Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) determined that Ernest Moreno’s retirement benefits had been incorrectly calculated and initiated proceedings to adjust Moreno’s retirement benefits and collect the overpayment. The trial court denied Moreno’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the CalSTRS actions. Moreno appealed, contending: (1) CalSTRS’s adjustment of his retirement benefits and collection of the overpayment were barred by the statute of limitations found in Education Code section 22008 (c) because CalSTRS was on inquiry notice of the problem as early as 2008; and (2) CalSTRS should have been equitably estopped from adjusting his retirement benefits and collecting the overpayments. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) CalSTRS was not on inquiry notice of the reporting error that led to overpayment until December 2014 when it began an audit of Moreno’s retirement benefits, and, therefore, CalSTRS’s adjustments to Moreno’s retirement benefits and collection of overpayments were not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) CalSTRS was not equitably estopped because CalSTRS was not apprised of (or on notice about) the overpayments until December 2014. View "Moreno v. Cal. State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The Icee Company and J & J Snack Foods Corp. (collectively, Icee) appealed a trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a dispute with a former employee. The employee, Taraun Collie, alleged a single cause of action against Icee under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Collie alleged that he worked for Icee from November 2014 to August 2015. When he began his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement. In July 2016, Collie filed his PAGA complaint on behalf of himself and other aggrieved employees. Icee moved to compel arbitration of Collie’s “individual claim” in August 2018. It argued that the parties had agreed to bilateral arbitration only, so Collie had to arbitrate his PAGA cause of action on an individual basis—that is, he could not seek PAGA penalties on behalf of other Icee employees. And because Collie had agreed to arbitrate all claims or controversies with Icee, he had effectively waived his right to bring a PAGA action on behalf of other employees in any forum. The trial court denied Icee’s motion, concluding that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014), required that result. The Court of Appeal concluded that under Iskanian, an employee could not be compelled to arbitrate a PAGA cause of action on the basis of a predispute arbitration agreement, thereby affirming the trial court. View "Collie v. The Icee Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied the petition for review challenging the Board's finding that Gerawan committed unfair labor practices by (1) engaging in bad faith "surface bargaining," and (2) insisting on the exclusion of workers employed by farm labor contractors (FLC workers) from the core benefits of any collective bargaining agreement (CBA) reached between Gerawan and the union. The findings were based on Gerawan's bargaining conduct both before and after the Board ordered the parties to "mandatory mediation and conciliation" (MMC) under the MMC statutory scheme, Labor Code section 1164 et seq.The court held that there is no conflict between the MMC statute and the Alatorre-Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (ALRA) with respect to imposing unfair practice liability for acts arising from the parties' negotiation sessions held outside the mediator's presence; the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole; section 1160 empowers the Board to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges that arise from negotiations outside the mediator's presence during the MMC process, and this necessarily includes the power, should the Board find that a party has engaged in an unfair labor practice, to, among other things, make employees whole "for the loss of pay resulting from the employer’s refusal to bargain;" and because Gerawan has not shown that Board Member Hall had an actual bias or there was an unacceptable risk of bias, the Board did not err when it denied Gerawan's disqualification motion. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Members of IATSE, lighting technicians, filed suit against CMS for wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code incurred in the 2016 production of a television commercial for Ulta Beauty. The superior court granted CMS's motion for summary judgment on the ground that CMS was not an employer of the four IATSE members.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that CMS failed to demonstrate it is not an employer within the meaning of IWC Wage Order No. 12-2001. In this case, CMS has failed to establish the AICP-IATSE Commercial Production Agreement (CPA) permits a signatory to avoid its responsibilities as an employer when it lends its signatory status to a nonsignatory producer. Furthermore, a triable issue of fact exists as to CMS's right to control aspects of the production and its failure to ensure compliance with the CPA. View "Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured while performing work in the Adult Offender Work Program (AOWP), he filed suit against the county for its failure to accommodate his preexisting physical disability and failure to engage in the interactive process under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county. The court held that an individual sentenced to perform work activities in lieu of incarceration in the absence of any financial remuneration, is precluded, as a matter of law, from being an "employee" within the meaning of the FEHA. The court explained that, while remuneration alone is not a sufficient condition to establish an individual is an employee under the statute, it is an essential one. Because plaintiff earned no sufficient financial remuneration as a result of participation in the AOWP, he could not be deemed an employee under the FEHA. The court did not reach plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Talley v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

Saw worked for Avago’s Malaysian subsidiary and could acquire ordinary shares and stock options of Avago stock under a management shareholders' agreement governed by the laws of Singapore. The agreement allowed Avago to repurchase shares and options at fair market value should an employee be terminated “for any reason whatsoever” within five years from the date of purchase. After Saw’s position was eliminated in 2009, Avago repurchased his equitable interest. Saw sued Avago’s subsidiary for wrongful termination and obtained a favorable judgment in Malaysia. Saw separately sued Avago in San Mateo County, asserting that Avago breached the shareholders' agreement by relying on an unlawful termination to repurchase his shares.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Avago. Saw is not entitled to any relief under Singapore law. The shareholders' agreement's choice of law provision requires the application of the substantive law of Singapore. Whether his termination was lawful or unlawful under Malaysian law has no bearing on Avago’s contractual right to repurchase shares acquired by a former employee. Saw’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law under the express terms of the shareholders' agreement. Saw has no viable cause of action under an implied duty of good faith. View "Saw v. Avago Technologies, Ltd." on Justia Law

The parties’ arbitration agreement purported to waive class actions and any “other representative action” (the representative waiver). There was no dispute that this representative waiver was broad enough to cover a Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claim, and was thus invalid. The arbitration agreement went on to provide that the provision containing the class action and representative waiver was not modifiable nor severable. The arbitration agreement also contained a provision that if the representative waiver was found to be invalid, “the Agreement becomes null and void as to the employee(s) who are parties to that particular dispute,” the so-called "blow-up provision." Plaintiff Nichole Kec brought individual, class, and PAGA claims against defendants R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Reynolds American Inc., and three individual employees at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, alleging in essence, that she and others were misclassified as exempt employees, resulting in various violations of the Labor Code. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Reynolds American Inc., moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims except the PAGA claim. The court granted the motion. The court reasoned: (1) because defendants had not asked the court to rule on the enforceability of the representative waiver, it had not found the representative waiver invalid, and thus the blow-up provision had not been triggered; and (2) the blow-up provision could apply only to the attempted waiver of the PAGA claim, not to the arbitrability of plaintiff’s claims under the Labor Code. The Court of Appeal concluded defendants could not selectively enforce the arbitration agreement in a manner that defeated its goals. "Had the parties intended to permit defendants to proceed with arbitration notwithstanding an invalid waiver of representative claims, they would have simply made that provision severable, like every other term in the agreement. But that is not what they did. Instead, by specifically making section 5 not severable, the agreement evinces an intent not to allow defendants to selectively enforce the arbitration agreement." The Court issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate its order granting arbitration, and to enter a new order denying the motion in its entirety. View "Kec v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The lack of initials next to a jury waiver contained in an arbitration agreement, even though the drafter included lines for the initials, is of no legal consequence in this case.After plaintiff filed an employment-related suit against BaronHR, BaronHR moved to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration because the language of the agreement between the parties establishes their mutual assent to submit employment-related disputes to arbitration and to waive the right to a jury trial. Furthermore, plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the agreement and thus he is deemed to have assented to its terms. The court stated that the fact that plaintiff did not also initial the subject paragraph does not provide a basis for concluding the parties did not mutually assent to the arbitration agreement. View "Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc." on Justia Law

David worked as an RN at QVMC from 2005-2015, as an hourly employee. David clocked in and out of work using an electronic timekeeping system that automatically rounded time entries up or down to the nearest quarter-hour. After her employment ended, David sued QVMC alleging failure to provide meal and rest periods, and failure to pay minimum wages. David claimed she was not paid for hours worked off-the-clock, such as when she performed charting work, and when her meal and rest periods were interrupted by co-workers and charge nurses who asked her work-related questions. David also claimed she was not paid all wages because of the hospital’s time-rounding policy. QVMC argued that whenever David reported a missed break, she received an extra hour of pay and that it could not be held liable for missed meal or rest periods of which it was unaware. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of QVMC. QVMC’s rounding policy is neutral on its face and rounds all employee time punches to the nearest quarter-hour without consideration of whether the employer or employee is benefitting from the rounding. QVMC provided the breaks required by law: an employer is not obligated to police those breaks and ensure no work is performed. View "David v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center" on Justia Law

The county petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse an administrative hearing decision in favor of plaintiffs, two sheriff's deputies, who alleged that their reassignments violated both the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the county and the employee organization, and an established past practice that deputies would not be involuntarily reassigned in the absence of disciplinary issues, documented performance issues, layoffs, or pending disability retirement.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision granting the petition, holding that the arbitrator who heard the matter abused his discretion because his findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, plaintiffs failed to establish a violation by the county of the express terms of the MOU; the association failed to establish that the MOU was ambiguous or silent regarding reassignment of employees, and therefore there was no need to consider the past practices of the parties to determine whether the county violated its obligation to negotiate a change in practice; substantial evidence did not establish an unequivocal and clearly enunciated past practice that the department would not make involuntary transfers in the absence of a disciplinary action, documented performance issue, layoff, or pending disability retirement; the arbitrators finding that a binding past practice existed is unsupported by the record; and substantial evidence does not support a finding that the department made a unilateral change in its own established past practice when it reassigned plaintiffs out of their specialty assignments and back to patrol against their wishes. View "County of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Assoc." on Justia Law