Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were employees of limited liability corporations located in Iowa. Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the businesses and certain individuals affiliated with the businesses, alleging that Defendants violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) by engaging in sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The lawsuits demanded punitive damages. Defendants moved to strike the claim for punitive damages. The district court granted the motion, concluding that punitive damages were not available under the ICRA. Plaintiffs sought, and the Supreme Court granted, interlocutory appeal. The Court then affirmed the district court, holding that an award of punitive damages is not permitted under the ICRA. View "Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a middle school teacher involved in a physical altercation with a student. The Iowa Board of Educational Examiners issued a statement of charges against Petitioner alleging student abuse. The Board subsequently imposed a ninety-day suspension of Petitioner's teaching license and permanent revocation of his physical education and coaching endorsements. Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review in district court within thirty days of the Board's denial of his application for rehearing but before the Board's final decision on the State's application for rehearing. The district court ultimately affirmed the Board's decision on the merits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's "premature" petition never invoked the district court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) the proper time to file a petition for judicial review is within thirty days after the agency's final decision on the last application granted for rehearing; and (2) Petitioner initially appealed prematurely before the Board's final decision on the State's rehearing application, but he later perfected his appeal to the district court. View "Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Examiners" on Justia Law

Douglas Moad was driving his truck within the course of his employment with Employer when his truck was struck by an oncoming vehicle. Douglas died from his injuries. Employer maintained workers' compensation services with Dakota Truck Underwriters (DTU), a South Dakota corporation with its principal place of business in South Dakota. Employer also maintained motorist liability coverage with Northland Insurance Company (Northland). Douglas and his wife Sharon maintained insurance coverage with Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford (Hartford). Sharon filed a petition seeking damages from Northland and Hartford for uninsured motorist benefits. DTU filed a notice of subrogation lien, asserting that it was entitled to reimbursement from any proceeds obtained by Sharon as a result of the damages action. Sharon reached a settlement agreement with Northland and Hartford. The district court approved the settlement and granted Sharon's motion to extinguish DTU's lien, concluding that in the event DTU's untimely filing of notice of its lien did not bar its interest, Iowa law applied and barred DTU's recovery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court utilized the wrong standard in resolving the conflict of laws question. View "Moad v. Dakota Truck Underwriters, Risk Admin. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee sought unemployment benefits from Iowa Workforce Development after his discharge from employment by Employer. An ALJ concluded Employee was not entitled to benefits, and the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) affirmed. Employee petitioned for judicial review, naming Employer in the caption as a "defendant." The caption made no mention of the EAB, but the body of the petition made it plain that the appeal was being taken from the final action of the EAB. The petition was timely served on the EAB. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that Employee's failure to list the EAB as a respondent in the caption was fatal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the petition where Employee substantially complied with the relevant statute by identifying the EAB as the agency who entered the final agency action from which Employee sought to appeal. Thus, the petition was sufficient to vest subject matter jurisdiction with the district court. View "Cooksey v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp." on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer and was awarded permanent partial disability benefits. Employee subsequently petitioned to review-reopen his workers' compensation claim, seeking additional workers' compensation benefits, seeking reimbursement for additional postarbitration medical expenses, requesting a determination of the amount of workers' compensation benefits still owed by Employer and its insurer, and asking the court to decide whether the workers' compensation commissioner needed to enter an additional order compelling payment to enforce an arbitration award for the unpaid benefits. The district court (1) rejected Employee's petition for review as untimely; (2) affirmed denial of reimbursement for some of Employee's medical expenses; and (3) did not provide the requested calculation but ruled that a compel-payment order was unnecessary because Employee could seek a judgment to enforce the award. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the statute of limitations for a petition for review-reopening; and (2) affirmed as to the judgment regarding which medical expenses were causally connected to the work-related injury. Remanded to the district court for it to remand the matter to the commissioner with directions to decide the issues regarding the amount still owed to Employee by Employer and its insurer under the arbitration award. View "Coffey v. Mid Seven Transp. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful discharge suit against the State. The State moved to dismiss the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Iowa Tort Claims Act (Act). The district court granted the motion, holding that the claim was a tort subject to the Act. After an unsuccessful appeal, Plaintiff filed her lawsuit in district court a second time. The district court held that Plaintiff failed to comply with the statute of limitations and dismissed the second lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff properly complied with the savings clause of the statute of limitations under the Act once the district court determined the Act provided the exclusive remedy for her claim. Remanded. View "Rivera v. Woodword Res. Ctr." on Justia Law

Employee, who was injured while working for Employer, sought enforcement of an arbitration award he received from the workers' compensation commissioner against Employer and Employer's insurer. Employee requested the district court to determine the amount Employer and its insurer (collectively, Appellees) owed him under the arbitration award in light of Employee's claim that Appellees failed to pay all of the medical benefits, mileage reimbursements, and interest due under the arbitration decision. Appellees claimed a credit against any amount they owed Employee due to his third-party settlements. After a hearing, the district court declined to answer the issues raised by the parties and declined to determine the amount still owed to Employee under the arbitration decision, concluding that addressing the issues in Employee's petition required the district court to exceed its authority. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court for the court to remand the matter to the commissioner with directions to decide the issues Employee raised in his petition for judgment. View "Coffey v. Mid Seven Transp. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for over ten years for Dentist. When Dentist's wife found out that her husband and Plaintiff often texted each other, she demanded that he terminate Plaintiff's employment. Dentist subsequently terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff brought this action against Dentist, alleging that Dentist discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The district court granted summary judgment for Dentist, finding that Plaintiff was not fired because of her gender but because she was a threat to Dentist's marriage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dentist's conduct here did not amount to unlawful sex discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. View "Nelson v. Knight" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a trial court's entry of a default judgment under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.971(3) is justified when a party fails to appear personally for trial, but the party's attorney is present and able to proceed in the client's absence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's entry of default judgment due to Plaintiff's failure to appear personally at the time of his scheduled trial. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that because Rule 1.971(3) does not require a party to appear personally for trial, it was an abuse of discretion to enter a default judgment against Plaintiff when his counsel was present and able to proceed to trial on his behalf. View "Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd." on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Iowa's workers' compensation statute allows a claimant to recover healing period benefits - after he had reached maximum medical improvement and returned to substantially similar work following a work-related injury - for a period of approximately thirteen weeks of postsurgical convalescence during which he was unable to work. The workers' compensation commission awarded such benefits, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Iowa Code 85.34(1) did not authorize the benefits under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the award, holding that section 85.34(1) did authorize an award of healing period benefits in this case.