Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After EDI assigned plaintiffs to pack produce for San Miguel Produce, plaintiffs filed suit against San Miguel for labor law violations. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of EDI and San Miguel's joint motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration was mandated. The court held that EDI and San Miguel were co-employers with an identity of interests and mutual responsibility for complying with state law governing employers in the produce packing industry, and it was inconsequential that plaintiffs chose not to name EDI as a defendant. In this case, plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising from their employment and, at all relevant times, EDI was plaintiffs' employer. The court remanded with directions to stay the court proceedings and to order the parties to arbitrate their dispute. View "Vasquez v. San Miguel Produce, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for having brought to the attention of Defendant’s management and the Board of Equalization defendant’s failure to pay use taxes (Labor Code section 1102.5). Proceeding as if the case turned on whether Plaintiff correctly accused Defendant of failing to pay use taxes, Plaintiff pursued and Defendant resisted efforts to obtain copies of Defendant’s tax returns. The court of appeal held that Defendant had not “waived the privilege against forced disclosure of tax returns” and that no exception to that privilege applied. In moving for summary judgment Defendant did not address Plaintiff’s allegation that she was terminated in retaliation for raising the tax-avoidance issue, nor did it seek to establish an affirmative defense to the claim. The motion was granted on the theory that Plaintiff could not prove her case without the tax returns. The court of appeal reversed. Defendant made no attempt to demonstrate that the reason Plaintiff was discharged was not the reason she alleges, nor has it argued that discharge for that reason would not violate section 1102.5(b) or fundamental public policy. Firing a “whistleblower” for complaining of the employer’s willful failure to pay taxes that are due would support a right to relief under both of Plaintiff’s causes of action. View "Siri v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick Theodore Rall III, a political cartoonist and blogger, filed suit against the Los Angeles Times after it published a "note to readers" and a later more detailed report questioning the accuracy of a blog post plaintiff wrote for The Times. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motions to strike the complaint.The court held that The Times' articles were published in a public forum and concerned issues of public interest, and thus the written statements were protected free speech activity. Furthermore, the articles were absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), because they were a fair and true report of an LAPD investigation that was central to the substance of the articles. Therefore, plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. In regard to plaintiff's wrongful termination claims, the court held that plaintiff's employment claims arose directly from The Times's protected First Amendment conduct: deciding not to publish plaintiff's work. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his employment claims. View "Rall v. Tribune 365 LLC" on Justia Law

Southwestern Community College District (District) and its governing board (Board) (together Southwestern) demoted Arlie Ricasa from an academic administrator position to a faculty position on the grounds of moral turpitude, immoral conduct, and unfitness to serve in her then-current role. While employed by Southwestern as the director of Student Development and Health Services (DSD), Ricasa also served as an elected board member of a separate entity, the Sweetwater Union High School District (SUHSD). The largest number of incoming District students were from SUHSD, and the community viewed the school districts as having significant ties. As a SUHSD board member, Ricasa voted on million-dollar vendor contracts to construction companies, such as Seville Group, Inc. (SGI) and Gilbane Construction Company, who ultimately co-managed a bond project for the SUHSD. Before and after SGI received this contract, Ricasa went to dinners with SGI members that she did not disclose on her Form 700. Ricasa's daughter also received a scholarship from SGI to attend a student leadership conference that Ricasa did not report on her "Form 700." In December 2013, Ricasa pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor count of violating the Political Reform Act, which prohibited board members of local agencies from receiving gifts from a single source in excess of $420. Ricasa filed two petitions for writs of administrative mandamus in the trial court seeking, among other things, to set aside the demotion and reinstate her as an academic administrator. Ricasa appealed the denial of her petitions, arguing the demotion occurred in violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act) because Southwestern failed to provide her with 24 hours' notice of the hearing at which it heard charges against her, as required by Government Code section 54957. Alternatively, she argued the demotion was unconstitutional because no nexus existed between her alleged misconduct and her fitness to serve as academic administrator. Southwestern also appealed, arguing that the trial court made two legal errors when it: (1) held that Southwestern was required to give 24-hour notice under the Brown Act prior to conducting a closed session at which it voted to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and (2) enjoined Southwestern from committing future Brown Act violations. The Court of Appeal concluded Southwestern did not violate the Brown Act, and that substantial evidence supported Ricasa's demotion. However, the Court reversed that part of the judgment enjoining Southwestern from future Brown Act violations. View "Ricasa v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant Tender Heart Home Care for failure to pay overtime wages under the Domestic Worker Bill of Rights (Labor Code 1450, DWBR), which requires that domestic work employees receive overtime wages for all hours worked more than nine hours per day or 45 hours per week. The trial court granted Tender Heart summary adjudication on the DWBR cause of action, finding the undisputed facts demonstrated Plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than an employee of Tender Heart for purposes of the DWBR. The court of appeal reversed. The DWBR contains two alternative definitions of employment: (1) when the hiring entity exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of a domestic worker; or (2) when a common law employment relationship has been formed. The trial court erred in exclusively applying the “common law” test to determine the issue. Under the appropriate tests, there is a dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff was Tender Heart’s employee. The court rejected Tender Heart’s argument that the undisputed facts establish it is a non-employer employment agency. View "Duffey v. Tender Heart Home Care Agency" on Justia Law

Furry sued his former employers East Bay, for unpaid overtime wages, meal and rest break compensation, and statutory penalties for inaccurate wage statements. Although the trial court found that East Bay failed to keep accurate records of Furry’s work hours, it concluded that Furry was not entitled to any relief because his testimony was too uncertain to support a just and reasonable inference that he performed work for which he was not paid. The trial court also found that Furry was provided with uninterrupted meal and rest breaks as required by law. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that it was error to completely deny Furry relief on his overtime claim because imprecise evidence by an employee can provide a sufficient basis for damages when the employer fails to keep accurate records of the employee’s work hours. Furry is not entitled to premium or regular pay for missed meal breaks because he failed to demonstrate that East Bay knew or reasonably should have known he was working through authorized meal breaks. View "Furry v. East Bay Publishing" on Justia Law

Labor Code section 226.2, a recently enacted law articulating wage requirements applicable where an employer uses a piece-rate method of compensating its employees, is not unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeal held that the demurrer was properly sustained as to constitutional challenges to the statute, and the statutory phrase "other nonproductive time" as "time under the employer's control, exclusive of rest and recovery periods, that is not directly related to the activity being compensated on a piece-rate basis" provides an adequately discernable standard that possesses a reasonable degree of specificity. Furthermore, because the substance of the declaratory relief cause of action, to the extent that it went beyond the basic issues the court has clarified, constituted a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion, the court concluded that it was properly dismissed. View "Nisei Farmers League v. California Labor & Workforce Development Agency" on Justia Law

The employer, Luxor Cabs, obtained workers' compensation insurance through AUCRA under an EquityComp program. The EquityComp workers’ compensation insurance program has garnered nationwide attention from administrative agencies and judicial tribunals. In 2016, the California Insurance Commissioner issued an administrative decision concluding that the EquityComp program violated state insurance laws and that the reinsurance participation agreement (RPA) between AUCRA and the insured employer, in that case, was void as a matter of law. In 2018, the Fourth Appellate District came to a similar decision in a case essentially identical to this one involving arbitrability under an RPA. Luxor, unhappy with AUCRA's handling of claims, filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of AUCRA’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of an RPA between an employer, Luxor Cabs, and AUCRA. The trial court properly rejected an argument that the validity of the arbitration clause should, itself, have been referred to arbitration in accordance with the RPA’s “delegation clause.” Both the delegation clause and the arbitration provision in the RPA were void and unenforceable because they each separately constituted an “endorsement” to the Policy which was not properly vetted and approved as required by Insurance Code section 11658. View "Luxor Cabs, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jose Robles, Christopher Rymel, and David Hagins sued defendant Save Mart Supermarkets, Inc., alleging various state law statutory employment claims. After successfully moving to sever, Save Mart moved to compel arbitration as to each plaintiff. The motions were heard together, and the trial court denied the motions by substantively identical orders. Save Mart appealed in each case. The original complaint alleged each plaintiff had been employed as an order selector at Save Mart’s Roseville Distribution Center (Rymel was also a forklift driver). Each alleged an industrial injury and torts stemming from their injuries under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Hagins also alleged he was retaliated against after he reported a workplace safety hazard, purportedly a whistleblower violation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Save Mart alleged plaintiffs were members of Teamsters Local 150 and were employed by Save Mart under a CBA that covered the pleaded disputes. Save Mart argued that resolving the disputes would require interpretation of the CBA or would be “substantially dependent” on such interpretation, that the claims were “inextricably intertwined” with parts of the CBA, and that judicial resolution of them would infringe on the arbitration process set forth in the CBA. Plaintiffs opposed the motions, arguing the pleaded claims did not fall within the scope of the CBA. The Court of Appeal concurred plaintiffs' claims did not require an interpretation of the CBA, and that their claims fell outside the scope of the CBA: "Save Mart explains that disputes about the employee termination and production norm provisions of the CBA are intended to be resolved through grievances. As an abstract proposition we do not disagree. But ...plaintiffs retain an independent (nonnegotiable) state law right to be free of discipline caused by protected activity, such as whistleblowing (Hagins) or exercising his FEHA rights (all plaintiffs)." View "Rymel v. Save Mart Supermarkets" on Justia Law

Howard alleges that Kaggle’s CEO, Goldbloom, three other members of its board of directors and three limited partnerships (the VC defendants)) abused their corporate power and breached their fiduciary duty to him by wrongfully diluting his interest in Kaggle’s stock, transferring its value to themselves through a self-dealing transaction. The defendants sought to compel arbitration of the claims and to stay proceedings, claiming that Howard had signed four separate agreements in which he consented to arbitrate disputes related to Kaggle. Three of the agreements were signed in 2011, when Howard became employed by Kaggle, and the fourth was a separation agreement executed in 2013, after Howard’s employment ended. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the arbitration clauses in the four agreements “go to the terms and interpretation of those agreements and matters released by them. Those employment-related agreements preceded by years the issues pled in the complaint, which do not regard Howard’s employment.” The court of appeal affirmed. This dispute is based on obligations owed to minority shareholders in the company, obligations that are independent of Howard’s employment relationship and hence not subject to arbitration even under a broad understanding of the arbitration clause. View "Howard v. Goldbloom" on Justia Law