Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Tammie Terrell, an African-American nurse, applied for a Chief Nurse position at the James A. Haley Veterans’ Hospital but was not selected. She sued the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under Title VII, alleging race and national-origin discrimination, retaliation, and a discriminatory and retaliatory hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Terrell failed to provide evidence that her race or national origin was a but-for cause of her non-selection or that it tainted the hiring process. The court also found that Terrell did not engage in any protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity that could form the basis for a retaliation claim. Furthermore, the court found that Terrell did not provide evidence that she experienced a hostile work environment due to her race, national origin, or EEO activity.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Terrell's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, finding that Terrell was attempting to relitigate her case and present evidence that she could have raised at the summary-judgment stage. View "Terrell v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Matthew Meinecke, a devout Christian, was arrested twice by Seattle police for refusing to move from public locations where he was reading Bible passages. The first incident occurred at an abortion rally and the second at an LGBTQ pride event. In both instances, Meinecke was asked to move after attendees began to physically assault him. Instead of dealing with the perpetrators, the police arrested Meinecke for obstruction. Meinecke sued the City of Seattle and certain Seattle police officers, seeking to prevent them from enforcing "time, place, and manner" restrictions and applying the City’s obstruction ordinance to eliminate protected speech in traditional public fora whenever they believe individuals opposing the speech will act hostile toward it.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied Meinecke's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, reasoning that the officers' actions were content neutral and did not aim to silence Meinecke. The court also expressed concern about the vague request for injunctive relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Meinecke has standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief, given that the City has twice enforced its obstruction ordinance against him, he has stated that he will continue his evangelizing efforts at future public events, and the City has communicated that it may file charges against him for doing so. The court found that Meinecke established a likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claim. The restrictions on his speech were content-based heckler’s vetoes, where officers curbed his speech once the audience’s hostile reaction manifested. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that there were several less speech-restrictive alternatives to achieve public safety, such as requiring protesters to take a step back, calling for more officers, or arresting the individuals who ultimately assaulted Meinecke. The court also held that Meineke established irreparable harm because a loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes an irreparable injury, and the balance of equities and public interest favors Meinecke. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction consistent with this opinion in favor of Meinecke. View "Meinecke v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) by four parents who were convicted of sex offenses and were on mandatory supervised release (MSR). The plaintiffs challenged an IDOC policy that restricts contact between a parent convicted of a sex offense and their minor child while the parent is on MSR. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violates their Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process.The district court upheld the policy, with two exceptions. It ruled that the policy's ban on written communications was unconstitutional and that IDOC must allow a parent to submit a written communication addressed to their child for review and decision within seven calendar days. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the policy's restrictions on phone and in-person contact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the district court that the policy does not violate procedural due process. However, it held that the policy's ban on phone contact violates substantive due process. The court found that call monitoring is a ready alternative to the phone-contact ban that accommodates the plaintiffs’ right to enjoy the companionship of their children at a de minimis cost to IDOC’s penological interests. View "Montoya v. Jeffreys" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Victor Ramirez, who was pulled over by police officers for traffic violations. Recognizing Ramirez as a gang member from a previous encounter, one of the officers asked him about his parole status. Ramirez confirmed he was on parole for a firearm-related offense. During the stop, the officers discovered a loaded firearm in Ramirez's car. Ramirez was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon.Ramirez moved to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop by asking about his parole status, which he claimed was unrelated to the traffic stop. The district court denied Ramirez's motion to suppress, and Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that asking about parole status during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as it reasonably relates to the officer's safety and imposes a negligible burden. The court also remanded the case in part so that the district court could correct the written judgment to conform it to the oral pronouncement of sentence. View "United States V. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The case involves an action filed by Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney Lawrence Haskell against Jilma Meneses, the secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The Prosecutor sought a writ of mandamus directing Meneses to comply with statutory duties under chapter 10.77 RCW and timely provide competency services in criminal proceedings. The case specifically concerned three categories of Spokane County defendants in felony criminal proceedings ordered to receive competency services from DSHS.Previously, a class action was filed in federal court, challenging DSHS's delays in providing competency services to criminal defendants in pretrial custody. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held these delays violated the class members’ due process rights and issued a permanent injunction against DSHS. The injunction set strict time limits for providing competency services to defendants in pretrial custody, appointed a special court monitor, and began oversight of DSHS’s efforts to comply with the injunction.In the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, DSHS argued that the court must dismiss the petition for lack of original jurisdiction because the secretary is not a state officer within the meaning of the state constitution. The court agreed with DSHS, concluding that the secretary is not a state officer. The court reasoned that a state officer must be elected, subject to impeachment, and granted a State sovereign power, none of which applied to the secretary. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Spokane County v. Meneses" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an employer's vicarious liability under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) for an employee's discriminatory behavior towards a customer. The plaintiffs, Tiffany Vargas and Erika Acevedo, alleged that they were subjected to racial discrimination by an employee of Riverbend Management, LLC, at a McDonald's restaurant owned and operated by Riverbend. The employee, Andrew Mosley, used a racial slur against Vargas and Acevedo.The case was initially filed with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which issued a right-to-sue letter, allowing the plaintiffs to commence an action in the Superior Court. Riverbend filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was not vicariously liable for the race discrimination committed by its employee. The court partially granted the motion, entering judgment in favor of Riverbend on the gender discrimination claim but denied summary judgment on the race-discrimination claim.After a bench trial, the court found that while Mosley violated the MHRA when he used a racial slur against Vargas and Acevedo, Riverbend was not vicariously liable for Mosley’s actions. The court relied on both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third) of Agency in reaching its conclusion. Vargas and Acevedo appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court applied the Third Restatement's standard for determining an employer’s vicarious liability under the MHRA for an employee’s act of discrimination against a customer. The court found that Mosley's discriminatory act reflected an independent course of conduct "not actuated by a purpose to serve" Riverbend, and therefore, Riverbend was not vicariously liable for Mosley’s conduct. View "Vargas v. Riverben Management LLC" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the death of Susan Teel, who was shot by Deputy Jonathan Lozada during a suicide attempt at her home. Dr. Dudley Teel, Susan's husband and the personal representative of her estate, sued Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff of Indian River County, alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff, but the decision was partially reversed and vacated in an earlier appeal. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment on the Monell claim, and the excessive force claim proceeded to trial. The jury found that Deputy Lozada did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Estate appealed the grant of summary judgment on the Monell claim, two of the district court’s jury instructions, and one of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. The Court held that the district court had wide discretion to modify the jury instructions to make them understandable for the jury. The Court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Deputy Lozada's prior misconduct. Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff on the Monell claim, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. View "Teel v. Lozada" on Justia Law

The case involves Songie Adebiyi, a former Vice President of Student Services at South Suburban College in Illinois, who was terminated in 2019 due to alleged performance issues. Adebiyi claimed that her termination was in retaliation for filing a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. She sued the college and its president, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to the college and its president, ruling that Adebiyi failed to show a causal link between her charge of discrimination and her termination. The court found that the evidence did not support Adebiyi’s retaliation claim. Adebiyi appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her Title VII retaliation claim and abused its discretion when it denied her motion to amend the complaint and seek more discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's finding that Adebiyi failed to demonstrate a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. The court found no evidence of pretext in the college's reasons for termination or suspicious timing between Adebiyi's filing of her EEOC and IDHR charge and her termination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Adebiyi's motion to file an amended complaint and take additional discovery. View "Adebiyi v. South Suburban College" on Justia Law

On July 4, 2021, Gavin Wallmow was arrested for violating his probation and was taken to Oneida County jail. During his booking, Wallmow denied any suicidal tendencies or mental health issues. Two days later, Wallmow's probation officer visited him and noticed a change in his behavior, including him hitting himself and expressing "demonic" thoughts. The officer reported this to a corrections officer at the jail, who then informed her superior. Despite these reports, Wallmow was observed behaving normally during routine checks. On July 8, Wallmow was found unresponsive in his cell, having committed suicide. His estate brought a series of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the jailers failed to protect Wallmow from himself.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the record did not support an inference that any defendant knew Wallmow faced a serious risk of harm. The court also found no reason to think the County's policies were inadequate, given the absence of any pattern of suicides to put it on notice.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the jail's employees had taken reasonable precautions, including checking on Wallmow at least 37 times per day. The court also noted that Wallmow had thrice disavowed any risk of suicide, and nothing indicated otherwise after his talk with his probation officer. The court concluded that the jail's actions complied with the Constitution's requirements. View "Estate of Wallmow v. Oneida County, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Albert Bustillos, an independent journalist, was filming content for his YouTube channel outside the Navajo oil refinery in Artesia, New Mexico. He was approached by refinery security and later by officers from the Artesia Police Department, including Corporal David Bailey. Despite Bustillos asserting he was on public property and had not broken any laws, Bailey arrested him for failure to identify himself in violation of New Mexico law.Bustillos sued Bailey and the City of Artesia, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights and New Mexico law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bailey was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, rejecting Bailey’s qualified immunity defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court found that Bailey lacked reasonable suspicion of a predicate crime, which is required to lawfully arrest someone for concealing identity. The court also found that Bustillos had met his burden to show that Bailey violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court dismissed the portion of the appeal relating to Bustillos’s state-law claims, as the defendants had failed to meet their burden to support pendent appellate jurisdiction. View "Bustillos v. City of Artesia" on Justia Law