Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After 14 years of employment, Clare Byrd received a Notice of Pending Dismissal from her position as Administrative Analyst/Specialist at San Diego State University (SDSU), part of the California State University (CSU) system. In December 2014, SDSU provided Byrd with a Notice which stated that she was dismissed from her employment effective December 15. Byrd then filed a Service Retirement Election Application with CalPERS, with a retirement date of December 31, 2014. CalPERS accepted her application and proposed effective retirement date. Byrd appealed after she was denied by a trial court for writ of mandate and declaratory judgment, asking the court to intervene following the breakdown of a settlement agreement between her and CSU, which the State Personnel Board (SPB) initially approved. But following a refusal to comply with material terms of the settlement by CalPERS, SPB changed its position and rejected the settlement in a decision vacating its prior approval. Among other provisions, the settlement agreement directed that Byrd would be reinstated to a classification with a significantly higher salary, which she had never held, and that she would receive compensation at the higher salary during the period that CSU, with her assistance, would apply for medical retirement benefits. Byrd requested that the trial court compel CalPERS to process her reinstatement at the higher salary level. CalPERS maintained it was unable to do so because Government Code section 21198 only authorized Byrd's reinstatement to a job classification she previously held before her termination. The trial court agreed with CalPERS and denied Byrd's petition. On appeal, Byrd argued section 21198 allowed CalPERS to reinstate Byrd to employment as a straightforward matter and did not require reinstatement to the same specific classification or pay rate. She emphasized that the bargained-for terms of the settlement agreement contemplated a scenario in which Byrd would return to work, at least for a short period, while her application for medical retirement benefits was processed. The Court of Appeal determined that in the typical case, section 21198 directs CalPERS to reinstate an employee who was involuntarily terminated but then returned to that same classification as a result of an administrative or judicial proceeding. There may be atypical circumstances in which an individual can be properly reinstate, but if there are those instances, the statute requires a nexus between the new classification and the underlying dispute. In the absence of any such connection here, the Court found section 21198 prevented CalPERS's compliance with the settlement agreement. View "Byrd v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Pneuma sued a former employee, a competitor that employee went to work for, and a Pneuma investor, alleging several business torts including claims under the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (Pen. Code section 502); for conversion; and for trespass to chattel relating to an internet domain. The investor filed a cross-complaint against Pneuma and its owner alleging they breached their investor agreement. The trial court ruled against Pneuma except on a single cause of action for trespass to chattel and ruled in favor of the investor on his cross-complaint. The court of appeal affirmed. A determination that a party engaged in trespass to chattel in a business context does not, without more, establish that the party engaged in an unlawful business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law. (Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200). View "Pneuma International, Inc. v. Cho" on Justia Law

Christopher Ross appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the County of Riverside on Ross's claims for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and for violation of the provisions in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, sec. 12900 et seq.; FEHA) prohibiting disability discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. Ross worked for the County as a deputy district attorney. He was assigned to the homicide prosecution unit and was "responsible for however many cases were assigned to [him] by [his] supervisor." In May 2013, Ross learned he was exhibiting neurological symptoms that required evaluation and testing to determine whether he had a serious neurological condition, and told his supervisor he might be very seriously ill with a neurodegenerative disease and needed to undergo medical testing. He requested a transfer to another assignment during the testing. His supervisor declined his request, telling him the district attorney's office would worry about his cases and transferring him if and when he found out he could not continue in his position. Ross also asked not to be assigned any new cases until after he completed the medical testing. His supervisor declined this request without explanation. In late September 2013, Ross met with his supervisor, the chief deputy district attorney, and the assistant district attorney to discuss transferring him from the Homicide Unit to the Filing Unit for the next three months because he was not able to go to trial or accept new cases. In the assistant district attorney's view, Ross's inability to accept new cases or go to trial in the near term made him insufficiently productive to be a member of the Homicide Unit. By April 2014, the County wrote Ross explaining that for the County to engage in a good faith interactive process and to evaluate his request for accommodation the County needed medical documentation from an appropriate healthcare professional or from the board-certified specialist selected to perform the fitness-for-duty examination. Through counsel, Ross deemed himself constructively terminated as of the date of the letter. By June 2014, the County considered Ross to have abandoned his job. The Court of Appeal concluded there were triable issues of material fact on the questions of whether Ross engaged in protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5 and whether Ross had a physical disability under the FEHA. The Court therefore reversed judgment as to these claims and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ross v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

After the Department rescinded plaintiff's probationary promotion to lieutenant based on investigatory findings that he had failed to report a use of force several months before the Department promoted him to the probationary position, he filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition for writ of mandate and agreed with the trial court's ruling that the Department's decision to deny plaintiff a promotion was merit-based. The court also held that plaintiff failed to show that the written evaluation detailing his unreported use of force will impact his career adversely in the future apart from the loss of his probationary position. View "Conger v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Christopher Ross appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the County of Riverside on Ross's claims for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and for violation of the provisions in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA) prohibiting disability discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. Ross worked for the County as a deputy district attorney. He sought an accommodation with his work schedule based on a concussion syndrome he was experiencing from previous work in the Military. Supervisors there did not oblige, and Ross sued for violations of the Labor Code section 1102.5, but it was determined he could not establish his claim for disability discrimination because he could not prove he could perform the essential functions of his job. He could not establish his claim for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for the same reasons as well as because he could not prove he had any functional limitations requiring accommodation and his requested accommodation was not reasonable. He could not establish his claim for failure to engage in the interactive process because he did not interact in good faith. And, he could not establish his claim for failure to prevent disability discrimination because he could establish his claims for disability discrimination. Because the Court of Appeal concluded there were triable issues of material fact of the questions of whether Ross engaged in protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5 and whether Ross had a physical disability under the FEHA, it reversed the judgment as to these claims and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ross v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former Safeway employees, appealed the trial court's judgment against them on two causes of action under the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The Court of Appeal affirmed and held that the trial court properly granted Safeway summary adjudication on the UCL claim because plaintiffs failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Safeway's no-premium-wages policy harmed the class members in a manner entitling them to the only UCL remedy plaintiff's sought, viz., restitution. Furthermore, even assuming plaintiffs raised a triable issue regarding whether Safeway took from the class members the value of the statutory guarantee, they failed to raise a triable issue regarding their ability to measure that value. The court also held that the trial court properly struck the PAGA claim because it was untimely. View "Esparza v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 276 and its president, Alan Wagner (collectively, the Union) brought this mandamus petition against the San Joaquin Regional Transit District (the District), alleging the Union had the right to fill by appointment a vacancy on the District’s retirement board, to ensure labor-management parity, as the Union claimed was required by Public Utilities Code section 99159 (or the San Joaquin Regional Transit District Act). The District proposed to conduct an election by all employees (not only union members) to fill the vacancy, claiming that process was required by an earlier statute, section 50150. The trial court denied the petition and the Union timely appealed. After hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeal vacated submission and ordered supplemental briefing, reserving the option to order further argument if we deemed it necessary. After considering all the briefing and argument, the Court found the Union’s position more persuasive, harmonizing the two statutes, avoiding any constitutional question, and was in accord with the use of the term “representative” in federal labor law and the long-standing practice of the parties--the only parties affected by the two statutes. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Amalgamated Transit Union v. San Joaquin Reg. Transit Dist." on Justia Law

After successfully obtaining summary judgment on a lawsuit brought by his former employer, Antonio Cuevas-Martinez sued the employer and their attorney (collectively, respondents) for malicious prosecution. Respondents filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. The trial court granted the motion, concluding Cuevas-Martinez failed to present prima facie evidence respondents filed the lawsuit without probable cause. The court based its ruling on Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (2003), which held the entry of summary judgment on a prior lawsuit for insufficient evidence does not, by itself, establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. On appeal, Cuevas-Martinez argued Jarrow was inapplicable because he did not rely on the mere fact of summary judgment victory, but instead submitted evidence that, if credited by a trier of fact, would support a verdict in his favor. The Court of Appeal agreed Cuevas-Martinez demonstrated his claim has the requisite minimal merit to survive anti- SLAPP scrutiny, and therefore reverse. View "Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc." on Justia Law

An employer's decision to deny or modify a physician's request for specific medical services for an injured employee is subject to review under the "utilization review" process; utilization review is handled by medical experts. Petitioners sought issuance of a writ of review following a decision by the appeals board concerning an employee and her request for heavy housework assistance.The Court of Appeal granted the employer's petition for review because the appeals board acted in excess of its jurisdiction in addressing, on the merits, the issue of home assessment for housekeeping services. The court explained that the Legislature has expressly stated that it was its intent to have medical professionals ultimately determine the necessity of requested treatment. Therefore, the court annulled the decision of the appeals board and remanded with directions for further proceedings. View "Allied Signal Aerospace v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Shawn Bennett sued defendant Rancho California Water District (the District) for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5(b). The matter was tried in front of a jury, and the trial court excluded evidence showing Bennett’s relationship with the District was anything other than an employment relationship. Citing an administrative law judge’s prior finding Bennett had been the District’s employee for purposes of retirement benefits eligibility through the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the trial court concluded the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied and established Bennett had been the District’s employee. To this, the Court of Appeal reversed for a new trial. The Court held a party was not collaterally estopped from litigating an issue when, in a prior proceeding, a dispositive finding had been made, but only by imposing a lesser burden of proof on the party invoking collateral estoppel than that which would have been applied in the subsequent proceeding. The Court found in the prior CalPERS proceeding, the administrative law judge expressly assigned to the District the burden of proving Bennett had been its independent contractor and thereby entirely relieved Bennett of the burden of proof on that issue. The trial court therefore erred by finding the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable and precluding litigation of Bennett’s employment status. At the retrial, the common law definition of employee will apply to Bennett’s section 1102.5(b) claim. View "Bennett v. Rancho Cal. Water Dist." on Justia Law