Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether a proposed amendment to the fire department's disciplinary system was subject to collective bargaining under the Charter of the City and County of Denver. Upon review of the Charter, and construing its plain language as a "harmonious and sensible whole," the Supreme Court concluded that Denver had the authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules, and that that authority was not limited by the firefighters' right to collectively bargain. The court of appeals held that discipline was a term and condition of employment under the Charter and not subject to collective bargaining. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of Denver v. Denver Firefighters" on Justia Law

Respondent Helen Rodriguez injured herself after falling down a flight of stairs at work. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether an "unexplained" fall satisfied the "arising out of" employment requirement of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court agreed with the appellate court that respondent's unexplained fall was compensable, but it disagreed with the reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred when it agreed with respondent's view that her injuries arose out of employment, and held that an unexplained fall necessarily stemmed from a "neutral" risk attributable to neither the employment nor the employee. "Under our longstanding 'but-for' test, such an unexplained fall 'arises out of' employment if the fall would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of employment placed the employee in a position where he or she was injured." View "City of Brighton v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

Kathleen Hopkins retired from the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. During her period of employment, the Department made contributions to her retirement fund, and once she retired, she began taking retirement payments from that fund. Later, she went to work for the Department again. When she was laid off from this second period of employment, she applied for and was awarded unemployment benefits. Benefits were discontinued and she was issued a notice of overpayment. She appealed the notice and a hearing officer restored her benefits. The Department appealed, and a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) reversed the hearing officer's decision, reasoning that Hopkins was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because her retirement income exceeded the amount of the unemployment. Hopkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the offset provision applied only when the employer contributed to the claimant's retirement fund during the base period of employment that made her eligible for unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and reversed, finding that the offset provision applied any time the employer has contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant received payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Colorado Dept. of Labor & Employment" on Justia Law

Petitioner Accord Human Resources, Inc. (Accord) is a professional employer organization that transacts business in Colorado along with four related entities. In 2004, Accord transferred a portion of its Colorado employees to another Accord entity with a lower unemployment tax rate and in doing so, reduced its unemployment tax burden. The Colorado Division of Employment and Training determined that it had authority to treat the various Accord entities as one for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes, thus erasing any tax advantage that could be gained through the employee transfer. Under this rationale, the Division issued a delinquent tax notice to Accord. Accord appealed, and the hearing officer reversed. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's Final Order and reinstated the hearing officer's decision. The Division sought to reverse the court of appeals decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, finding that nothing gave the Division authority to combine separate employer tax accounts into one account for purposes of assessing unemployment taxes.

Petitioner Lucht's Concrete Pumping sought to enforce a non-compete agreement signed by Respondent Tracy Horner, a former at-will employee. Because Mr. Horner was an at-will employee at the time he signed the agreement, Lucht's argued that its forbearance from terminating Mr. Horner constituted adequate consideration for the non-compete agreement. The appellate court held that continued employment did not constitute adequate consideration once an employee started working for an employer because the employee is in the same position as he was before he signed the agreement. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that an employer that forbears from terminating an existing at-will employee forbears from exercising a legal right, and that constitutes adequate consideration. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.