Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted former United States Postal Service employee Robert Hamilton of three counts of making a false or fraudulent statement for the purpose of obtaining compensation under the California workers' compensation law. On appeal, Hamilton argued: (1) because, as a federal employee, his workers' compensation benefits were provided under the Federal Employment Compensation Act, the doctrine of federal preemption barred him from being prosecuted under California law for any offense alleging fraud in obtaining federal workers' compensation benefits under FECA; and (2) regardless of whether the prosecution was preempted, his conviction was supported by insufficient evidence under Insurance Code section 1871.4 (a)(1) because that statute applied only to false or fraudulent statements made for the purpose of obtaining compensation afforded under the California workers' compensation law, which was not applicable to him as a federal employee. On the issue of federal preemption, the Court of Appeal concluded that Hamilton did not meet his burden to establish that the State's prosecution of him was preempted. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court agreed with the State's concession that insufficient evidence supported Hamilton's convictions because he did not receive compensation under the California workers' compensation law. The Court declined to exercise discretion to modify the judgment to impose convictions on a lesser included offense. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed. View "California v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Kileigh Carrington filed a complaint against her former employer, Starbucks Corporation, asserting a representative cause of action under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA). In her suit, she claimed Starbucks failed to properly provide meal breaks or pay meal period premiums for certain employees in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512. In a bifurcated bench trial on plaintiff's action, the trial court determined Starbucks was liable for these violations and imposed penalties of $150,000, with 75 percent thereof payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25 percent payable to Carrington and the employees she represented in the action. The trial court entered judgment in Carrington's favor. Starbucks appealed, arguing Carrington failed to prove she was an aggrieved employee and failed to prove a representative claim. After review, the Court of Appeal found no legal error and find that substantial evidence supported the judgment. View "Carrington v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

As part of an internal affairs investigation regarding the unauthorized disclosure of a confidential police report, the San Diego Police Department (Department) questioned plaintiff/real party Dana Hoover, a detective for the Department, regarding the content of communications between Hoover and an attorney representing her in an employment-related lawsuit against defendant/petitioner City of San Diego. Although Hoover invoked the privilege, the Department directed her to answer the internal affairs questions or face discipline and/or termination of employment. The Court of Appeal found the trial court properly concluded that the City violated the attorney-client privilege when Department investigators insisted Hoover respond to questions despite her invocation of the privilege. A deputy city attorney attending the interview as an observer also violated the California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct when she began questioning Hoover about her lawsuit without the permission of her lawyer in the case. Hoover filed a motion to disqualify the City Attorney in her lawsuit. The Court of Appeal found disqualification of counsel, was a drastic remedy that should be ordered only where the violation of the privilege or other misconduct has a "substantial continuing effect on future judicial proceedings." The Court found the transcript of the internal affairs interview demonstrated that although relevant confidential information could in theory have been elicited in response to the internal affairs questions, in fact no such information was disclosed. Under these circumstances, because "a disqualification order must be prophylactic, not punitive" the drastic remedy of depriving a party of its counsel of choice was unwarranted. The Court issued a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order granting Hoover’s motion to disqualify the San Diego City Attorney. View "City of San Diego v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The superior court challenged the Board's decision that certain court personnel rules and regulations violated the Trial Court Employment Protection and Governance Act, and therefore constituted unfair practices. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Board's decision invalidating the rule prohibiting the distribution of literature during nonworking time in working areas, because the rule was ambiguous. Furthermore, the invalidation of the ambiguous rule did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.The court otherwise set aside the Board's remaining conclusions where the remaining workplace rules were consistent with the state of the law. The court held that a trial court's interest in appearing impartial constitutes special circumstances justifying restrictions on clothing and adornments worn by court employees. The court also held that the solicitation during working hours rule was not ambiguous; and the restriction on displaying writings and images was appropriate. View "Fresno Superior Court v. PERB" on Justia Law

Moustafa applied for a license to be a registered nurse and disclosed she had been convicted of four misdemeanors that were subsequently dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. The Board of Registered Nursing her a probationary license as a result of three of those convictions—two for petty theft and one for vandalism--and the conduct underlying the convictions. Moustafa opposed the restriction. The trial court, relying on Business and Professions Code section 480(c), which bars a licensing board from denying a license “solely on the basis of a conviction that has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4,” ruled in favor of Moustafa. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that until July 2020, when legislation amending section 480 takes effect, the Board may deny or restrict a license based on the conduct underlying a dismissed conviction, but only when the conduct independently qualifies as a basis for denying a license. Conduct does not necessarily so qualify merely because it involves some act of theft, dishonesty, fraud, or deceit. Conduct qualifies only if it substantially relates to the applicant’s fitness to practice nursing. Applying this standard, the Board could restrict Moustafa’s license based on the conduct underlying the petty thefts, but not on the conduct underlying the vandalism. View "Moustafa v. Board of Registered Nursing" on Justia Law

Lindh, a law enforcement officer, took blows to the head during training. He subsequently had severe headaches lasting between several hours and two days. A month later, Lindh suddenly lost most of the vision in his left eye. Two treating physicians did not believe the vision loss was related to the blows. Dr. Kaye, a neuro-ophthalmologist, the Qualified Medical Examiner (QME), agreed with the other physicians, that Lindh’s “blood circulation to his left eye was defective,” absent the injury,” Lindh likely would have retained a lot of his vision. He agreed that even had Lindh not suffered the blows, he could have lost his vision due to this underlying condition; it was “unlikely” Lindh would have suffered a vision loss if he had not had the underlying “vascular spasticity,” a rare condition. His professional opinion was that: 85% of the permanent disability was due to his old condition and 15% was due to the work injury. The ALJ rejected that analysis and found Lindh had 40 percent permanent disability without apportionment between his underlying condition and the work-related injury. The Board affirmed, concluding that the preexisting conditions were mere risk factors for an injury entirely caused by industrial factors; the QME had “confused causation of injury with causation of disability.” The court of appeal ordered an apportioned award. Dr. Kaye’s opinion was consistent with the other physicians' opinions, that it was unlikely the trauma caused the loss of vision. Whether an asymptomatic preexisting condition that contributed to the disability would, alone, have inevitably resulted in disability, is immaterial. View "City of Petaluma v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment brought by defendant AMN Services, LLC (AMN), and denied motions for summary adjudication of one cause of action and one affirmative defense brought by plaintiff Kennedy Donohue, individually and on behalf of five certified plaintiff classes she represented (together Plaintiffs). AMN, a healthcare services and staffing company, recruits nurses for temporary contract assignments. AMN employed Donohue as a nurse recruiter in its San Diego office between September 2012 and February 2014. During the first few weeks of Donohue's employment in September 2012, for any noncompliant meal period, Team Time, AMN's timekeeping system, assumed a Labor Code violation, and the recruiter automatically received the full statutory meal period penalty payment. At all relevant times after mid-September 2012, if a recruiter's meal period was missed, shortened, or delayed, Team Time automatically provided a drop-down menu that required the recruiter's response: if the recruiter indicated that she chose not to take a timely 30-minute meal period, AMN did not pay a meal period penalty; however, if the recruiter indicated that she was not provided the opportunity to take a timely 30-minute meal period, then AMN paid the full statutory meal period penalty. The operative second amended complaint, filed on behalf of Donohue individually and a class of similarly situated AMN employees and former employees, alleged: (1) failure to provide meal and rest periods; (2) failure to pay overtime and minimum wage; (3) improper wage statements; (4) unreimbursed business expenses; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) unfair business practices; and (7) civil penalties authorized by the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). In her appeal, Donohue challenged the grant of AMN's motion for summary judgment and the denial of her motion for summary adjudication of one of the causes of action. On appeal, Donohue also challenged what she characterized as the trial court's "fail[ure] to hear a proper motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment and summary adjudication rulings. After review, the Court of Appeal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the rejection of Donohue's motion for reconsideration; the Court found no issues of material facts and affirmed summary judgment in favor of AMN. View "Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Wilmot commenced employment with the Fire Protection District in 1985. He was a member of the retirement program, administered by the Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association (CCERA). In 2012, Wilmot decided to retire. His final day on the job was December 12; he applied for a service retirement” to CCERA the following day. On January 1, 2013, the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act took effect, mandating the complete or partial forfeiture of pension benefits/payments if a public employee is convicted of “any felony under state or federal law for conduct arising out of or in the performance of his or her official duties.” (Gov. Code 7522.72(b)(1).) In February 2013, Wilmot was indicted. In April 2013, the CCERA approved his retirement application, fixing Wilmot’s actual retirement as December 13, 2012. Wilmot began receiving pension checks. In December 2015, pled guilty to embezzling county funds for 12 years, ending in December 2012. CCERA reduced Wilmot’s monthly check in accordance with the forfeiture provision. The court of appeal held that the forfeiture provision applies to Wilmot and declined to address whether it would amount to an unconstitutional impairment of his employment contract or an ex post facto law for someone in a different situation. Finishing the last day of work does not automatically make a public employee a “retired” former employee. View "Wilmot v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued a staffing company that provided employees for public recycling facilities under contracts with Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts, in a class action under the Labor Code. The trial court found that the prevailing wage law did not apply and the Labor Code section 226.7 remedy was the exclusive remedy for shortened meal periods, an additional hour of pay at their regular rate. The court of appeal reversed. The prevailing wage law applies; plaintiffs were engaged in “public work” within the meaning of the Labor Code. The amount of back pay to which plaintiffs are entitled for that violation, and whether plaintiffs are entitled to additional damages arising from the breach, are matters for the trial court on remand. The remedy for improper shortening of meal periods consists of one additional hour of pay for every shortened meal period under section 226.7 plus payment of wages for actual time worked during the shortened meal period. Plaintiffs are not entitled to be compensated for the time during which they were free from employer control. Because plaintiffs were entitled to wages for actual time they were required to work during their meal periods, defendants may be subject to “waiting time penalties” that apply when an employer willfully fails to pay any wages of an employee who is discharged or quits (section 203(a)). Defendants are also subject to civil penalties (section 1197.1) for payment of wages less than the legal minimum. View "Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were class representatives of current and former employees of defendant Pacific Bell Telephone Company who installed and repaired video and internet services in customers’ homes. They appealed a judgment in favor of defendant following cross-motions for summary judgment or summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought compensation for the time they spent traveling in an employer-provided vehicle--loaded with equipment and tools--between their homes and a customer’s residence (the worksite) under an optional and voluntary Home Dispatch Program. The trial court, like federal courts that have considered the question under California law, concluded the travel time was not compensable. The Court of Appeal agree and affirmed, finding: (1) the Home Dispatch Program was not compulsory; and (2) simply transporting tools and equipment during commute time was not compensable work where no effort or extra time is required to effectuate the transport. View "Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co." on Justia Law