Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the Department of Labor determined that that certain individuals who provided services for Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc. (Plaintiff) were misclassified as independent contractors rather than as employees and that Plaintiff owed $41,501 in unemployment contribution taxes due to this misclassification. An appeals referee affirmed. The Employment Security Appeals Division, Board of Review, upheld the decision of the appeals referee. Plaintiff appealed, and a judge trial referee, exercising the powers of the superior court, dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that the individuals at issue were Plaintiff’s employees under the test set forth in the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act. View "Standard Oil of Conn., Inc. v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the widow and presumptive dependent of Decedent. Decedent was employed as a photograph engraver and was later diagnosed with disabling pulmonary fibrosis as a result of his work exposure to toxins. Decedent filed a timely claim for benefits and subsequently died from his illness. The claim was not accepted nor were benefits paid before Decedent’s death. Just over one year after Decedent’s death, Plaintiff filed a claim for death and survivor benefits. Thereafter, Defendants accepted Decedent’s underlying claim for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was timely filed under the Workers’ Compensation Act and ordered Defendants to pay survivor benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board reversed, finding that a dependent filing for survivor’s benefits must file a separate claim for benefits within one year of the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was not required to file a separate notice of claim for survivor benefits because the timely filing of Decedent’s notice of claim for benefits under the Act satisfied the limitation period for claims under the Act. View "McCullough v. Swan Engraving, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the University of Connecticut Health Center, filed a grievance with the Health Center Appeals Committee against Jay Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the Center, accusing Lieberman of attempted intimidation and harassment. Aronow requested copies of the Committee’s report of its findings regarding Aronow’s grievance as well as the report written by the president emeritus of the University, but the Center denied Aronow’s request, concluding that the reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10a-154a. The Freedom of Information Commission, however, concluded that the reports were not exempt from disclosure under the statute and ordered the center to provide Aronow with a copy of the reports free of charge. The trial court dismissed Lieberman’s appeal, concluding that the Commission properly determined that the reports did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a faculty member under section 10a-154a and were therefore not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reports in this case did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a state university faculty or professional staff member within the exemption created by section 10a-154a. View "Lieberman v. Aronow" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two unions, filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Department of Public Utility Control seeking a ruling establishing that the Department had violated the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act by failing to promulgate regulations prescribing the rights of persons designated as participants in uncontested proceedings before the Department. The Department denied Plaintiffs’ petition. The trial court set aside the Department’s decision, concluding that the Department was required to promulgate the regulations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because Plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts that, if true, demonstated that they were aggrieved by the Department’s ruling on their petition. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal. View "Conn. Indep. Util. Workers, Local 12924 v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who worked for Defendant as a plumber, brought this action seeking payment of overtime wages for, among other things, his daily commute between his home and the job sites. The trial court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to overtime compensation for his travel time between home and work because the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) preempted the relevant Connecticut laws and regulations governing overtime and travel time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 31-60-10 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, as applied to the facts of this case, confers lesser benefits on employees than those afforded under the FLSA, federal preemption applies, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for his commuting time. View "Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her employer (Defendant) signed a document regarding the terms of Plaintiff’s employment. The parties agreed the document would cover "a thirty-six month period." After Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment before the term expired, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that she and Defendant had entered into a letter agreement for a fixed term of employment of thirty-six months and that Defendant violated the agreement. The trial court concluded that, on its face, the letter agreement constituted a contract for a definite term and that Defendant breached the agreement when it terminated Plaintiff’s employment without good cause before the term expired. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the letter agreement was ambiguous. Specifically, the language of the letter agreement could reasonably be interpreted as evincing either an intent to create a definite term of employment or an intent to set the terms and conditions of an at-will employment contract, and therefore, the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Employee filed notice of a workers' compensation claim related to a lower back injury he received during the course of his employment. Employee was discharged approximately four years later pursuant to a termination agreement that provided that he agreed to release Employer from any and all workers' compensation claims. Employer later brought an action against Employee, alleging civil theft, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion based on Defendant's admission that he never intended to release his workers' compensation claim. Employee counterclaimed, claiming that Employer's cause of action was in retaliation for Employee's decision to exercise his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Employer filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, asserting that the doctrine of absolute immunity shielded Employer from the counterclaim. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss, holding that an employer's right to seek redress for its alleged grievances in court does not outweigh an employee's interest in exercising his rights under the Act without fear of retaliation by his employer, and therefore, absolute immunity did not shield Employer from Employee's counterclaim. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti" on Justia Law

Claimant suffered a lower back injury during the course of his employment and filed notice of a workers' compensation claim. Employer later informed Claimant he would be discharged from his employment. Claimant signed a termination agreement in order not to forfeit his severance pay. The agreement stipulated that Claimant released his previously accepted workers' compensation claim. The Workers' Compensation Commissioner refused to approve the termination agreement, finding there was no consideration offered by Employer to Claimant in exchange for Plaintiff's release of the workers' compensation clim. The Workers' Compensation Review Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board properly affirmed the Commissioner's decision not to approve the agreement as a "voluntary agreement" or stipulation in light of its finding that Claimant's release of his workers' compensation claim was not supported by consideration. View "Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc." on Justia Law

The Town of Malborough terminated the employment of Emily Chaponis as town assessor after the board of selectmen did not make a motion to reappoint her to a successive term of office. Chaponis filed a grievance through the Union, of which she was a member, alleging that the Town violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by discharging her without just cause. An arbitration panel ordered the Town to reinstate Chaponis to her position, concluding that the Town violated the agreement when it terminated Chaponis' employment without just cause. The trial court denied the Town's application to vacate the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrators' award ordering the reinstatement of Chaponis' employment after the statutory expiration of her term of office contravened the mandates of the statutory scheme governing the term of office for municipal officers, and therefore, the award was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Town of Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052" on Justia Law

After the Town of Westbrook's board of selectmen unanimously voted not to reappoint Ivan Kuvalanka to a successive term of office as town assessor, Kuvalanka filed a grievance asserting that the Town had violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, of which Kuvalanka was a member. The arbitrators determined that the grievance was not arbitrable under the agreement. The Union filed an application in the trial court to vacate the award. The trial court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly limited the scope of its review when considering the Union's application to vacate the award; and (2) properly determined that the Union did not establish grounds to vacate the award. View "AFSCME, Council 4. Local 1303-325 v. Town of Westbrook" on Justia Law