Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A general manager at a car rental business located within a hotel near Orlando International Airport was shot multiple times by an unknown assailant while moving from an indoor kiosk to an outside office late at night. The attack, which did not include robbery, was recorded on surveillance video. The manager had been working an unusual shift to train new employees after firing others, and often carried cash and rental agreements between locations. The motive and identity of the assailant remain unknown. The manager survived and sought workers’ compensation benefits, arguing the attack was related to risks inherent in his employment, such as carrying cash late at night and the potential for retaliation from recently terminated employees.A Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the injuries compensable, relying in part on precedent from the Supreme Court of Florida and determining that the employment and work environment substantially increased the risk of attack. The JCC found that the risk was more likely related to work duties or job-related issues, rather than a purely personal dispute. Normandy Insurance Company appealed, arguing that the injuries did not arise out of employment as required under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.The First District Court of Appeal vacated the JCC’s order, holding that the injuries did not arise out of the “work performed,” narrowly interpreting the statutory language to require that the specific work activity at the time of injury must itself cause the injury. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case, rejected the First District’s narrow interpretation, and clarified that an employee may receive compensation for injuries from a third-party assault if the claimant can establish that the employment or work environment exposed them to an increased risk of such injury. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings using the correct legal standard. View "Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An employee in Florida was terminated by his employer after raising several workplace safety concerns. The employer stated that the termination was due to the employee's use of racially disparaging language, following a series of disciplinary actions. The employee subsequently filed suit, alleging that his dismissal was in retaliation for objecting to what he believed were illegal safety practices, in violation of Florida’s private sector Whistle-Blower’s Act.After discovery, the employer moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court, arguing that the employee failed to show he had objected to actual violations of law, rule, or regulation. The employee countered that it was sufficient to show he had a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the practices he objected to were illegal. The trial court sided with the employer, holding that the statute required objection to an actual, not suspected, violation. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, aligning with decisions from the Second and Fifth Districts and certifying conflict with the Fourth District, which had adopted a “good faith, objectively reasonable belief” standard.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case to resolve this conflict among the district courts of appeal. The Court held that, under section 448.103 and section 448.102(3), Florida Statutes, an employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s activity, policy, or practice to which the employee objected is, by definition, in violation of law. It is not enough for the employee simply to have a subjective, good faith, or objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct was illegal. The Court approved the result reached by the First District but clarified the applicable legal standard. View "Gessner v. Southern Company" on Justia Law

Wilfred Ramos, Jr. was employed by Steak N Shake as a grill operator. After sustaining a back injury in a car accident, Ramos alleged that Steak N Shake reduced his work hours and eventually terminated him in retaliation for his disability and requests for accommodations. Ramos filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, marking "Retaliation" and "Disability" and citing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991. The charge was dual-filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations but did not specifically reference the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Steak N Shake, concluding that Ramos failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FCRA because he did not specifically allege FCRA claims in his charge of discrimination. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that Ramos was not required to specifically allege FCRA claims in his charge of discrimination to exhaust administrative remedies. The Second District certified conflict with the Fourth District's decision in Belony v. North Broward Hospital District, which held that merely asserting a violation of federal law in a dual-filed charge was insufficient to satisfy the FCRA's requirements.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that a claimant does not need to specifically allege they are seeking relief under the FCRA to exhaust administrative remedies when dual-filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The Court approved the Second District's decision and disapproved the Fourth District's decision in Belony to the extent it held otherwise. View "Steak N Shake, Inc. v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this workers' compensation dispute, holding that Fla. Stat. 440.13(11)(c), a section of the Workers' Compensation (WCL), does not preclude circuit court jurisdiction over claims brought under Fla. Stat. 559.77(1), a section of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA).In the proceedings below, the Second District concluded that a provision of the WCL vesting the Department of Financial Services (DFS) with exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters concerning workers' compensation reimbursement was inapplicable as a bar to suit by an injured worker against a healthcare provider for prohibited debt collection practices. The Supreme Court approved the result, holding that the matter at issue in this case under the FCCPA was not a matter concerning reimbursement subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of DFS. View "Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of quo warranto, which Petitioner filed after the Governor suspended her as Superintendent of Schools for Okaloosa County, holding that the Governor did not exceed his suspension authority.In an executive order, Governor Ron DeSantis invoked his authority under Fla. Const. art. IV, 7(a) to suspend Petitioner. In her petition for writ of quo warranto, Petitioner asserted that the misconduct alleged in the executive order was limited to conduct that occurred "exclusively" in Petitioner's prior term in office, and therefore, the Governor exceeded his suspension power. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the executive order alleged misconduct occurring in Petitioner's current term and satisfied the standard set forth in State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 155 So. 129, 133 (Fla. 1933). View "Jackson v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

Home health referral sources can be a protected legitimate business interest under Fla. Stat. 542.335.In these two cases consolidated for review before the Supreme Court, both Employees were former employees of licensed home health care companies. Both Employees engaged in conduct in violation of their non-compete compliment contracts by working for direct competitors of their prior employers within the non-compete territories during the relevant periods. Because a contract providing restrictions on competition must involve a legitimate business interest as defined by statute to be enforceable, at issue was whether home health service referral sources can be a protected legitimate business interest under section 542.335 sufficient to support a restriction on competition in a contract. The Supreme Court held that home health service referrals may be a protected legitimate business interest depending on the context and proof adduced. View "White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Southeast Florida, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union that represented officers employed by the City of Miami’s police department (the Union) and the City of Miami (the City). After the City declared a “financial urgency” in 2010, the City notified the Union that it intended to implement changes to the CBA. When the parties were unable to come to an agreement, the City’s legislative body voted to unilaterally alter the terms of the CBA and adopted changes regarding wages, pension benefits, and other economic terms of employment. The Union filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), arguing that the City acted improperly by unilaterally changing the CBA before completing the impasse resolution process provided for in Fla. Stat. 447.4095. PERC dismissed the Union’s ULP charge. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding (1) an employer must demonstrate that funds are available from no other possible reasonable source before unilaterally modifying a CBA; and (2) modification can only be made after completing the impasse resolution process set forth in section 447.4095. View "Headley v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

In 2010, a final judgment was entered awarding Lyantie Townsend compensatory damages and punitive damages against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. The judgment also awarded post-judgment interest. In 2012, an amended final judgment was entered awarding compensatory and punitive damages and ordering that the total sum would “bear interest as provided by law” from April 29, 2010. In 2014, R.J. Reynolds filed a motion to determine the rate of interest payable on the amended final judgment, contending that a 2011 amendment to Fla. Stat. 55.03(3) governed the accrual of interest on the judgment after the amended statute became effective. The trial court denied the motion. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the 2011 amendment applied to the judgment. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding that the 2011 amendment to section 55.03(3) does not apply to a judgment entered between October 1998 and June 30, 2011. View "Townsend v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, Bradley Westphal suffered a severe work-related injury. The City of St. Petersburg provided temporary total disability benefits pursuant to Fla. Stat. 440.15(2). Westphal did not reach maximum medical improvement prior to the expiration of the 104-week limitation on temporary total disability benefits and thus filed a petition for benefits pursuant to Fa. Stat. 440.15(1). The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denied Westphal’s claim, thus leaving Westphal totally disabled at the cessation of temporary total disability benefits but not yet entitled to permanent total disability benefits because he could not prove he would still be totally disabled when he reached maximum medical improvement. Westphal appealed, arguing that section 440.15(2) was unconstitutional. The First District Court of Appeal “valiantly attempted to save the statute from unconstitutionality” by interpreting it so that Westphal would not be cut off from compensation after 104 weeks. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision, holding that section 440.15(2)(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Westphal and all others similarly situated as a denial of access to courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. View "Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg" on Justia Law

This workers’ compensation case involved the statutory attorney’s fees provision declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Castellanos v. Next Door Co. Pursuant to the fee schedule in Fla. Stat. 440.34, the judge of compensation claims was constrained to award the claimant’s attorney $19.44 per hour for 90 hours of work. The First District Court of Appeal was compelled to affirm the $1,750 statutory fee award. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Castellanos, which held that the conclusive statutory fee schedule is unconstitutional as a denial of due process under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. View "Richardson v. Aramark/Sedgwick CMS" on Justia Law