled the claim. About nine months after the settlement, Employer terminated Employee's employment. Employee filed suit against Employer, asserting an intentional tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and claiming that Employer terminated his employment because he brought the previous personal injury claim. The district court granted Employer motion to dismiss for failure to make a claim. The court of appeals reversed. On review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that Iowa Code 668, the state's comparative fault statute, did not contain a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy of the state limiting an employer's discretion to discharge an at-will employee.